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961.
权变管理理论与《易经》哲学思考 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
随着全球经济一体化的日益深入,组织所面临的内外环境更加复杂.权变管理理论对组织的决策、计划、领导等方面的作用越来越受到人们的重视,本文将结合《易经》哲学的一些观点从变化观、系统观、过程观等方面对权变管理理论进行探讨. 相似文献
962.
本文从利益调适、人生心态、人生意志、人生消费等多方面论证了加强人生观研究是构建社会主义和谐社会的内在需要,并在此基础上提出了社会主义和谐社会需要确立利益兼顾、诚信友爱、进取而又平和、身心和谐的人生观。作者还提出,建设社会主义和谐社会的人生观可以从中外文明中汲取宝贵的精神滋养. 相似文献
963.
Zhengyu Sun 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):124-132
To explore the development of contemporary Chinese philosophy, fundamentally, is to explore the development of Marxist philosophy
in contemporary China. The disputes over philosophical views in Chinese academic circles during the first half of the twentieth
century have been focused on understanding Marxist philosophy from such aspects as “what kind of philosophy Chinese society
needs,” “the relation of philosophy to science,” and “philosophy as an idea to reflect on one’s life.” These explorations
have provided us a significant ideological insight into the development of Marxist philosophy and contemporary Chinese philosophy;
that is, in contemporary China, Marxist philosophy, as a doctrine of the liberation and all-round development of human beings,
exists not only as a kind of “doctrine” or “academy” but also as a kind of widely accepted “xueyuan (academic cultivations)” among people.
Translated by Zhao Zhiyi from Jourmal of Jilin University (Social Sciences), 2005:1 相似文献
964.
Qingzhong Yang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(4):572-593
The existence of the Dao 道 (the Way), according to the Yizhuan 易传 (the Commentary), is something intangible. The connotation of the Dao is the law of change caused by the interaction between yin and yang. The main functions of the Dao are “to change” and “to generate”. The intangible refers to the law of change caused by the interaction between yin and yang, and the law is expressed by the divinatory symbolic system (卦爻符号, the trigrams or hexagrams). It is through the unique permutation
of yin and yang lines of a trigram or hexagram that the law of change is explained as a universal model uniting celestial, terrestrial and
human laws. The symbolic system is used to express the universal nature of continual generation of life.
__________
Translated from Zhongguo Zhexue Shi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy), 2005(4) by Yun Yufen 相似文献
965.
Nanshi Wang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(2):245-253
Dialectics is essentially the method or logos in which categories of forms are combined to explain things. Dialectics was developed because reason faces difficulties in
grasping the sensible world. Practical wisdom is knowledge about some things or certain person or persons because of its variable
objects. But it is not entirely specific or only about a particular thing and without universality in any sense. As one kind
of dialectics, it combines various elements to accord with the right logos, similar to the way in which various forms are combined in theory. Therefore practical wisdom as a combination or polymerization
of elements can be regarded as another kind of logic, namely practical logic or dialectics.
__________
Translated from Zhexue Dongtai 哲学动态 (Philosophical Trends), 2005 (4) by Xie Yongkang 相似文献
966.
Xiaogang Ke 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):51-59
From a phenomenological perspective of game-space and horizon, this paper tries to make a deconstructive reading of Hegel’s
“two galleries”, namely, “the gallery of opinions” and “the gallery of knowledge”, which are mentioned in the introduction
of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The reading shows that the Game-space or the ab-gruendiger
Grund of the Hegelian concept of philosophical history lies in an originally differencing space that is keeping in absence, which
is called by Edmund Husserl and Jacques Derrida “the gallery of Dresden”.
Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu, 2005:6 相似文献
967.
Junping Liu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(4):517-538
The terminology tianxia has both historical evolution and cultural and philosophical connotations. This concept not only denotes a geographical and
spatial meaning, but also implies the moral construct of metaphysics. A systematic study of its historical and cultural repercussions
can show that the evolution of the meaning “tianxia” not only embodies the cosmological construction, moral belief and self-identity of the Chinese nation, but also manifests
the historical processes of modern China evolving from “tianxia” to a modern nation-state. Meanwhile, the deconstruction of the tianxia cosmology has shattered the old Chinese concept of a single united tianxia, or the whole world under one Heaven. Also, “Confucian China” has been increasingly losing its vitality and strong hold on
the people, while the concept of nation-state has gained its way into people’s consciousness, which has added more diversity
and open-mindedness to the concept of tianxia.
__________
Translated from Wenshizhe 文史哲 (Literature, History and Philosophy), 2004 (6) by Huang Deyuan 相似文献
968.
Michael R. Matthews 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》1990,10(1):93-97
This paper describes an attempt to introduce philosophy and history of science to pre-service science teachers. I argue briefly for the view that science in the schools cannot be taught without implicitly assuming a particular philosophy of science. Therefore, both philosophy and history of science are necessary components of undergraduate science education courses. 相似文献
969.
Henri Joly 《Argumentation》1990,4(1):5-33
Rhetoric is at present the object of a rehabilitation on a grand scale, all the more as it overlaps the fields of literature, linguistics, and philosophy. Actually, if philosophy rejects and removes rhetoric, it is nevertheless, as a method of word, wholly impregnated with it. To investigate the complex relationship of mutual implication in which rhetoric and philosophy are involved is part and parcel of this plan of re-evaluation of rhetoric as “discourse art” with a view to a re-definition of its field and functions. In this perspective, rhetoric articulates itself within, in relation to, and with Plato's dialogues in a much more subtle and complex manner than warranted by the process of “anti-rhetoricalness” initiated by philosophy against rhetoric after Plato. Going back to the origins of this conflict and recalling the system of oppositions supporting the official Platonic vulgate, this study begins to pave the way for a micr-reading of the Platonic text regarded as a paradigm of philosophic textuality. It is certainly true that the Phaedrus, the Gorgias, and the Symposium set up a system of oppositions between between rhetoric and dialectrics which are in contrast with each other in the word practices, in the rules and methods of discourse, and which are antinomic in their ends. This system of oppositions always seems to be referable to the opposition between “speaking fair” and “speaking the truth”. But the strategies and procedures set going in the Symposium, in particular in “Agathon's speech” and in “Diotima and Socrates' speech” betray a much closer connection between the supposed “bad rhetoric” revealed by Phaedrus and the “good rhetoric” which is dialectrics. The search for this connection is conducted through two types of reading of the Symposium. In actual fact, between the paronomasia on the agathoi and that on “Gorgias' head” (this Gorgon of rhetoric) there takes place a speech, Agathon's, whose parodied, exacerbated, and counterfeit rhetoric allows us to gauge Plato's own rhetoric in this artefact which distances itself, more or less openly, from Gorgian rhetoric. This “hyper-rhetoricalness” and “over-grammaticalness” cannot be there with the sole aim of serving as evidence against rhetoric. It is in fact possible to perceive through the web of the text the ends, quite rhetorical themselves, which preside over the structure of Agathon's speech, seen from the viewpoint of the figure of the antithesis. Thus, it is in the play of a “neo-rhetoricalness” where we must, in the last analysis, look for the spring allowing the philosophical discourse to overturn the rhetorical one. And while in Giorgias what clothes the discourse is actually the truth, in Plato it is the antinomy between “speaking fair” and “speaking the truth”, conveniently set up, which forms the basis of the function of diversion by which Socrates points out — in the complex network of the continuity and discontinuity existing between rhetoric and philosophy — the structures of reversal and the original upheavals which Plato imposes on the relation between rhetorical and dialectric discourse. Actually, dialectrics is found in “Socrates and Diotima's speech”, not as “anti-rhetoric”, but rather as a “transposition” of the rhetorical discourse, thus acquiring the traits of a “neo-rhetoric”. The analysis of this discourse, which constitutes the second reading exercise of the Symposium, allows us to pick out the aversion and inversion strategies that turn dialectrics in an overtuned rhetoric. The founding deed of this “inversion” (rather than “separation”) is recognizable in the alteration it introduces in the first plase in the type of discourse, which from a rhetorical, explicitly addressed, macrological, monological, and continuous discourse turns into a dialectical, brachylogous, dialogic discourse with partners and interlocutors, i.e. into a dialogue; in the second place, the subject of the discourse shifts from the locuteur, author and signer of the discourse to ever-present interlocutors who end up by making room for a talking and knowing speaker in a regime of anonymous subjectivity: this is an extreme alteration of the anthropological and epistemic subject, culminating in the scientific discourse of Euclidean geometry. Finally, the inversion is recognizable in the object of the discourse, whose prâgma slips from being the predicate of a qualified grammatical subject into a process of objectivation and substantivation, thereby moving from the rhetorical question “What is beautiful?” to the philosophical question “What is the beautiful?”. The hypothesis of a “neo-rhetoricalness” of dialectics, underlying this research, is therefore more Platonic than it appears, insofar as between rhetoric and dialectics there has been a tradition which has tried to wipe out the traces of its transmission, but where the neo-rhetoricalness of dialectics shows through quite clearly, taking advantage, without admitting it, from a more ancient rhetoric than it is itself. (A.T.) 相似文献
970.
George C. Williams 《Zygon》1988,23(4):383-407
Abstract. T. H. Huxley's essay and prolegomena of 1894 argued that the process and products of evolution are morally unacceptable and act in opposition to the ethical progress of humanity. Modern sociobiological insights and studies of organisms in natural settings support Huxley and justify an even more extreme condemnation of nature and an antithesis of the naturalistic fallacy: what is, in the biological world, normally ought not. Modern biology also provides suggestions on the origin of the human moral impulse and on tactics likely to be effective in the combat against nature urged by Huxley. 相似文献