New Directions in Catholic Historical Research: Saints in Social Work

For over half a century now, the profession of social work has ignored calls to develop critical infrastructures for strengthening and expanding historical research in schools of social work. Since World War II, for example, doctoral dissertations involving significant historical research in schools of social work have become virtually extinct. The vanishing of these dissertations represents a simultaneous vanishing of social work's capacity to detect historical figures who are indigenous to and yet have remained undetected in social work history. As a result, and unintentionally, social work scholars have been seemingly unable to detect Louise de Marillac as the patron saint of social workers or Ellen Gates Starr as a popular folk saint among social workers in Catholic religious orders. The study includes the rare, post-mortem photograph of Ellen Gates Starr, dressed in the full habit of a Catholic Benedictine nun.     

Accuracy of Basic Knowledge of Traumatic Historical Events: The Armenian Genocide

This research assumes that accuracy of shared historical knowledge of genocide might help new generations cope with the trauma lived by previous generations, while the longer the denial of a genocide the more fragmented the macronarrative and the longer the collective trauma. The Armenian genocide (1915) is generally represented in opposite ways by the Turks and Armenians. The study explores the knowledge accuracy of the 1915 events before and after the centennial commemoration of the genocide and uses convenience samples from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Romania, United States, Venezuela, and a representative sample (Romania, N = 1231). The major findings suggest a very low basic knowledge of genocide, with a few exceptions, despite a significant increase of this knowledge after the 100-year commemoration.     

Crossan on the Couch, Along with the Rest of Us: Part Two: Six Proposals Toward a New Paradigm for a Psychologically Realistic Approach to the Search for the Historical Jesus as Suggested by the Work of Hal Childs

Building on the theoretical basis spelled out in my first article on Hal Childs' The Myth of the Historical Jesus and the Evolution of Consciousness, the present article engages in dialogue with Crossan's 2000 autobiography, A Long Way From Tipperary. The dialogue focuses on six proposals emerging from Childs' work that advocate the inclusion of psychological realism in rethinking the task, practice, and outcome of historical Jesus research. The six proposals are as follows: first, that psychological realism is an essential part of historical realism; second, that unconscious factors are to be considered at work in the viewer as well as in the viewed in historical Jesus research; third, that every reconstruction of the historical Jesus is mythic; fourth, that the preunderstanding that the Jesus scholar brings to historical Jesus research is generated within a hermeneutical circle constituted by a vast web of relationships, purposes, and meanings that include every aspect of the scholar's life; fifth, that the final goal of historical Jesus research is not the facts about the historic Jesus, but the meaning of these facts as archetypal images for self-understanding, world-understanding, and the evolution of consciousness; and sixth, that the purpose of the Gospel is to evoke new archetypal projections in the reader that can lead to new incarnations of the archetypal Self awakened and informed by the story of Jesus, often as recovered by the Jesus historian.     

"元气"演化史观--《易纬》的自然史观研究

"元气"演化史观是<易纬>历史观的重要内容.本文论<易纬>的"元气"演化史观即自然史观,强调<易纬>对<易传>"太极生化"说的发展与改造,探讨其"五气渐变,是为五运"的自然史观对自然演化过程的物质前提的肯定,从"象"与"数"的角度讨论其自然史观的哲学性质,肯定其具有的一定的合理性.     

Do I get what you get? Learning about the effects of self-performed and observed actions in infancy

The present study investigated whether infants learn the effects of other persons' actions like they do for their own actions, and whether infants transfer observed action-effect relations to their own actions. Nine-, 12-, 15- and 18-month-olds explored an object that allowed two actions, and that produced a certain salient effect after each action. In a self-exploration group, infants explored the object directly, whereas in two observation groups, infants first watched an adult model acting on the object and obtaining a certain effect with each action before exploring the objects by themselves. In one observation group, the infants' actions were followed by the same effects as the model's actions, but in the other group, the action-effect mapping for the infant was reversed to that of the model. The results showed that the observation of the model had an impact on the infants' exploration behavior from 12 months, but not earlier, and that the specific relations between observed actions and effects were acquired by 15 months. Thus, around their first birthday infants learn the effects of other persons' actions by observation, and they transfer the observed action-effect relations to their own actions in the second year of life.     

The logic of the stimulus

This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes–its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.This contribution is part of the special issue “Animal Logics” (Watanabe and Huber 2006).     

Toddlers’ social evaluations of agents who act on false beliefs

Mature social evaluations privilege agents’ intentions over the outcomes of their actions, but young children often privilege outcomes over intentions in verbal tasks probing their social evaluations. In three experiments (N = 118), we probed the development of intention-based social evaluation and mental state reasoning using nonverbal methods with 15-month-old toddlers. Toddlers viewed scenarios depicting a protagonist who sought to obtain one of two toys, each inside a different box, as two other agents observed. Then, the boxes’ contents were switched in the absence of the protagonist and either in the presence or the absence of the other agents. When the protagonist returned, one agent opened the box containing the protagonist's desired toy (a positive outcome), and the other opened the other box (a neutral outcome). When both agents had observed the toys move to their current locations, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box containing the desired toy. In contrast, when the agents had not seen the toys move and therefore should have expected the desired toy's location to be unchanged, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box that no longer contained the desired toy. Thus, the toddlers preferred the agent who intended to make the protagonist's desired toy accessible, even when its action, guided by a false belief concerning that toy's location, did not produce a positive outcome. Well before children connect beliefs to social behavior in verbal tasks, toddlers engage in intention-based evaluations of social agents with false beliefs.     

Philosophy and the real reasons for action: G. H. von Wright's understanding explanations

According to the received view, philosophy of action took a justified turn towards causalism because anti-causalists failed the causalist challenge about efficacious reasons. This paper contests that view by examining the ways in which Georg Henrik von Wright responded to causalism in his later philosophy. First, von Wright attacked the subjectivism of causalism by arguing for an objectivist view that construes reasons not as subjective mental states but as external facts of the agent's situation. Second, von Wright fundamentally disagreed with the view of philosophical inquiry that underpinned causalism. For von Wright, the task of philosophy was conceptual: to explicate what one is looking for when one is looking for the real reasons for action. In contrast, for causalists the task was ontological: to determine what kind of item in the world the real reason for action is. Examining von Wright's account contributes to contemporary assessments of the metaphilosophical dimension of the reasons/causes debate.     

Commentary on “Transformations in hallucinosis and the receptivity of the analyst” by Civitarese

After summarizing Civitareses complex and stimulating thoughts, merits of his conceptualization are emphazised firstly before coming to drawbacks of it. As a supplementary perspective on the conceptualisation (TH) of Civitares the commentary is focused on a slightly different approach. Transformation into hallucinosis is linked to excessive forms of projective identification., which can have massive influence on the analyst, thus pressing him into (behavioral) patterns similar to what was phantazised, or hallucinated or deluded by the patient about the relationsship. If the analyst is after a shorter or longer period able to recognize, how near he is or was to the Patient's deluded or hallucinated Constructions of his world, this will give him a further source to sense and to examine the patients experience.