Mixed Generation Sensitivity Analysis: An Optimal Scenario Study

There are several generating units available to meet the load demand on any given day. The mixed‐integer programme case engages generating units that can be shut down or operated between minimum and maximum output levels within a specific time demand block. An examination of these conditions espouses the utilization of renewable energy technology as a reliable power generation source and its effectiveness and augmentation in a robust, heavily subjugated thermal generation system. The mixed‐integer problem has the predisposition to generate many subproblems during the computation. However, with careful selection of the parameters in the model, the challenges are easily overcome. Hydroelectric energy is significant from an operational standpoint as it requires little or no ramp‐up time, commonly found in many combustion technologies. The essential load‐following capability, peaking capacity and voltage stability attributes render hydroelectric energy as a significant part in ensuring reliable electricity service and in meeting customer needs in a market‐driven industry. When this renewable resource is combined with the thermal generation, an improved reliability function is apparent. Yet, in order to minimize the environmental effects inherent in this type of energy resource, the renewable power supply is expected to produce an effectual, consistent output. The integration of renewable generation within the electrical system entails intricate analysis of the transmission line upgrades throughout the system. These upgrades are designed to relieve congestion, improve reliability and provide voltage support by thoroughly evaluating the alternatives to accommodate the new expansion efforts. This paper examines the system integration of renewable generators, via simulated studies, in the context of electrical operations from the hydroelectric generation perspective. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Beyond Dialogue: The Role of Science Within Theology

Abstract : The purpose of this article is to provide background overview and contemporary context for the theme of this issue of Dialog, the role of science within theology. Over the last fifty years, this role has primarily involved dialogue and the drive to mutual understanding. That discussion has now reached a new stage seeking to move beyond dialogue toward what some are referring to as hypothetical consonance. One of the most serious constructive proposals moving beyond dialogue is Creative Mutual Interaction (CMI), proposed by Robert John Russell. The first five ways he discusses in CMI specifically address the role of science in theological reflection. It is argued that these five ways will assist the reader in contextualing the discussion found in the articles in this issue. Elaboration of each way is given, concluding with a constructive theological example of the heuristic use of scientific concepts found in quantum field theory.     

Hypothetical Retrospection

Moral theory has mostly focused on idealized situations in which the morally relevant properties of human actions can be known beforehand. Here, a framework is proposed that is intended to sharpen moral intuitions and improve moral argumentation in problems involving risk and uncertainty. Guidelines are proposed for a systematic search of suitable future viewpoints for hypothetical retrospection. In hypothetical retrospection, a decision is evaluated under the assumption that one of the branches of possible future developments has materialized. This evaluation is based on the deliberator’s present values, and each decision is judged in relation to the information available when it was taken. The basic decision rule is to choose an alternative that comes out as morally acceptable (permissible) from all hypothetical retrospections.

Effects of reward magnitude frames on measures of delay discounting in a hypothetical money scenario

The current study analyzed the effects of three frames of reward magnitude—quantity, volume, and duration—on the rate at which college students discounted hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Hypothetical scenarios were presented using the fill-in-the-blank discounting questionnaire and participants made choices between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards. Scenarios framed the monetary choices as (a) quantity of dollar bills, (b) height (inches) of a stack of dollar bills, and (c) duration of time spent in a hypothetical cash machine to collect dollar bills. For each scenario, participants' subjective values were used to calculate the area under the curve (AuC). Framing resulted in a moderate effect size: The duration frame yielded significantly smaller AuC values compared to the quantity and volume frames. Thus, the framing of reward magnitude was a significant variable in controlling discounting rates for hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Subsequent investigations should be aware of the independent effects of the reward magnitude frames on delay discounting rates.     

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES,MORAL REQUIREMENTS,AND MORAL MOTIVATION

Abstract: Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant's claim has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant's doctrine. I argue that Kant's claim captures the unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant's claim focus on one condition that a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to understanding why moral requirements are not hypothetical. I also argue that the claim that moral requirements are not categorical because they depend on desires for motivation is beside the point. The issue of whether moral requirements are categorical is not an issue about whether moral desires or feelings are necessary for moral motivation but are rather an issue about the ground of moral desires or moral feelings. Moral requirements are categorical because they are requirements of reason, and reason makes moral desires or feelings possible.     

Might Intentions be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives?

I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of instrumentalism. According to the position I defend, genuine practical deliberation and genuine practical imperatives take as their starting point the agent's intentions and only the agent's intentions.Given my loose usage, the Humean position Bernard Williams defends in his seminal article “Internal and External Reasons” (1981) counts as a version of instrumentalism about practical reason, since it incorporates the idea that every genuine practical imperative takes as its starting point some existing motivation(s) of the agent. It deviates from strict instrumentalism in that it leaves room for specificationist reasoning (reasoning aimed at moving from general ends to specific ends) in addition to means-end reasoning. For example, it leaves room for practical reasoning that is focused on “finding constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment” or on “thinking how the satisfaction of elements in [one's subjective motivational set] can be combined, e.g. by time-ordering” (Williams, 1981, p. 104).     

假言推理判定标准的发展性研究

以充分条件和必要条件假言推理题目为测验材料,对小学四年级、初中二年级、高中二年级和大学二年级共469名被试进行了测量。结果表明:(1)内容和形式两种判断标准从小学四年级就开始发展了,但是小学生和中学生还是根据经验事实来进行判断,直到大学才摆脱经验事实的束缚。(2)必要条件推理的能力发展要早于充分条件推理的能力,而且最后能够达到的水平也要高。(3)被试对规则掌握的先后顺序是肯定前件式、否认前件式、肯定后件式和否认后件式。(4)被试是否受到信念偏见效应的影响,还要看题目是否符合事实以及是否符合逻辑规则。     

Iterative Probability Kinematics

Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and that every Popper function is representable in terms of the standard real values of some infinitesimal measure.Our main goal in this article is to study the constraints on (qualitative and probabilistic) change imposed by an extended version of McGee's result. We focus on an extension capable of allowing for iterated changes of view. Such extension, we argue, seems to be needed in almost all considered applications. Since most of the available axiomatizations stipulate (definitionally) important constraints on iterated change, we propose a non-question-begging framework, Iterative Probability Systems (IPS) and we show that every Popper function can be regarded as a Bayesian IPS. A generalized version of McGee's result is then proved and several of its consequences considered. In particular we note that our proof requires the imposition of Cumulativity, i.e. the principle that a proposition that is accepted at any stage of an iterative process of acceptance will continue to be accepted at any later stage. The plausibility and range of applicability of Cumulativity is then studied. In particular we appeal to a method for defining belief from conditional probability (first proposed in [42] and then slightly modified in [6] and [3]) in order to characterize the notion of qualitative change induced by Cumulative models of probability kinematics. The resulting cumulative notion is then compared with existing axiomatizations of belief change and probabilistic supposition. We also consider applications in the probabilistic accounts of conditionals [1] and [30].     

Kant's Pragmatism

This article offers a definition of the term ‘pragmatic’, as it is used in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The definition offered does not make any reference to the affinities between Kant's pragmatism and the philosophies of the American or other pragmatists but draws its definiens entirely from the Kantian conceptual framework. It states that the term ‘pragmatic’ denotes imperatives, laws and beliefs of a specific type: an imperative is pragmatic if and only if it is concerned with the choice of means to individual or universal happiness; a law is pragmatic if and only if our willingness to presuppose it results from our obedience to a pragmatic imperative; and a belief is pragmatic if and only if it relates to the objective validity of pragmatic laws. This article also discusses two rival definitions of the term ‘pragmatic’ (as used by Kant) that have been brought forward by Sidney Axinn and Nicholas Rescher.     

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.