B.F. SKINNER AND THE GRAND INQUISITOR

Abstract. B.F. Skinner allures us with the possibilities of turning the stones of materialistic rewards into the bread of human values. He tempts us by assuring success in achieving our goals through behavioral science, if only we give up our autonomy. He offers the power of complete control over our behaviors, on condition that we relinquish responsibility for our lives to a technological elite. Is B. F. Skinner a flesh-and-blood Grand Inquisitor? This essay tries to persuade the reader that Skinner's offers are worth considering.     

Effects of a variable-ratio conditioning history on sensitivity to fixed-interval contingencies in rats.

We investigated the possibility that human-like fixed-interval performances would appear in rats given a variable-ratio history (Wanchisen, Tatham, & Mooney, 1989). Nine rats were trained under single or compound variable-ratio schedules and then under a fixed-interval 30-s schedule. The histories produced high fixed-interval rates that declined slowly over 90 sessions; differences as a function of the particular history were absent. Nine control animals given only fixed-interval training responded at lower levels initially, but rates increased with training. Despite differences in absolute rates, rates within the intervals and postreinforcement pauses indicated equivalent development of the accelerated response patterns suggestive of sensitivity to fixed-interval contingencies. The finding that the histories elevated rates without retarding development of differentiated patterns suggests that the effective response unit was a burst of several lever presses and that the fixed-interval contingencies acted on these units in the same way as for single responses. Regardless of history, the rats did not manifest the persistent, undifferentiated responding reported for humans under comparable schedules. We concluded that the shortcomings of animal models of human fixed-interval performances cannot be easily remedied by including a variable-ratio conditioning history within the model.     

Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

Socialization for the democratic personality in modern society

A comprehensive analysis of socialization requires a complex model that both explicates and synthesizes the various subprocesses involved in this phenomenon. Traditional concerns with socialization that have focused almost exclusively on its objective functions, that is, on those which serve society and its institutions, need to be complemented by an equal emphasis on subjective functions in terms of the sociological and psychological development of the individual. Chiefly relevant in this latter respect is the production of basic human needs and the consequences that result from their inadequate gratification in unauthentic and/or unresponsive societies. One such outcome that is particularly crucial to both personal and societal function is that of alienation, which can be assessed specifically in terms of its significance for civic participation. Our model recognizes the limits of both human systems and social systems; and, in terms of the principles of authenticity and responsivity, it articulates the linkage among these systems constituting the essence of socialization. Our model also provides an implicit clarification of the nature and meaning of citizenship in a democracy, which by definition should be a responsive society, and delineates the required sociopsychological images for maximizing the role of political participation.     

An historical preface to engineering ethics

This article attempts to distinguish between science and technology, on the one hand, and engineering, on the other, offering a brief introduction to engineering values and engineering ethics. The method is (roughly) a philosophical examination of history. Engineering turns out to be a relatively recent enterprise, barely three hundred years old, to have distinctive commitments both technical and moral, and to have changed a good deal both technically and morally during that period. What motivates the paper is the belief that a too-easy equation of engineering with technology tends to obscure the special contribution of engineers to technology and to their own professional standards and so, to obscure as well both the origin and content of engineering ethics.     

内隐记忆研究的实验方法探索：启动效应计量方法的改进思路及其实验研究

以实验鉴定了常规的启动效应计量方法的有效性程度,并为客观地计量启动效应,创用了“超意识广度法”、“二次比较法”等．结果发现：（１）如被试数量较少,以不同补笔率为“基线值”所求得的启动效应之间发生显著差异的可能性存在;（２）超意识广度法能克服“阈下呈现刺激法”“分散注意法”的不足,为内隐记忆提供有利的识记情境;（３）“二次比较法”能为正常人内隐记忆的存在提供更为直接、可靠的证据,并能客观、精确地计量启动效应。     

Rasch's multiplicative poisson model with covariates

As a multivariate model of the number of events, Rasch's multiplicative Poisson model is extended such that the parameters for individuals in the prior gamma distribution have continuous covariates. The parameters for individuals are integrated out and the hyperparameters in the prior distribution are estimated by a numerical method separately from difficulty parameters that are treated as fixed parameters or random variables. In addition, a method is presented for estimating parameters in Rasch's model with missing values. The author is now affiliated with the Otara University of Commerce. The author is grateful to Yoshio Takane, Haruo Yanai, Eiji Muraki, the editor and referees for their careful readings and helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Part of this work was presented at the third European Congress of Psychology at Tampere, Finland in 1993.     

How much woe when we go: A quantitative method for predicting culture shock

Culture shock is defined as the confusion and discomfort caused by the conflict in perceived motives and expected behaviors between the home culture and the foreign culture. Several quantitative and graphical methods employing techniques of cluster analysis and similarity mapping are offered for predicting the magnitude of culture shock between pairs of countries using data extracted from Hofstede's 1980–83 studies of national cultural values. Implications for business, politics, and personal stress management are discussed.     

HOW DID MORALITY EVOLVE?

Abstract. This paper presents and criticizes. Alexander's evolutionary theory of morality (1987). Earlier research, on which Alexander's theory is based, is also reviewed. The propensity to create moral systems evolved because it allowed ancestral humans to limit conflict within cooperating groups and thus form larger groups, which were advantageous because of intense between-group competition. Alexander sees moral codes as contractual, and the primary criticism of his theory is that moral codes are not completely contractual but also coercive. Ways of evaluating Alexander's theory as well as modified versions of it are discussed.     

Catholic Feminist Ethics Reconsidered

Taking Catholic sexual ethics and liberal feminist ethics as points of departure, this essay argues that both frameworks are ill‐prepared to deal with the moral problems raised by sex trafficking: while Catholic sexual ethics is grounded in a normative understanding of sexuality, liberal feminist ethics argues for women's sexual autonomy, resting upon freedom of action and consent. From a perspective that attends both to the phenomenological interpretation of embodied selves and the Kantian normative interpretation of dignity, it becomes possible to critique both the Catholic and the liberal feminist frameworks of ethics. I argue that Catholic sexual ethics requires a reconceptualization as social ethics in order to meet the challenges of our present time, but that the shift is possible without giving up the moral imperatives of both Catholic and feminist ethics to protect human dignity and women's rights.