Blockchain,The Greater Good,and Human and Civil Rights

The central theme of this paper is that the development of a technology that is predicted to have a major impact on the way we transact with each other should be a matter where the needs of society at large are taken into account. Where the technology is one that emerges from the domain of the Internet, inclusivity becomes even more acute in order to avoid widening the already existing gap in reaping the “digital dividend.” With blockchain, the obligation could even be seen as a moral one, as blockchain is said to have the potential to negate the scope for the abuse of trust by states and institutions. This could be a game changer in areas such as public procurement and the conduct of elections where abuse can lead to the denial of essential resources and a concomitant loss of life, or to conflict and mass killings. Blockchain presents an opportunity for the Internet development community to claim a degree of recognition in the human rights realm by aiding civil intervention in areas where military intervention has been deemed inappropriate.     

Strawson’s modest transcendental argument

Although Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was published over fifty years ago and has been widely discussed, its main argument is still notoriously difficult to pin down. The most common – but in my view, mistaken – interpretation of Strawson’s argument takes him to be providing a ‘relentlessly’ naturalistic framework for our responsibility practices. To rectify this mistake, I offer an alternative interpretation of Strawson’s argument. As I see it, rather than offering a relentlessly naturalistic framework for moral responsibility, Strawson actually develops a transcendental argument, which grounds our moral responsibility practices in the practical perspective of social agents. However, the aims of this essay are not purely interpretative. Strawson’s essay continues to have important implications for a number of issues that arise in the contemporary debates that concern free will and moral responsibility. In particular, it puts significant pressure on moral responsibility sceptics like Derk Pereboom [Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001] who think that the truth of moral responsibility scepticism has no worrisome implications for our lives with others.     

Are you willing to pay the price? The impact of corporate social (ir)responsibility on consumer behavior towards national and foreign brands

This research examines how the country of origin (national vs. foreign) affects the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and consumers' willingness to pay and purchase intention. In the study, we adopted a first‐price sealed bid auction approach, using money in a “real‐world” setting. The results showed that CSR/corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR) affects consumer behavior and, particularly, consumers' willingness to pay and purchase intention. The study supports both the moderation hypothesis of country of origin in the relationship between CSR/CSIR and willingness to pay and between CSR/CSIR and purchase intention. In the globalization context, these results have important implications for brands' communication and marketing strategy and can stimulate important insights in organizations. Future research directions and limitations are also discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hawking Says that Discovering Intelligent Life Elsewhere Would Spark Greater Compassion and Humility among Us … But Why Wait?

It matters how we talk to each other about METI and about contact, and Hawking could set a better example.     

Biographical truths and their clinical consequences: Understanding ‘embodied memories’ in a third psychoanalysis with a traumatized patient recovered from severe poliomyelitis

The relationship between ‘narrative’ and ‘historical–biographical truth’ in psychoanalytic treatment has become the subject of many controversial debates in recent years. Findings of contemporary memory research have lead to great scepticism as to whether therapists are able objectively and reliably to reconstruct biographical events on the basis of their observations in the therapeutic situation. Some authors even claim that psychoanalysts should concentrate exclusively on observing the here and now of the patient′s behaviour within the transference relationship to the analyst. In this paper it will be discussed whether the baby has been thrown out with the bathwater in this debate. Centred around the insights from a third psychoanalysis with a patient who suffered from a severe case of childhood polio, the hypothesis will be discussed that working through the traumatic experience in the transference with the analyst, as well as the reconstruction of the biographical–historical reality of the trauma suffered, prove to be indispensable for a lasting structural change. Integration of the trauma into one′s own personal history and identity is and remains one of the main aims of a psychoanalytic treatment with severely traumatized patients. The reconstruction of the original trauma is indispensable in helping the patient to understand the ‘language of the body’ and to connect it with visualizations, images and verbalizations. The irreversable wounds and vulnerability of his body as the ‘signs of his specific traumatic history’ have to be recognized, emotionally accepted and understood in order to live with them and not deny them any longer. Another important aspect in psychoanalysis is to develop the capability to mentalize, in other words, to understand the intentions of central (primary) objects related to the trauma. The concept of ‘embodied memory’ might be helpful in understanding precisely in what way ‘early trauma is remembered by the body’. Observing in detail the sensory‐motor coordinations in the analytic relationship enables one to decode the inappropriate intensity of affects and fantasies which match the original traumatic interaction and are revealed as inappropriate reactions in the present, new relationship to the analyst.     

The ethics of belief and two conceptions of christian faith

This article deals with two types of Christian faith in the light of the challenges posed by the ethics of belief. It is proposed that the difficulties with Clifford’s formulation of that ethic can best be handled if the ethic is interpreted in terms of role-specific intellectual integrity. But the ethic still poses issues for the traditional interpretation of Christian faith when it is conceived as a series of discrete but related propositions, especially historical propositions. For as so conceived, the believer makes claims that fall within the province of an intellectual discipline, history, that requires evidence and rules of procedure for the adjudication of such claims. It is noteworthy how few Christian theologians and philosophers of religion deal with the issue in these terms. Alvin Plantinga is a noteworthy exception and his views are examined and criticized because, among other things, his conclusion is that any believer without having any training in biblical languages or historical studies can know that the New Testament narratives are true. The article then considers a second conception of Christian faith in which this conflict does not arise. One finds it in the works of Schleiermacher, Wittgenstein, and, surprisingly, in the conception of faith found in the early writings of Karl Barth.     

Believing one’s reasons are good

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper (1) articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, (2) motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, (3) defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and (4) shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility.     

Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don’t!

This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of any interest or power.

责任的二重性及责任意识的培养——基于心理学的视野

责任就是做好分内应做之事,既包括职务客观要求的“应做之事”,也包括个体主观认同的“分内之事”,体现出客观与主观二重性。这一特性决定了责任意识包含对应做之事进行客观认识的“责任认知”与对分内之事进行主观认同的“责任情感”二个方面。培养责任认知可以按照传统的教育方法,但责任情感的培养却需另辟蹊径。该文基于心理学的研究成果,从责任分散效应、责任归因理论与角色扮演理论等出发提出了培养责任意识的几条途径。