Basic desert of reactive emotions

In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.     

In defense of a regulated market economy

The dominant understanding of political corporate social responsibility (CSR) suggests new, broader political roles for businesses in the globalized economy, challenging the classical liberal social order (where business firms’ task is to focus on economic issues and the government's role is to take care of political responsibilities). In this paper, we show how the major framing of the political CSR discussion not only challenges the classical liberal social order but also goes against the more general political economic perspective of the regulated market economy (where strict and [in most cases] strong boundaries exist between business and politics). We argue that this latter tendency of the political CSR discussion is its main weakness. We introduce a Rawlsian reframing of political CSR that is in line with the idea of a global-regulated market economy and compatible with some of the basic global ethical aims of the political CSR movement.     

Review of Jesus

This new psychobiographical analysis of Jesus by Donald Capps promises to be a controversial but important book. While the venture is an engaging one, new theses about what and why Jesus did what he did suffer the same sorts of challenges as have traditional and critical presentations of the historical Jesus. This review engages theological issues and their implications, historical judgments and their plausibility, and methodological approaches and their fruitfulness.     

The Use of Self of the Therapist

This article explores how the Satir model facilitates the development of the self of the therapist, which Virginia Satir strongly advocated. Discovering and developing creative ways to externalize the internal hidden processes of people, she invited therapists to work on their own unresolved issues in their training through various methods such as: family of origin, family reconstruction, ingredients of an interaction, and parts party. Her goal was to increase self-esteem, foster better choice making, increase responsibility, and facilitate personal congruence through a therapeutic process. Although very relevant in the training and professional development of therapists, there has been little exploration or research of this topic.     

政府与个人的责任——中国当代医疗改革的责任伦理学剖析

卫生改革的重点必须放在政府部门;公共卫生,预防与初级医疗保健是人类生存的需要,带有鲜明的公益性和福利性。应由政府投资为主筹集资源,以国家投资为主体负担费用,这个层次的卫生服务产品,属非商品经济部分,并不以赢利为目的,不能引进市场经济,个人对健康负有重要责任,包括：选择医疗保健,决定花费数额,生活方式和卫生习惯的养成,主动接受健康教育,抵抗压力,支持国家与地区的卫生保健政策;个人对自身健康负责是一种道德责任,健商（health quotient)这一重要概念,具有伦理价值和普遍的医学人类学意义;个人对健康负责是一种社会风尚。     

萨特在人的发展问题上的"责任"困境

在萨特的人学理论中,“自由”无疑是一个最重要的范畴。存在就是自由,自由的绝对性使得它成为一切事物及其自身的根据。然而,为了保证人的发展的合理性,在高扬了自由之后,萨特力图在最后解决的却一直是“自由”与“责任”的统一,这样,萨特将自己陷于一个无从解脱的困境之中：由于绝对自由论的前提,他所倡导的对自己、对他人,乃至对世界的“责任”,最后却成了人们逃避责任的一种托辞。     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict

When a group of persons such as a nation orcorporation has a relatively clear structureand set of decision procedures, it is capableof acting and should, it can well be argued, beconsidered morally as well as legallyresponsible. This is not because it is afull-fledged moral person, but becauseassigning responsibility is a human practice,and we have good moral reasons to adopt thepractice of considering such groupsresponsible. From such judgments, however,little follows about the responsibility ofindividual members of such groups; much moreneeds to be ascertained about which officialsor executives are responsible for what beforewe can consider individual members of nationsor corporations responsible.Whether an unorganized group can be morallyresponsible is much less clear, but there havebeen useful discussions in recent years of thepossible responsibility of whites for racism,or males for sexism, and the like. In thisessay I explore arguments for consideringgroups or their members responsible for ethnicconflict. Such groups may lack a clearorganizational structure, but they are notrandom assortments of persons. Groups can andoften should take responsibility for theattitudes and actions of their members, and cansometimes be considered responsible for failingto do so. And persons often can and shouldtake responsibility for the attitudes andactions of the groups of which they aremembers.     

Collective Responsibility

The basic bearer of responsibility is individuals, because that isall there are – nothing else can literally be the bearer of fullresponsibility. Claims about group responsibility therefore needanalysis. This would be impossible if all actions must be understoodas ones that could be performed whether or not anyone else exists.Individuals often act by virtue of membership in certain groups;often such membership bears a causal role in our behavior, andsometimes people act deliberately in order to promote the prospectsof members of a given group. Nevertheless, it is rational to awardproportionally to individual contributions to those actions andindividual shares in the production of the consequences of thoseactions.