Freedom, Preference and Autonomy

Philosophers have advocated different kinds of freedom, but each has value and none should be neglected in a complete theory of freedom and responsibility. There are three kinds of freedom of preference and action that should be distinguished. A person S may fully prefer to do A at every level, and that is one kind of freedom. A person S may autonomously prefer to do A when S has the preference structure concerning doing A because S prefers to have that very preference structure, and that is a second kind of freedom. A person S may prefer to do A when S could have preferred otherwise, and that is a third kind of freedom. These forms of freedom may be combined, but they are valuable and essentially independent. They all involve the metamental ascendence of preference over desire, but it is autonomous preference that makes a person the author of his or her preference. The responsibility a person has for what he or she does out of a preference for doing it depends on the kinds of freedom of preference the person has and must be ranked in terms of them.     

Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency

This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent's determining or controlling her action (if it's not the action's being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" phenomenal quality and is undetermined by antecedent events - and Timothy O'Connor's agent-causation view. It defends simple indeterminism against O'Connor's objections to it and offers objections to O'Connor's view.     

Heidegger's Brightness as a Responsibility of the Therapist in Existential Family Therapy

The author reflects upon the Heideggerian concepts of thrown-ness, death imagery, arrogance and brightness and their usefulness in existential family therapy. The article describes and illustrates with clinical material the process of helping a couple or family to move from an arrogance response to thrownness and death imagery to the response of brightness as attendants of Being. The responsibilities of the therapist in facilitating such a process are also described.Director of the Worthington Logotherapy Institute, co-director of Lantz and Lantz Counseling Associates, and a professor at The Ohio State University. College of Social Work     

Community psychology and politics

If community psychology is to profit from its experience to develop an accurate and consistent theory of the effect on individuals of societal pressures, it will need to review reflexively its own position in relation to politics and empowerment. Despite an inspirational and at times positively grandiose rhetoric, psychologists are in fact in no particularly powerful position to influence the factors which cause personal distress, and should not, through a pretence of therapeutic potency, ‘psychologize’ the notion of ‘empowerment’ and reinforce therapeutic ideals which are in fact destructively normative. Without attempting to appropriate politics, community psychology can, however, offer an essentially scientific analysis of power and distress, which may have therapeutically ‘demystifying’ qualities as well as important political implications for the wider society.     

Wanton Responsibility

Mainstream accounts of responsible agency either overlook or discount wanton agents as plausible candidates for responsible agency. This is largely due to the compatibilist project of such accounts, and to their deemphasis of historical and modal considerations. I argue that wantons – those who are indifferent to the desires that move them to act – can and ought to be counted as responsible agents. Indeed, they deserve special blame for the acts of wrong doing that issue from their wanton behavior.     

On a neglected feature of moral agency

Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.     

Vertical vs horizontal bullying: A need of socio‐interactive ethical trainings at workplace

Bullying at workplaces is a growing problem associated with several antecedents and outcomes of psychological disorders. Extant literature shows the relationship of victimization with the owning‐up curriculum to confront bullying, but so far there is little research to cure the issue of bullying through ethics and there is no study to check the impact of ethical lessons and exercises in training materials to curb bullying at workplace. The current paper is based on a literature review of aggression and bullying, and chiefly addresses the HR practices in rescuing the people from peer victimization. Conceptually segregating supervisor‐subordinate (vertical) and peer‐peer (horizontal) bullying psychology, this paper attempts to see what possible corrective steps can be taken by senior managers, supervisors and psychologists to resolve this critical problem through interior capacities. In this paper, we have developed three propositions for conducting a future empirical investigation in connection to a cohort study. By addressing the counterproductive/deviant behavior, the present report is likely to be beneficial for psychology scientists and HR practitioners in noticing and resolving the bullying issues at the workplace for the well‐being of employees.     

The impact of acknowledgement and denial of responsibility for harm on victim groups' perceptions of justice,power, and intergroup attitudes

Acknowledgement of responsibility for in‐group harmdoing is considered a precondition for reconciliation. However, we know little about its impact on victim groups. Using a mixed methods approach, in two studies in Bangladesh we examined the role of acknowledgement and denial of responsibility on intergroup outcomes. Study 1 used an open‐ended survey to assess Bangladeshis' perceptions about acknowledgement and denial of responsibility for the mass violence committed by the Pakistani army on Bangladeshis during the 1971 war. Study 2 experimentally examined the effects and the potential mechanisms (emotional reactions, perceived injustice, and relative power) through which acknowledgement and denial of responsibility impact two intergroup outcomes: out‐group animosity and willingness for contact. Both studies demonstrated the importance of anger and perceived injustice as mediators of the effects of acknowledgement and denial of responsibility on intergroup outcomes. We draw implications for theory and for strategies to address past victimization across different contexts of conflict.     

The Influence of Perceived Deservingness on Policy Decisions Regarding Aid to the Poor

In the current climate of welfare reform, it is important to understand how perceptions of the poor affect policy decisions. This paper examines how people distinguish between the undeserving poor and the deserving poor, and how this differentiation affects policy decisions. Survey respondents rated each policy in a set of hypothetical policies on a liberal-conservative continuum. Analyses were then conducted to explore differences in the respondents' likelihood of recommending the most liberal and the most conservative of these policies. Study 1 demonstrated that liberal policies were more likely to be recommended and conservative policies were less likely to be recommended when the target group was perceived to be deserving rather than undeserving. Study 2 replicated this effect of perceived deservingness and demonstrated an effect of attribution of responsibility. That is, liberal policies were more likely to be recommended and conservative policies were less likely to be recommended when the responsibility for the target's poverty was attributed to society rather than to the individual.