WHY RIGHTS? WHY ME?

That Jews are concerned about human rights is distinct from why Jews should be concerned about rights in the first place. This project analyzes the reasons Jews in the twentieth century put forward to convince co‐religionists to take rights seriously. Focusing on the content of these arguments facilitates dividing the proffered rationales into three broad categories—the temporal, the innate, and the philosophical. Analysis of each category reveals subdivisions, reflecting the many ways Jews try to persuade each other to care about human rights. This taxonomy, unlike others, highlights the different ways in which Jews conceptualize the burning ethical questions of our day: of how and why to be Jewish and modern. These rationales therefore are understood to function as moral reasons and, as such, can be assessed by their relative claims.     

The Church is Permanently Underway

This article examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the unity of the human community in Japan, specifically Tokyo, where the 2020 Olympic Games have been postponed until 2021. This allows reflection on the issue of ecclesiology during this time of uncertainty. First, the article describes the critical response of the ecumenical leaders to the country’s first-ever declaration of a state of emergency. Second, it reflects upon the impact of the compulsion to conform to intolerant social order and the neoliberal “self-responsibility theory” that abandons the most vulnerable in society. Third, it explores the relationship between Tokyo and the Olympics, which has been inextricably linked to the aim of national unity. Finally, this article draws the conclusion that we must steer clear of any “unity” that conceals a deeper disunity. Therefore, the church must distance itself from both the “self-responsibility theory” and the enthusiasm of nationalism and instead work toward the restoration of the human community and the renewal of the church, which are currently the main issues of concern.     

Odysseans of the Twenty-First Century

In his book Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies—and What It Means to Be Human (2005), author-journalist Joel Garreau identifies four technologies whose synergistic activity may transform humankind into a state transcending present human nature: genetic, robotic, information, and nano (GRIN) technologies. If the GRIN technologies follow Moore's Law, as information technology has done for the past four decades, Homo sapiens and human society may be unimaginably different before the middle of this century. But among scientists, futurists, and other pundits there is no agreement on the nature and ramifications of this transformation. Based on dozens of interviews, Garreau sees three possible scenarios for our species. The Heaven Scenario foresees enhanced bodies and minds in a disease-free world, perhaps even immortality; the Hell Scenario warns of losing our identity as a biological entity and perhaps the demise of liberal democracy; the Prevail Scenario predicts that we will muddle through the GRIN technology revolution basically intact, as we have prevailed during past technological upheavals. In this review, these scenarios are examined in the context of Kuhn's “normal” versus “extraordinary” science and in the context of current understanding about gene function.     

Empathy and universal values explicated by the empathy-altruism hypothesis

ABSTRACT

Research reports that empathy is on the decline in present-day society, together with an increasing trend in self-enhancing values. Based on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, we investigated whether these constructs are interlinked by analyzing the relationships between emotional and cognitive empathy and 10 universal values. In the first study, using a middle-aged U.S. sample, the results showed that empathy was strongly and positively related to altruistic values and negatively to self-enhancing values in a pattern that aligned with the empathy-altruism hypothesis. In a second confirmation study, these findings were replicated and extended, while also controlling for the Big Five personality traits, to discount that empathy is only captured by basic personality. Only emotional empathy, not cognitive empathy, accounted for up to 18% additional variance in altruistic values, which further confirmed the emphasis on feelings, as postulated by the empathy-altruism hypothesis.     

Generational differences in American students’ reasons for going to college, 1971–2014: The rise of extrinsic motives

ABSTRACT

We examined generational differences in reasons for attending college among a nationally representative sample of college students (N = 8 million) entering college between 1971–2014. We validated the items on reasons for attending college against an established measure of extrinsic and intrinsic values among college students in 2014 (n = 189). Millennials (in college 2000s–2010s) and Generation X (1980s–1990s) valued extrinsic reasons for going to college (“to make more money”) more, and anti-extrinsic reasons (“to gain a general education and appreciation of ideas”) less than Boomers when they were the same age in the 1960s–1970s. Extrinsic reasons for going to college were higher in years with more income inequality, college enrollment, and extrinsic values. These results mirror previous research finding generational increases in extrinsic values begun by GenX and continued by Millennials, suggesting that more recent generations are more likely to favor extrinsic values in their decision-making.     

Metaphilosophical Criteria for Worldview Comparison

Philosophy lacks criteria to evaluate its philosophical theories. To fill this gap, this essay introduces nine criteria to compare worldviews, classified in three broad categories: objective criteria (objective consistency, scientificity, scope), subjective criteria (subjective consistency, personal utility, emotionality), and intersubjective criteria (intersubjective consistency, collective utility, narrativity). The essay first defines what a worldview is and exposes the heuristic used in the quest for criteria. After describing each criterion individually, it shows what happens when each of them is violated. From the criteria, it derives assessment tests to compare and improve different worldviews. These include the is‐ought, ought‐act, and is‐act first‐order tests; the critical and dialectical second‐order tests; the mixed‐questions and first‐second‐order third‐order tests; and the we‐I, we‐it, and it‐I tests. The essay then applies these criteria and tests to a concrete example, comparing the Flying Spaghetti Monster deity with Intelligent Design. For another application, it draws more general fruitful suggestions for the dialogue between science and religion.     

Perpetrators' Freedom of Choice as a Determinant of Responsibility Attribution

Abstract

In the present study, a swindler had high versus low freedom of choice while deciding to commit a crime. He actually swindled Polish university students (involved observers) out of a large versus a small amount of money (high vs. low loss). Other students (noninvolved observers) were informed about the swindler's action. All students suggested the punishment that they believed the swindler deserved (the punishments chosen were used as an index of responsibility attribution). Involved students assigned more severe punishments than noninvolved students did. In the high-loss condition, involved observers were more punitive than they were in the low-loss condition. The judgments of the swindler's victims were determined by the magnitude of their loss; they ignored information about the swindler's freedom of choice. In contrast, the responsibility attributed by the noninvolved observers was influenced by the swindler's freedom of choice, but only in the low-loss condition. Noninvolved observers informed that the swindler had high freedom of choice were insensitive to information about the magnitude of the consequences for the victim.     

Doing Sociology in The Age of Globalization

The emergence of processes of globalization has gone hand in hand with a theoretical “crisis” in sociology. According to an increasing number of scholars, “global society” has transformed the “social” to such an extent that classical sociological theory and that of the nineteenth century no longer seem adequate for conceptualizing not only the “new society,” but (human) society as such. The very distinction between human and non-human society has gone lost. In this context, is it still possible to formulate a “theory of society” and what form should such a theory take?     

SCIENCE AND VALUES: MY DEBT TO ERNAN McMULLIN

Abstract Ernan McMullin's 1982 presidential address to the Philosophy of Science Association dealt with the issue of science and values, arguing that although scientists are rightfully wary of the infiltration of cultural and social values, their work is guided by “epistemic values,” such as the drive for consistency and predictive fertility. McMullin argued that it is the pursuit of these epistemic values that drives nonepistemic values (like religious yearnings) from science. Using the case study of the fate of the nonepistemic value of progress in the history of evolutionary theorizing, I show that, vital though McMullin's thinking was for my own scholarship, in fact the study shows that the connections between epistemic and nonepistemic values in science are more complex than either of us supposed.     

Making IBM's Computer, Watson, Human

This essay uses the recent victory of an IBM computer (Watson) in the TV game, Jeopardy, to speculate on the abilities Watson would need, in addition to those it has, to be human. The essay's basic premise is that to be human is to behave as humans behave and to function in society as humans function. Alternatives to this premise are considered and rejected. The viewpoint of the essay is that of teleological behaviorism. Mental states are defined as temporally extended patterns of overt behavior. From this viewpoint (although Watson does not currently have them), essential human attributes such as consciousness, the ability to love, to feel pain, to sense, to perceive, and to imagine may all be possessed by a computer. Most crucially, a computer may possess self-control and may act altruistically. However, the computer's appearance, its ability to make specific movements, its possession of particular internal structures (e.g., whether those structures are organic or inorganic), and the presence of any nonmaterial "self," are all incidental to its humanity.