Controlling the Means of Production: The Urban Poor in An Age of Globalisation

Although the social variables of modernity and dependency theory have given way to neo-liberalism and globalism, life strategies of the urban poor in Latin America have not necessarily changed. At the same time, current sociological research reflects methodological distance in relation to the urban poor as a subject. This article employs the methodological advantages of observation/participation to show that the strategies of the urban poor in one of Latin America's largest slums are coherent and integrated, and reveal an inner logic that not only allow them to survive the harsh realities of globalism, but enable them contribute to popular urban culture. Self-help housing, the informal economy, and grassroots participation in Pentecostal Religion are inextricably bound by providing marginalised people a degree of autonomy and control over the production of certain cultural forms and their meaning.     

Author's response

The year 1996 was regarded by a considerable part of contemporary literature on global political economy as a definite turning point in modern history. The majority of experts tended to see the starting point of take‐off that year, but others—not a negligible minority—saw omens of disastrous recession and lasting depression. It appears the time has not yet come. The question is now that of the incalculable resultant of runaway (deregulated) forces of the international financial “whirlpool”, of a random process of global, regional and local accumulation of capital. The year 1997 will set in with a foreseeable and calculable agrarian and related cycle and it may find an outlet for accumulated tensions of capital accumulation at the high tide of unemployment (demographic or migratory) wave with unforeseeable and incalculable effects and side‐effects. This will be just the beginning of the end and a Black Weekday still lies ahead of us. There can be no doubt that we live in a transition period but we do not know where this transition leads to. Loose talk about “post‐industrial society”, “post‐modern age” and “postsomething anything” has limited interpretative power. Very few students of social sciences venture to see and verify secular trends in world history.     

INTEGRAL LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21 st CENTURY

Current leadership theories and business models—built around modernist assumptions about winners and losers, power and control, and local rather than global interactions—are decades out of date with what is needed to lead postindustrial and postmodern enterprises. This article calls for a collaborative and socially intelligent theory for leadership development based on Integral Science. This theory incorporates and unifies appropriate elements of current leadership research for a postmodern knowledge economy and seeks answers to questions still unanswered.     

Notes on "bioethics and sin" by Jean-Francois Collange.

Placing the notion of sin in the context of a meontic account of evil, and emphasizing the effect of sin on the sinner himself, this commentary exposes the insufficiency of restricting oneself to human efforts at atonement, and of thus underemphasizing the role of Christ. Collange's claim that the teaching of "predestination" is rooted in Paul and that the doctrine of merits and indulgences is rooted in Augustine is criticized, and Luther's "forensic" understanding is linked with Augustine, rather than with Paul. Collange's reduction of the concern for holiness to respect and trust is contrasted with holiness's essential context of loving unification with God. The commentary closes by exposing the unsatisfactory scantiness of Collange's treatment of cloning, health-care economy, and of the evils of life.     

Labor supply and consumption of food in a closed economy under a range of fixed- and random-ratio schedules: tests of unit price

The behavioral economic concept of unit price predicts that consumption and response output (labor supply) are determined by the unit price at which a good is available regardless of the value of the cost and benefit components of the unit price ratio. Experiment 1 assessed 4 pigeons' consumption and response output at a range of unit prices. In one condition, food was available according to a range of fixed-ratio schedules, whereas in the other condition, food was available according to a range of random-ratio schedules. Consistent with unit price predictions, consumption and response output were approximately equivalent across schedule types within the lower range of unit prices. However, at Unit Prices 64 (ratio value = 192) and greater, considerably more consumption and response output were observed in the random-ratio condition. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with 4 pigeons using the rapid demand curve assay procedure that is commonly used in the behavioral economics literature. Findings are integrated with two mathematical models of behavior under variable reinforcer delays.     

The economics of the law of effect.

A corollary of the law of effect predicts that the larger the reinforcement, the greater the rate of responding. However, an animal must eat more small portions than large portions to obtain the same daily intake, and one would predict, therefore, that when eating smaller portions an efficient animal would eat less (conserving time and energy) and/or respond faster (conserving time). The latter of these predictions was supported by the present experiments with free-feeding rats for which portion size (pellet size or duration of feeder presentation) and portion price within meals were varied. Response rate was a function of the unit price (responses/g) of food: Rats responded faster when portions were smaller or when prices were higher. Meal size and frequency were relatively unaffected by unit price, but were influenced by the price of meal initiation. The results are discussed in relation to the economic differences between traditional operant and free-feeding paradigms and to both traditional and more recent formulations of the law of effect.     

Responding on concurrent-chains schedules in open and closed economies.

Pigeons' key pecks were reinforced according to concurrent-chains schedules of reinforcement. The programmed average time from the onset of the initial links to a terminal link entry was held constant across conditions while the value of variable-interval schedules in the terminal links was varied. Performance was assessed under two economic conditions: (a) an open economy in which session duration was limited to 1 hr and subjects were maintained at 80% of their free-feeding body weights with postsession food when necessary; and (b) a closed economy in which sessions were 23.5 hr long and no deprivation regimen was in effect. In all cases, the relative rate of responding in the initial links matched the reduction in overall delay to primary reinforcement correlated with entry into one terminal link relative to the reduction in delay correlated with entry into the other terminal link. Although the sum of responses made in the initial links and terminal links was found to increase, then decrease, as the rate of food presentation decreased in the closed economy, there was no consistent effect of overall rate of food presentation on total responding in the open economy. The choice data suggest that relative delay reduction predicts choice accurately, regardless of economic context.     

THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF A TOKEN ECONOMY ON SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN OPEN-PIT MINING

A token economy that used trading stamps as tokens was instituted at two dangerous open-pit mines. Employees earned stamps for working without lost-time injuries, for being in work groups in which all other workers had no lost-time injuries, for not being involved in equipment-damaging accidents, for making adopted safety suggestions, and for unusual behavior which prevented an injury or accident. They lost stamp awards if they or other workers in their group were injured, caused equipment damage, or failed to report accidents or injuries. The stamps could be exchanged for a selection of thousands of items at redemption stores. Implementation of the token economy was followed by large reductions in the number of days lost from work because of injuries, the number of lost-time injuries, and the costs of accidents and injuries. The reductions in costs far exceeded the costs of operating the token economy. All improvements were maintained over several years.     

Why be my colleague’s keeper? Moral justifications for peer review

Justifying ethical practices is no easy task. This paper considers moral justifications for peer review so as to persuade even the sceptical individualist. Two avenues provide a foundation for that justification: self-interest (the right behaviour is that which maximally serves one’s own interests) and social contract theory (the right behaviour is that which best meets obligations set in binding social contracts). A wider notion of “interest” permits the self-interest approach to justify not only submitting one’s own work to peer review but also removing oneself momentarily from the production of primary knowledge to serve as a rigorous, independent, and honest referee. The contract approach offers a non-selfish alternative and relies on four types of binding social contracts: those implicit in accepting funds, those implicit in asserted professional status, those to contribute what is of most value to society, and those to defend the ideals of the Academy. Efforts to restore respect for rigorous, independent, honest peer review should begin in earnest.     

An experimental analysis of the cost of food in a closed economy.

Rats lived in individual chambers in which the only food available was delivered for lever pressing. During Stage I, a fixed number of presses was required for each food pellet. As this fixed ratio of presses per food pellet was increased daily, a rat's daily intake of food was reduced. During Stage II, the cost of a food pellet was increased by replacing each fixed ratio with its interval equivalent. Each interval was a rat's mean time between the first press of a ratio and the delivery of a pellet during Stage I. During Stage II, only two presses were every required for a food pellet: The first press initiated a delay and the second activated the pellet dispenser after that delay elapsed. Food intakes for the series of fixed ratios and a rat's series of delay equivalents were very similar when plotted as a function of delay, but not when plotted as a function of presses per pellet. Consequently, the fixed ratio reduced food intake because larger ratios increased delay to food from the first press of a ratio. Observations and an analysis of interresponse times further revealed that as the fixed ratio increased, and local as well as overall rate of food intake decreased, lever pressing became more stereotyped. Because this increased stereotypy resulted in greatly increased rates of lever pressing, delay to food was minimized, and perhaps more importantly, so too was the reduction of a rat's baseline daily intake.