Rethinking Epistemic Relativism

“Relativism” is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy, but relativistic theories are not entirely unappealing—they have features that might be tempting if they weren't thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. The aim of this paper is to rethink both our attitude to epistemic relativism and the basic features of the view itself. The paper discusses four objections and uses them to isolate five constraints on a more plausible epistemic relativism. It then sketches out a view that meets all of these constraints. This stratified epistemic relativism offers a complex, socially informed picture of justification that accounts for the many different kinds of roles that epistemic agents act, and think, in accordance with each day, and can serve as a starting point for constructing a more detailed epistemic relativism, which could secure its appealing benefits without incurring the costs traditionally associated with relativist views.     

Striking coincidences: How realists should reason about them

Many metaethicists assume that our normative judgments are both by and large true, and the product of causal forces. In other words, many metaethicists assume that the set of normative judgments that causal forces have led us to make largely coincides with the set of true normative judgments. How should we explain this coincidence? This is what Sharon Street (2006) calls the practical/theoretical puzzle. Some metaethicists can easily solve this puzzle, but not all of them can, Street argues; she takes the puzzle to constitute a specific challenge for normative realism. In this article I elucidate Street’s puzzle and outline possible solutions to it, framed in terms of a general strategy for reasoning about coincidences. I argue that the success of Street’s challenge crucially depends on how we set the ‘reference class’ of normative judgments that we could have endorsed, assuming realism. I conclude that while the practical/theoretical puzzle falls short of posing a general challenge for normative realism, it can be successful as a selective challenge for specific realist views.     

Dialoguing Height Psychology into a life of interconnectedness: Response to commentaries by Hwang,Bhawuk, King & Hodgetts,Kashima, and Xie,Su, & Zhong

Liu (Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 000, 000) attempts to articulate an epistemology for the aspirational practice of Height Psychology as a human science informed by Kantian epistemology in dialogue with other philosophies, especially Confucianism and Taoism. Height Psychology is a framework or metatheory for the practice of teaching, research, and service rooted in Kantian epistemology, in dialogue with other philosophies. It provides a holistic philosophy for social scientists responding to wicked problems unfolding over long periods of time. In responding to commentaries, I suggest a corollary to Shweder's (Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3, p. 207) ‘One mind, many mentalities’: ‘Many indigenous psychologies, interconnected by one epistemology’. Height Psychology is about holding to an invisible moral centre. The practical postulates are foundational to the moral and ethical practices of human societies: they are for doing, their value is ontological. Human agency, proscribed by natural science epistemologies takes centre stage in Height Psychology by facilitating social scientists to act reflexively from multiple positions (from basic to action research) to benefit society. Height Psychology is dedicated to articulating and actioning the moral and ethical basis of a human science that can assist present and future generations of social scientists to meet the grave situational futures facing us in different parts of the world.     

Humility,Virtue Epistemology,and the New Atheism

Most criticisms of the New Atheism are attempts at traditional apologetics. However, Christians who wish to defend the faith against the onslaughts of these critics might appeal to virtue epistemology by showing that the New Atheists do not possess the necessary habits of thought that a person would need to make a careful and thoughtful consideration of the evidence. In fact, the New Atheists fail to practice intellectual humility and this prevents them from genuine engagement with the strengths religion offers.     

Theology After the Scientific Revolution: The Significance of Nancey Murphy’s Contribution to Philosophy of Religion

This paper evaluates Nancey Murphy’s contribution to philosophy of religion paying special attention to epistemology and ethics. I argue that Murphy’s intellectual moves are motivated by a reflective and constructive engagement—around particular loci such as human knowledge, divine action, and the moral nature of the universe—with reductive materialism as a rival tradition of inquiry. At paper’s end, I suggest an amendment in Murphy’s contribution to ethics.     

God of the hinge: treating LGBTQIA patients

This paper looks at systems of gender within the context of analysis. It explores the unique challenges of individuation faced by transsexual, transgender, gender queer, gender non‐conforming, cross‐dressing and intersex patients. To receive patients generously we need to learn how a binary culture produces profound and chronic trauma. These patients wrestle with being who they are whilst simultaneously receiving negative projections and feeling invisible. While often presenting with the struggles of gender conforming individuals, understanding the specifically gendered aspect of their identity is imperative. An analyst's unconscious bias may lead to iatrogenic shaming. The author argues that rigorous, humble inquiry into the analyst's transphobia can be transformative for patient, analyst, and the work itself. Analysis may, then, provide gender‐variant patients with their first remembered and numinous experience of authentic connection to self. Conjuring the image of a hinge, securely placed in the neutral region of a third space, creates a transpositive analytic temenos. Invoking the spirit of the Trickster in the construction of this matrix supports the full inclusion of gender‐variant patients. Nuanced attunement scaffolds mirroring and the possibility of play. Being mindful that gender is sturdy and delicate as well as mercurial and defined enriches the analyst's listening.     

THE epistemologies of parsimony: A review of Ockham's razors: A user's manual by Elliott Sober

Sober analyzes two paradigms of parsimony that have been used successfully in science. These are associated with two interpretations of probability: Bayesian and frequentist. Sober applies these paradigms to problems in biology, psychology, and philosophy. In the chapter on psychology, he argues that objective data consisting of environmental input and two or more concurrent responses could be used to refute empirically the radical behaviorist thesis that probability of learned responses can be accounted for solely on the basis of environmental variables. Sober believes that such data are readily available and offers a thought experiment to illustrate his point. Behavior analysts, however, would want actual experimental data, undoubtedly with animals, before accepting any such refutation. Nonetheless, Sober's philosophical point about the type of experiment that would be capable of refuting this thesis is valid. The behavior analytic program, however, does not depend upon the truth of this thesis.     

The mobile frontiers of Piaget’s psychology. From academic tourism to interdisciplinary collaboration / Las fronteras móviles de la psicología de Piaget. Del turismo académico a la colaboración interdisciplinaria

Jean Piaget’s (1896–1980) interdisciplinarity was related to his psychology in several ways. First, he was a simple tourist of other fields: an interested outsider. But as he became increasingly involved in the professionalization of the discipline, he moved through different contexts that constrained the possibilities for successful action in new and different ways. To make these clear, we adopt a little-known aspect of his later epistemological framework: the open hierarchy of levels. This then affords new perspectives of his life, his work, his theory and his location in the history of both Swiss psychology and French psychology. It also outlines his reasoning regarding the necessity of a disciplined approach to interdisciplinary collaboration, institutionalized in the founding of his International Centre for Genetic Epistemology. We therefore come not only to a fuller understanding of how Piaget thought scientific knowledge develops, but also of how the boundaries of scientific disciplines are pushed back.     

Reasons and doubt in Dharmottara and his critics

This paper examines the role of doubt in the classification of inferential reasons in Dharmottara’s Nyāyabindu?īkā, and in the works of his Nyāya rivals Ke?avami?ra and Jayantabha??a. As deeply systematic thinkers, larger themes in these philosophers’ metaphysics directly determine the more local issues in epistemology and inferential theory, helping to explain, and show the significance of, the differences in their accounts of inferential reasons. For Ke?ava, an ontology which includes real universals allows for an externalist, reliabilist epistemology, on which the conditions for a genuine inferential reason can be stated in an absolute (as opposed to cogniser-relative) manner. For Dharmottara, on the other hand, an ontology in which mentally constructed universals are imposed upon real particulars leads to greater dependency on the cognising agent, such that the triple conditions for the inferential reason are formulated in a cogniser-relative way. These differences lead to a more restrictive list of acceptable reasons on Dharmottara’s part, which excludes cases involving doubt.