What do children with autism attend to during imitation tasks?

Individuals with autism show a complex profile of differences in imitative ability, including a general deficit in precision of imitating another’s actions and special difficulty in imitating nonmeaningful gestures relative to meaningful actions on objects. Given that they also show atypical patterns of visual attention when observing social stimuli, we investigated whether possible differences in visual attention when observing an action to be imitated may contribute to imitative difficulties in autism in both nonmeaningful gestures and meaningful actions on objects. Results indicated that (a) a group of 18 high-functioning 8- to 15-year-olds with autistic disorder, in comparison with a matched group of 13 typically developing children, showed similar patterns of visual attention to the demonstrator’s action but decreased attention to his face when observing a model to be imitated; (b) nonmeaningful gestures and meaningful actions on objects triggered distinct visual attention patterns that did not differ between groups; (c) the autism group demonstrated reduced imitative precision for both types of imitation; and (d) duration of visual attention to the demonstrator’s action was related to imitation precision for nonmeaningful gestures in the autism group.     

Categories of Historical Thought

This paper argues that the identity of history as a discipline derives from its distinctive combination of intellectual assumptions, or categories. Many of these categories are shared with other fields of thought, including science, literature, and common sense, but in history are understood in a unique way. This paper first examines the general notion of categories of historical understanding, then scrutinises some of the specific categories suggested by classic authors on the philosophy of history such as Dilthey and Collingwood. More recent works by Goldstein, Oakeshott, Bevir, and Tucker are treated as contributions to the same discussion. It concludes that the various categories these writers have proposed are neither trivial nor incompatible and that when collated they do indeed compose a framework capable of characterising historical thought.

幼儿心理理论愿望信念理解与情绪理解关系研究

考察了幼儿心理理论信念愿望理解与情绪理解的发展状况及相互关系.运用实验法对256名3~6岁儿童施测.结果表明:(1)幼儿心理理论愿望-信念理解与情绪理解的发展在3~6岁期间随年龄逐渐提高.4岁是基于信念的情绪理解能力发展的关键年龄;4~5岁是幼儿情绪观点采择能力发展的关键年龄.(2)幼儿基于信念的情绪理解能力的发展晚于错误信念理解能力的发展.(3)幼儿心理理论的愿望-信念理解与情绪理解之间相关显著.     

7～9岁儿童失言理解与执行功能的关系

为了说明学龄儿童心理理论与执行功能的关系,研究采用失言理解、威斯康星卡片分类和汉诺塔任务分别考察了90名7—9岁儿童的心理理论和执行功能。结果表明,失言理解与抑制-转换能力相关显著（r=0．34,P〈0．01）,但是与计划能力相关不显著（r=0．06,P〉0．05）。在控制年龄后,失言理解与抑制-转换能力的相关仍然显著（r=0．29,P〈0．05）。研究结果说明,学龄儿童心理理论与执行功能的相关模式与学龄前儿童完全一致,提示心理理论与执行功能的相关关系从学龄前延续到了学龄阶段。     

4~6岁儿童对梦的起因和可控性的理解

以结构式访谈的方法考察了173名4~6岁儿童对梦的起因和可控性的理解。结果表明：（1）4~6岁儿童对梦的起因的理解接近成人的水平,他们认为具有与某事物相关经验和知识的人更有可能梦到该事物,而4~6岁儿童在偏好如何影响梦的的理解上与成人不同。（2）与4~5岁儿童比,有更多的6岁儿童认为梦具有弥补没有实现愿望的功能,但未达到成人的水平。（3）4~6岁儿童还不能理解梦是不可控的,表现在他们没有认识到做梦是一个不受意识控制的过程,并认为个体的意愿能够控制做梦     

Action understanding as inverse planning

Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an “intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a “teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.     

Comprehension of the representational mind in infancy

A broad array of infant studies are reviewed that appear to be consistent with the idea that belief understanding specifically, and mental attribution generally, emerge much earlier than previously acknowledged. We first examine existing false-belief research, which, while confirming that children under 4 years perform poorly on standard tests, suggests nevertheless that they have more implicit understanding of beliefs than they can express. After surveying theories that both favor and reject early development of theory of mind (TOM), we address two recent bodies of visual fixation research that provide support for the possibility of knowledge and belief attribution in infancy. The first indicates that infants of 13–15 months are sensitive to others’ false beliefs (and therefore have a representational TOM), the second, that by 12 months or younger infants have two antecedently related psychological understandings: (a) that when agents look they “see” and (b) that seeing plays a presumptive role in producing knowledge. This raises the broader question of whether “mentalism” might be part of core knowledge, which takes us to the earliest manifestation of psychological attribution, the construal of agentive behavior as intentional. Contrary to previous assumptions, recent studies indicate that infants of 3–9 months do not accord intentionality exclusively to humans or to self-propelled objects but rather to any entity that: (1) chooses flexibly among means and ends, (2) responds non-randomly to social overtures, and (3) reacts rationally to changing circumstances (i.e., that is not a mere automaton but is selectively and adaptively responsive to the environment). Other evidence is then examined which suggests that infants begin to construe these and other behaviors in mentalist rather than teleological terms much earlier than expected. Finally, the implications of this empirical record for domain-specific and domain-general theories of TOM are considered.     

幼儿生气和伤心情绪情景理解

考察三类成人（113名幼儿母亲、42名幼儿教师、221名大学生）对西方研究者常用的22个生气和伤心情景中幼儿情绪的推断;以中国成人的情绪情景理解为标准,进一步考察120名4-6岁幼儿生气和伤心情景理解能力的发展。结果表明：三类成人一致推断的6个生气情景和6个伤心情景,与西方研究者的界定基本一致;幼儿的伤心情景理解能力显著高于生气情景理解能力;4岁幼儿的伤心情景理解能力显著低于5岁和6岁幼儿     

幼儿情绪理解、情绪调节与其同伴接纳的关系

选取83名4岁幼儿,探讨他们的情绪理解、情绪调节与其同伴接纳的关系.采用表情识别任务、情绪观点采择任务测查幼儿的情绪理解能力,采用教师评定问卷测查幼儿的情绪调节策略,使用照片社会评价法测查幼儿被同伴接纳的程度.结果表明:在总体上,情绪观点采择与情绪调节策略有关,情绪调节策略与同伴接纳有关,情绪观点采择能力与同伴接纳的边缘正相关在控制年龄后消失了;年长组儿童的攻击策略能显著预测同伴接纳,年幼组儿童的情绪观点采择、攻击策略、建构性策略都与同伴接纳有关,但只有攻击策略、建构性策略能显著预测同伴接纳;年幼组儿童的情绪观点采择分别通过攻击策略、建构性策略两条路径间接影响了同伴接纳.研究结果为进一步了解学前儿童同伴接纳的个体差异来源提供了情绪能力方面的数据.     

论先秦与古希腊神话的精神向度

神话是一种原始文化积淀,是各个民族在发轫时期的精神遗存,中国和希腊神话作为两个伟大民族文化的发源和民族意识的深沉积淀,表现出不同的神话精神特征。