CHRISTIAN REALISM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Christian realism has provided a theological understanding of politics that identifies the limits within which all political choices are made. Those limits are set by a theological understanding of judgment, which reserves the ultimate meaning of history to divine judgment, and by a theological understanding of responsibility, which gives proximate meaning to the choices between greater and lesser goods that are available to human politics. The assessments of global politics offered by Reinhold Niebuhr and other Christian realists during the Second World War and the Cold War which followed owe their influence partly to an astute and historically informed reading of events, but primarily, their influence is due to this basic theological understanding of politics. While the world has changed in ways that clearly reveal limitations in the original formulations of Christian realism, the theological principles of judgment and responsibility continue to provide an understanding of global politics adequate to the new realities of the twenty-first century.     

Brain-Injured Footballers,Voluntary Choice and Social Goods. A Reply to Corlett

ABSTRACT

In this essay, we respond to Angelo Corlett’s criticism of our paper ‘Ethics, Brain Injuries, and Sports: Prohibition, Reform, and Prudence’. To do so, first, we revisit certain assumptions and arguments Corlett makes concerning intercollegiate football and brain injuries in his 2014 paper ‘Should intercollegiate football be eliminated?’. Second, we identify and criticize two key elements in his response regarding (a) ‘luck egalitarianism’, and (b) ‘public goods’. We conclude by reaffirming our critical reading of Corlett’s original 2014 paper and by identifying further elements (i) luck and the nature of individual responsibility; and (ii) the nature of sports as public rather than merely private goods, that he would have to address for his latter 2018 position to hold true.     

Putting Religion Back Into Religious Ethics

This essay on Richard Miller’s Friends and Other Strangers (2016) locates its arguments in the context of how the practice of religious ethics bears upon debates about normativity in the study of religion and the cultural turn in the humanities. After reviewing its main claims about identity and otherness, I focus on three areas. First, while commending Miller’s effort to analogize virtuous empathy with Augustine’s ethics of rightly ordered love, I raise questions about his use of Augustine and his distinctive formulation of Augustinian “iconic realism.” Second, I suggest his discussion of public reason is at odds with the dialogical spirit of the book and may distract from the democratic solidarity required by our political moment. Third, more briefly, I highlight the practical implications of Miller’s vision for higher education at both the graduate and undergraduate level.     

Introduction What aptitudes,values, and behaviors for an already present future?

Abstract

Evolution, in particular demographic growth, and progress in the world of science and technology, has led to deep‐seated transformations on economic, social and political levels. How are we to teach the young to build the 21st century in the most suitable way? What are the values, what are the aptitudes and behaviors which will enable them to flourish as actors on the stage of a changing, complex and uncertain world?     

Relational Complexity and Ethical Responsibility

Richard Miller uses the concepts of alterity and intimacy as touchstones for analyzing neglected aspects of our interpersonal and social relationships. He argues that, as persons in relation, we oscillate between experiences of alterity and intimacy, and it is with a greater awareness of this oscillation that we do best to consider our ethical responsibilities. This paper affirms the value of thinking about—and potentially reimagining—how we conceive and relate to various others. It also makes explicit that, as persons, each of us is separate, not only from some, but from all other persons, even as we are also one with them. Moreover, each of us is different from all other persons, even as we are also like them. The aspects of persons and relationships on which we focus, in a given situation, matter because they partly determine the choices that we make in another’s regard.     

Search for meaning and responsibility

It is essential to restore the sense of action, if efficiency is not to become an end in itself, leading to selfish behavior and exclusion.

In parallel the notion of responsibility must be taken into account in training, in particular intergenerational responsibility, through the promotion of those links which bind us to the world.     

From relation to the field: Modes of unconscious fantasy elaborations1

Abstract

Relational and field theories have much in common, despite divergent foundations. In this paper, several areas of divergence are selected, including the structure of the field as a relational matrix or as an unconscious joint fantasy of the couple; the fate and form of insight; and the nature of the unconscious as relational or ubiquitous. Differences in cognitive and attentional sets are identified and linked to different modes of insight. Using a clinical vignette, these divergences will be illustrated with an attempt to compare and contrast the two approaches through a discussion of how each lens highlights, expands, or forecloses different features of the analytic process. A mode of conceiving the unconscious as unstructured and multiple in potential is offered to reconcile divergent assumptions in therapeutic action. A consideration of Sandor Ferenczi’s clinical emphasis on relaxed technique, elasticity, and especially mutuality suggests that he would have been a field theorist were he among us today.     

Constitutivism and the virtues

In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are “constitutive standards” of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomously efficacious, and the categorical and hypothetical imperatives arise from those two attributes. These principles are also “constitutive” of agency in two more specific ways. First, they meet the “constitution requirement”: the object must meet the standard in question, at least to some extent, in order to be the kind of object that it is. Second, they meet the “self-constitution requirement”: the object makes itself into the kind of object that it is by conforming to the standard. That is, the agent makes herself into an agent, and into the particular agent who she is, by conforming to those standards. Some neo-Aristotelians believe that Aristotelian virtues are constitutive standards. In this paper, I first ask why moral philosophers should focus on the virtues at all, considering the views of David Hume, Philippa Foot, and Aristotle. I then ask whether Aristotelian virtues meet the constitution requirement, and suggest that there are grounds for this view in the Nicomachean Ethics. But Aristotelian virtues do not meet the self-constitution requirement, which leaves Aristotle unable to explain moral responsibility. I end by examining the role that Aristotelian virtues could play in a Kantian ethic.     

The utility of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) facet and item scores in predicting violent recidivism

There is relatively limited research on psychopathy in non-Caucasian ethnic groups and even less on the utility of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) that focuses on PCL-R facet and item scores in predicting violent recidivism. In this study, we assessed the utility of the PCL-R in prospectively predicting violent versus nonviolent recidivism during an 11-year follow-up window. A high-risk sample of 451 incarcerated Korean male offenders was assessed on the PCL-R at baseline. A total of 445 were reconvicted after release (353 violent and 92 nonviolent recidivists). Psychopathy facet scores were higher in violent compared to nonviolent recidivists. Facet 2 (affective) showed the strongest effect size (Cohen's d = 0.53; Percentage change in odds = 22.6%) in predicting violent recidivism. Analyses of the four items constituting the affective facet indicated that callous/lack of empathy (Percentage change in odds = 134.4%) and failure to accept responsibility (Percentage change in odds = 94.5%) were the strongest predictors of violent recidivism. Findings are to our knowledge the first to document the utility of the PCL-R in distinguishing violent from nonviolent recidivism and highlight the role of affective impairment (particularly lack of empathy) in violent recidivism.