Practice makes perfect: Training the interpretation of emotional ambiguity

The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can be altered through training procedures that are collectively called cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). In three experiments, we systematically manipulated the nature of the training in order to discriminate between emotional priming and ambiguity resolution accounts of training effects. In Experiment 1 participants completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to identify relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. We then manipulated the training sentences to show that interpretation bias was eliminated when participants simply completed valenced word fragments following unrelated sentences (Experiment 2), or completed fragments that were related to emotional but unambiguous sentences (Experiment 3). Only when participants were required to actively resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in interpretation emerge at test. Findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of meaning from emotionally ambiguous alternatives, in line with an ambiguity resolution account.     

Gender differences in salivary alpha-amylase and attentional bias towards negative facial expressions following acute stress induction

This study investigated gender differences in two key processes involved in anxiety, arousal and attentional bias towards threat. Arousal was assessed using salivary alpha-amylase (sAA), a biomarker of noradrenergic arousal and attention bias using a dot-probe task. Twenty-nine women and 27 men completed the dot-probe task and provided saliva samples before and after a stress induction [cold pressor stress (CPS) test]. Women displayed a significant increase in arousal (sAA) following the stressor compared to men, who displayed a significant reduction in arousal. Reaction time data revealed a significant avoidance of threat in women at baseline, but a significant change to an attention bias towards threat following the stressor. Men did not significantly respond to the stressor in terms of attentional bias. These findings suggest that women are more reactive to a stressor than men, and display an initial avoidance response to threat, but an attentional bias towards threat following stress.     

Early group bias in the Faroe Islands: Cultural variation in children's group-based reasoning

Recent developmental research demonstrates that group bias emerges early in childhood. However, little is known about the extent to which bias in minimal (i.e., arbitrarily assigned) groups varies with children's environment and experience, and whether such bias is universal across cultures. In this study, the development of group bias was investigated using a minimal groups paradigm with 46 four- to six-year-olds from the Faroe Islands. Children observed in-group and out-group members exhibiting varying degrees of prosocial behaviour (egalitarian or stingy sharing). Children did not prefer their in-group in the pretest, but a pro-in-group and anti-out-group sentiment emerged in both conditions in the posttest. Faroese children's response patterns differ from those of American children [Schug, M. G., Shusterman, A., Barth, H., & Patalano, A. L. (2013). Minimal-group membership influences children's responses to novel experience with group members. Developmental Science, 16(1), 47–55], suggesting that intergroup bias shows cultural variation even in a minimal groups context.     

Reasoning,biases and dual processes: The lasting impact of Wason (1960)

Wason (1960) published a relatively short experimental paper, in which he introduced the 2-4-6 problem as a test of inductive reasoning. This paper became one of the most highly cited to be published in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology and is significant for a number of reasons. First, the 2-4-6 task itself was ingenious and yielded evidence of error and bias in the intelligent participants who attempted it. Research on the 2-4-6 problem continues to the present day. More importantly, it was Wason's first paper on reasoning and one which made strong claims for bias and irrationality in a period dominated by rationalist writers like Piaget. It set in motion the study of cognitive biases in thinking and reasoning, well before the start of Tversky and Kahneman's famous heuristics and biases research programme. I also show here something for which Wason has received insufficient credit. It was Wason's work on this task and his later studies of his four card selection task that led to the first development of the dual process theory of reasoning which is so dominant in the current literature on the topic more than half a century later.     

Racial Differences in Attributions,Perceived Criticism,and Upset: A Study With Black and White Community Participants

The primary aims of the current investigation were (a) to examine the relationships among attributions, perceived constructive and destructive criticism, and upset due to criticism and (b) to explore racial differences in mean levels of attributions, perceived criticism, upset due to criticism, and warmth in a community sample of Blacks and Whites (N = 272). The Attributions of Criticism Scale (ACS) was used to measure participants’ attributions regarding criticism from their relatives. No racial differences were found in mean levels of attributions or type of perceived criticism. However, Blacks were significantly less upset by perceived criticism from their relatives than Whites. When the relationships between attributions, perceived criticism, and upset were explored, results showed that positive attributions were associated with greater perceived constructive criticism and less upset due to criticism, whereas negative attributions were associated with greater perceived destructive criticism and more upset. Perceptions of relatives’ warmth were also associated with greater perceived constructive criticism and less perceived destructive criticism, but warmth was only related to less upset for Blacks and not Whites. Findings suggest that attributions and warmth play an important role in the perception of criticism and the extent to which individuals become upset in response to criticism from loved ones. Results also point to potential racial differences in mean levels of these variables and the associations among them.     

Trained interpretive bias and anxiety

The relationship between anxiety and interpretive bias has been studied extensively, but the causal direction of this relationship remains largely unexplored. Do negative interpretations cause anxiety or is anxiety the cause of negative interpretations? Or are the two mutually reinforcing? The present study addressed this issue by experimentally inducing either a negative or a positive interpretive bias using Mathews and Mackintosh' [(2002). Induced emotional interpretation bias and anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 604-615] training paradigm and then examining its impact on state anxiety and anxiety vulnerability. In addition, it was investigated as to whether the interpretive bias was trained implicitly. Results indicated that style of interpreting could be manipulated. That is, when confronted with ambiguous information after the training, participants (n=118) interpreted this information congruent with their (positive or negative) training condition. Data on the issue of implicitness showed that participants tended to be explicitly aware of the valence of their training stimuli. Effects of trained interpretive bias on anxiety were only marginal and absent on anxiety vulnerability. It appears that interpretive bias can be trained reliably, but its effects on mood and vulnerability require further explanation.     

Invariance in Measurement and Prediction Revisited

Borsboom (Psychometrika, 71:425–440, 2006) noted that recent work on measurement invariance (MI) and predictive invariance (PI) has had little impact on the practice of measurement in psychology. To understand this contention, the definitions of MI and PI are reviewed, followed by results on the consistency between the two forms of invariance in the general case. The special parametric cases of factor analysis (strict factorial invariance) and linear regression analyses (strong regression invariance) are then described, along with findings on the inconsistency between the two forms of invariance in this context. Two numerical examples of inconsistency are reviewed in detail. The impact of violations of MI on accuracy of selection is illustrated. Finally, reasons for the slow dissemination of work on invariance are discussed, and the prospects for altering this situation are weighed. This paper is based on the Presidential Address given at the International Meeting of the Psychometric Society in Tokyo, Japan, on July 11, 2007. This research was supported by National Institute of Mental Health grants 1P30 MH 068685-01A1 and RO1 MH64707-01.