Kant: The Audacity of Judgement

In the legal judgement reason demands that it extend itself beyond the mere subjective limits of the self in order that it might fashion a judgement that speaks for the other. This is the universal necessity of the judgement. No claim of truth or the moral law can guarantee that others will agree with this judgement: thus disputation is the risk which reason takes in order to judge at all. The author examines this audacity of judgement by reference to Kant's autonomy of reason, which risks itself in the thought that thinks. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Getting real in analysis

The author uses a detailed clinical example to illustrate how reality testing can create rather than foreclose opportunities for analytic investigation. He proposes that authentic analysis of transference within the treatment relationship requires close and explicit attention to be paid to considerations of reality, but in a way that does not require the patient to defer to the analyst's view. The author reconsiders certain conceptions of a special psychoanalytic reality, of regression in clinical analysis, and of the nature of free association, suggesting that they tend to discourage the realism necessary to effective psychoanalytic work. In this context, he underlines the importance of ongoing reference to therapeutic outcome as an aspect of reality, and reflects upon the impact of the reality of the analytic treatment setting and the question of termination.     

Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm

People judge that an individual who attempts to harm someone but fails should be blamed and punished more when they imagine how things could have turned out worse, compared to when they imagine how things could have turned out the same, or when they think only about what happened. This moral counterfactual amplification effect occurs when people believe the protagonist had no reason for the attempt to harm, and not when the protagonist had a reason, as Experiment 1 shows. It occurs for intentional failed attempts to harm and also for accidental near-misses, as Experiment 2 shows, but not for failed attempts in which the harm occurs anyway by another cause, for both general judgments about the event and specific judgments about the individual's actions, as Experiments 3 and 4 show. The implications for understanding the role of counterfactual thoughts in moral judgement are discussed.     

FOK产生机制的实验研究

通过以初中生和大学生为被试的两个实验探讨了FOK（Feeling-of-Knowing即“熟知感”）的产生机制,是线索熟悉性还是靶项目的可提取性（或记忆强度）决定FOK判断的等级。识记材料为90对中文词对.分前后两部分让被试识记,前后两部分词对之间安排三种关系：①完全相同;②仅线索词相同,③完全不同,这三种关系可选成不同的靶项目记忆强度和不同的线索熟悉性.两组实验结果一致表明,FOK的等级判断的高低取决于线索熟悉程度,而不随靶项目的记忆强度而变化.     

Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

Social cognition and the human brain

Humans are exceedingly social animals, but the neural underpinnings of social cognition and behavior are not well understood. Studies in humans and other primates have pointed to several structures that play a key role in guiding social behaviors: the amygdala, ventromedial frontal cortices, and right somatosensory-related cortex, among others. These structures appear to mediate between perceptual representations of socially relevant stimuli, such as the sight of conspecifics, and retrieval of knowledge (or elicitation of behaviors) that such stimuli can trigger. Current debates concern the extent to which social cognition draws upon processing specialized for social information, and the relative contributions made to social cognition by innate and acquired knowledge.     

Temporal order judgment reveals how number magnitude affects visuospatial attention

The existence of spatial components in the mental representation of number magnitude has raised the question regarding the relation between numbers and spatial attention. We present six experiments in which this relation was examined using a temporal order judgment task to index attentional allocation. Results demonstrate that one important consequence of numerical processing is the automatic allocation of spatial attention, which in turn affects the perception of the temporal order of visual events. Given equal onset time, left-side stimuli are perceived to occur before right-side stimuli when a small number (1, 2) is processed, whereas right-side stimuli are perceived to occur before left-side stimuli when a larger number (8, 9) is processed. In addition, we show that this attentional effect is specific to quantity processing and does not generalize to non-numerical ordinal sequences.