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591.
This paper explores an internal relation between wrong-doing and the ability to think in moral terms, through Hobbes’ thought.
I use his neglected retelling of our ‘original sin’ as a springboard, seeing how we then discover a need to vindicate our
own projects in terms shared by others. We become normatively demanding creatures: greedy for normative vindication, eager to judge others amid the difficulties of our world. However there is, of course,
no choice for us but to choose our own principles of judgment, or at least some authority to provide these. Unconvinced by
Hobbes’ remedies, I conclude with one implication for moral philosophy@ a need to look rather differently at agency and responsibility.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
592.
David K. Chan 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2000,3(4):405-434
I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is morally objectionable. I show firstly that the mental state of a rational agent who is certain that a side-effect will occur satisfies Bratman's criteria for intending that effect. I then clarify the nature of the moral distinction in double effect cases and how it can be used to evaluate the moral blameworthiness of agents rather than the moral status of acts. The agent's blameworthiness is reduced not by his lack of intention but by his desire not to bring about the side-effect, and the 'counterfactual test' can be used to determine whether he desires the effect in acting. In my version, the DDE has its rationale in virtue ethics; it is not liable to abuse as the traditional version is; and it makes more plausible distinctions when applied to standard examples. 相似文献
593.
Jeffrey S. Wicken 《Zygon》1989,24(2):153-184
Abstract. I will discuss some of the implications of the ongoing Darwinian revolution for theology as a constructor and interpreter of human meaning. Focus will be directed toward the following issues: How should we best understand ourselves in the new, evolutionary cosmos? What are the problems with the kind of genetic reductionism espoused by neo-Darwinism? How are those problems resolved by the “relational” understanding of life made available by thermodynamics and ecology? How do we generate meaning-structures in this relationally-constituted cosmos? Finally, how do these developments enrich our understandings of responsibility—to each other and to our private conceptions of God? 相似文献
594.
595.
Geoffrey Scarre 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》1998,1(4):423-445
This paper discusses the issue of German moral responsibility for the Holocaust in the light of the thesis of Daniel Goldhagen and others that inherited negative stereotypes of Jews and Jewishness were prime causal factors contributing to the genocide. It is argued that in so far as the Germans of the Third Reich were dupes of an 'hallucinatory ideology,' they strikingly exemplify the 'paradox of moral luck' outlined by Thomas Nagel, that people are not morally responsible for what they are and are not responsible for. The implications of this paradox for the appraisal of German guilt are explored in relation to the views of a number of recent writers on the Holocaust. 相似文献
596.
Critical Consciousness: An Alternative Pathway for Positive Personal and Social Development 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Elena Mustakova-Possardt 《Journal of Adult Development》1998,5(1):13-30
This paper presents a conceptual model of the integrative psychological construct of critical consciousness (CC), defined as a moral awareness which propels individuals to disembed from their cultural, social, and political environment, and engage in a responsible critical moral dialogue with it, making active efforts to construct their own place in social reality and to develop internal consistency in their ways of being. The ontogeny of CC is analyzed in terms of the synergistic interaction between its two main components, structural developmental and moral motivation. The paper describes the cross-cultural interview research which allowed the elaboration of the CC developmental pathway. It posits the dimension of moral motivation as distinguishing the CC pathway, and illustrates the continuum between predominantly moral and expediency motivation through brief case vignettes. The paper differentiates three developmental macrolevels of CC, and illustrates through case vignettes two alternatives of social consciousness at the level of conventional morality—CC and non-CC. Some possible sources of moral motivation in personal history and biography are discussed. 相似文献
597.
The ethical codes of the professional engineering bodies identify the responsibilities of the engineer. Of equal importance
to the codes are the virtues which enable the engineer to fulfil these responsibilities. After briefly reviewing such virtues
this paper argues that the systematic learning of virtues is possible in a formal way through learner centred learning. Central
to this learning experience is the development of integrity which focuses the other major virtues and enables reflection upon
them. A review of undergraduate courses suggests how this can be achieved.
Rev’d. Dr. Simon Robinson is a lecturer in the Centre for Business and Professional Ethics at the University of Leeds. 相似文献
598.
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN 《The Journal of Ethics》1997,1(1):27-43
We are planning agents and we are, or so we suppose, responsible agents. How are these two distinctive aspects of our agency related? In his "Freedom and Resentment" Peter Strawson understands responsible agency in terms of "reactive attitudes" like resentment and gratitude, attitudes which are normally embedded in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." I draw on Strawson's account to sketch an answer to my question about responsibility and planning. First, the fact that an action is plan-embedded can influence the agent's degree of culpability for that action; for such embeddings can constitute or indicate important facts about the quality of the agent's will. Second, general planning incapacities can to some extent exempt an agent from normal judgments of responsibility. My argument for this second claim appeals to the normal roles of planning in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." 相似文献
599.
George Kaufman 《Zygon》1997,32(2):175-188
This article sketches what is required of a world picture (religious or nonreligious) that is intended to provide orientation in the world for ongoing human life today. How do we move from conceptions and theories prominent in the modern sciences—such as cosmic and biological evolution—to an overall picture or cosmology which can orient us for the effective address of today's deepest human problems? A biohistoricalconception of the human is proposed in answer to this question. 相似文献
600.
论医疗事故的法律责任 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
曾建敏 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》1999,20(5):7-9
随着我国医疗卫生体制的改革、法制建设的发展,特别是新《刑法》的施行、《执业医师法》的颁布,关于医疗事故中医方行政、民事和刑事法律责任的法律规定正逐步健全。为了引起医方的高度重视、提高医疗质量、减少医疗事故的发生、有效地避免触犯法律,故对医疗事故概念的界定、构成、免责情形及三种具体法律责任作了较为系统的阐述。 相似文献