EMERGENCE AND HUMAN UNIQUENESS: LIMITING OR DELIMITING EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION?

Abstract. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence presents a highly sophisticated argument against any kind of uncritical theology that might want to follow science into a world of overly narrow, compartmentalized disciplines that do not sufficiently communicate between themselves. Clayton argues persuasively that the basic structure of the phenomenal world is multileveled, with emergent properties and degrees of freedom that cannot be adequately described, predicted, or explained in terms of lower‐level phenomena only. Moreover, the various levels of organization are linked to one another by interfaces of mutual constraint in terms of upward and downward causation. The most valuable part of Clayton's argument, however, is that in a philosophy of emergence one must also, if not especially, account for the role of the biological sciences and especially for the influence of human thoughts and skills, human choices and actions, and—one of the most important causes of all—human purposes. Clayton's biggest challenge is that the level of human personhood offers us the only appropriate level to introduce the question of God and the possibility of divine agency. I critically evaluate this central claim and its implications not only for the extent of divine influence on the world but also for the scope and limitations of the interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and the sciences.     

The Relation of Personal Epistemology to Parenting Style and Goal Orientation in College Mothers

This study sought to establish the relevance of mothers’ epistemic beliefs to their parenting style and preferred academic goals for their child. College mothers (N = 163) from primarily working class families completed a variety of self-report measures including a modified version of Schommer’s [(1990). Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 498–504] Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire, the Parental Attitudes Questionnaire-Revised [Reitman, Rhode, Hupp, & Altobello (2002). Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 24(2), 119–127], and several goal orientation scales. Results indicated that a view of learning as effortful and under the learner’s control and a view of knowledge as actively constructed were associated with an authoritative parenting style and with a preference for their child to focus on learning, improvement, and effort in approaching academic tasks. By contrast, a view of learning as quick, straightforward, relatively passive and as based in innate constraints and a view of knowledge as consisting of discreet, unambiguous facts were associated with authoritarian and permissive styles and the adoption of performance goals for one’s child. Portions of this study were presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development in Atlanta, April, 2005.     

A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples

Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition. __________ Translated from Fudan Xuebao 复旦学报 (Fudan Journal), 2004 (5)     

PERSONALITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY: COGNITIVE SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY AS A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Abstract. Implicit in the cognitive social learning model of personality as articulated by Walter Mischel, Albert Bandura, and others, is an epistemology which emphasizes the activity of the mind in the construction of knowledge. Using Mischel's five person variables as an outline, the epistemic implications of this model of personality are developed and then illustrated by application to William James's typology of the religious personality and to the current debate over hermeneutic and empirical approaches to studying human behavior. This approach explicates the connection between personality characteristics and epistemological approaches in terms of cognitive social learning theory.     

Rationale for a pragma-dialectical perspective

Starting from a concept of reasonableness as well-consideredness, it is discussed in what way science could serve as a model for reasonable argumentation. It turns out that in order to be reasonable two requirements have to be fulfilled. The argumentation should comply with rules which are both problem-valid and intersubjectively valid. Geometrical and anthropological perspectives don't meet these criteria, but a critical perspective does. It is explained that a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation which agrees with this critical perspective is indeed problem-valid and that strong pragmatic and utilitarian arguments can be given for its intersubjective validity. Thus, conventional validity is promoted for a code of conduct for discussants who want to resolve their disputes reasonably by way of a critical discussion.     

Goldman and the foundations of social epistemology

This essay argues that Alvin I. Goldman's truth-linked theory of group knowledge (veritism) omits individual components of social cognition, that all group based theories of knowledge lead to scepticism, and that if any sense is to be made of social knowledge, it must be done on individualist lines. I argue that Goldman's veritism can be reconstructed by adopting a reliabilist theory,social reliabilism. And I argue that Goldman's objections to a particular sort of consensualism are not telling. So there are now two plausible and competing theories of social knowledge-social reliabilism and consensualism.I am grateful to Keith Lehrer and Alvin Goldman for their criticisms of previous drafts of this paper.     

Social epistemology as a rhetoric of inquiry

Fuller's program of social epistemology engages a rhetoric of inquiry that can be usefully compared and contrasted with other discursive theories of knowledge, such as that of Richard Rorty. Resisting the model of conversation, Fuller strikes an activist posture and lays the groundwork for normative knowledge policy, in which persuasion and credibility play key roles. The image of investigation is one that overtly rejects the storehouse conception of knowledge and invokes the metaphors of distributive economics. Productive questions arise as to how notions of creation and distribution might guide this rhetoric.     

On Holisms: Insular, Inclusivist, and Postmodern

Nancey Murphy's offer to take us “beyond liberalism and fundamentalism” is an exciting one: Who wants to be caught in the clutches of a fruitless theological dispute? She argues that the key to our escape is “Anglo-American postmodernity.” I analyze what Murphy means by this term and why it may turn out to be a more precarious escape route than one might think. Holism or “post-foundationalism” is indeed inescapable for science/religion discussions today, but an inclusivist holism is preferable to Murphy's insular holism     

Radical behaviorism: A productive and needed philosophy for education

Radical behaviorism is the philosophy of the science of behavior originating in the work of B. F. Skinner and elaborated over the years by a community of researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Radical behaviorism is a complete, or thoroughgoing behaviorism in that all human behavior, public and private, is explained in terms of its functional relations with environmental events. Radical behaviorism is often misrepresented in the literatures of education and psychology. Two fundamental misconceptions of radical behaviorism are that its followers (1) are logical positivists who require that a phenomenon be observed by two or more people before it qualifies for scientific analysis, and (2) either will not or cannot incorporate private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings) into their analyses of human behavior. This paper offers an advocacy perspective on contemporary radical behaviorism. In particular, we define radical behaviorism and briefly outline the history of the term's use in psychological literature, discuss the scientific practice of behavior analysts, explain the intolerance exhibited by radical behaviorists, and comment on the use of popularity as a criterion for good science. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent shift in educational research and practice from empiricism and outcome-oriented intervention toward a holistic/constructivist philosophy described by its advocates as incompatible with behaviorally-based instruction.     

Storytellers and Scenario Spinners: Some Reflections on Religion and Science in Light of a Pragmatic, Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge

Asserting that both scientists and religious thinkers are involved in telling stories about the past and spinning scenarios about the future, I first compare and contrast the purposes of scientific and religious storytelling. Then, in light of some recent work on brain and language evolution, I offer a possible story about how humans might have become storytellers. Finally, I discuss how religious stories might be evaluated pragmatically and even scientifically by developing Lakatosian-type research programs.