Loyal peripherals? The interactive effects of identification and peripheral group membership on deviance from non-beneficial ingroup norms

For ensuring the well-being of groups, people are needed who deviate from ingroup norms that harm the group (“loyal deviance”). Qualifying previous results that loyal deviants have to be highly identified with the group, we hypothesize and show that this is only true when group members at the same time feel that they are highly prototypical for the group. No such effects occurred for peripheral members. In all three studies (N1 = 207, N2 = 115, N3 = 107), we measured people's intention to conform to a non-beneficial (vs. beneficial; Study 1) ingroup norm, self-investment in the group, and perceived (manipulated in Study 3) marginalization. Obviously, dissent from non-beneficial norms requires both a deep psychological investment in the group as well as secure ingroup membership. Implications are discussed.     

Exposure to national flags reduces tax evasion: Evidence from the United States,Australia, and Britain

There have been numerous theories from numerous academic fields explaining why individuals engage in tax evasion. Drawing broadly on Social Identity Theory, we predict that exposure to one's national flag can reduce tax evasion by making salient one's national identity, motivating one to sacrifice one's self-interests for one's country—which would presumably include paying one's fair share of taxes. In three experiments, we found that exposure to American, Australian, and British flags reduced Americans', Australians', and Britons' tax evasion in financially incentivized tasks (Experiments 1, 3) and increased tax-paying attitudes (Experiment 2). The effects arose because flag primes made salient participants' national identities that then motivated them to help their country. We ruled out social norms and trust in authorities as alternative explanations. As such, flag primes might reduce tax evasion and in doing so improve the economic and societal welfare of a country.     

Active desire

Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by behavioral and neural data which indicate that imagining can either strengthen or weaken our existing desires. Arguably, this influence is made possible by our capacity to imaginatively elaborate on the content of our desires. This gives a reason to think that what we desire is partially under our control. It is under our control only partially because we can influence our desires insofar as their content appears appealing to us in imagination.     

Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action–outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress–outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.     

Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task: Comparing human and machine co-agents

Recent studies have suggested that individuals are not able to develop a sense of joint agency during joint actions with artificial systems. We sought to examine whether this lack of joint agency is linked to individuals’ inability to co-represent the machine-generated actions. Fifteen participants observed or performed a Simon response time task either individually, or jointly with another human or a computer. Participants reported the time interval between their response (or the co-actor response) and a subsequent auditory stimulus, which served as an implicit measure of participants’ sense of agency. Participants’ reaction times showed a classical Simon effect when they were partnered with another human, but not when they collaborated with a computer. Furthermore, participants showed a vicarious sense of agency when co-acting with another human agent but not with a computer. This absence of vicarious sense of agency during human-computer interactions and the relation with action co-representation are discussed.     

Interactions of reading and semantics along the ventral visual processing stream

Converging evidence supports a distributed-plus-hub view of semantic processing, in which there are distributed modular semantic sub-systems (e.g., for shape, colour, and action) connected to an amodal semantic hub. Furthermore, object semantic processing of colour and shape, and lexical reading and identification, are processed mainly along the ventral stream, while action semantic processing occurs mainly along the dorsal stream. In Experiment 1, participants read a prime word that required imagining either the object or action referent, and then named a lexical word target. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants performed a lexical decision task (LDT) with the same targets as in Experiment 1, in the presence of foils that were legal nonwords (NW; Experiment 2) or pseudohomophones (PH; Experiment 3). Semantic priming was similar in effect size regardless of prime type for naming, but was greater for object primes than action primes for the LDT with PH foils, suggesting a shared-stream advantage when the task demands focus on orthographic lexical processing. These experiments extend the distributed-plus-hub model, and provide a novel paradigm for further research.     

Reiki as surrender: evidence of an external authority

In this article I explore the concept of surrender and its significance for Reiki practitioners. Reiki is a hands-on healing method with roots in spiritual practice. The term ‘surrender’ has been emphasised, not always explicitly, by Reiki practitioners in Britain. I posit that surrender within the Reiki context is indicative of an external authority and source of significance. This contributes to previous literature regarding internal self-authority or non-formative social authority and shows that an external authority provides a third form of influence for practitioners. I explicate the idea of surrender and demonstrate that the object of that surrender, understood as reiki energy, has agency and that the power of this agency is operationalised through authority. In effect, surrender illuminates a consideration of reiki as an agential external authority which is legitimised through practice and training, allowing for new forms of a transformed identity and a sense of freedom and autonomy from hegemonic discourses.     

视频游戏中的化身认同

化身认同是个体在使用和体验游戏化身的过程中,自我知觉发生暂时性改变,并与化身在情绪和认知上的联系暂时加强的心理现象,它为理解化身效应提供了新视角。目前,化身认同的测量模型主要有三维和四维结构模型,其神经机制也得到初步揭示。影响化身认同的因素主要包括游戏自身特点和个体因素。影响效果方面,化身认同与游戏体验、游戏成瘾、攻击行为和自我同一性的关系是目前关注的焦点。未来的研究,仍需深入探讨化身认同的概念与结构,研发更加有效的测量工具,拓展研究方法,丰富研究变量,并加强应用研究。