INTO TERRA INCOGNITA: CHARTING BEYOND PETER HARRISON'S THE TERRITORIES OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Peter Harrison's The Territories of Science and Religion throws down a serious challenge to advocates of dialogue as the primary means of engagement between science and religion. This article accepts the validity of this challenge and looks at four possible responses to it. The first—a return to the past—is rejected. The remaining three—exploring new epistemic frameworks for the encounter of science and religion, broadening out the engagement beyond the context of the physical sciences and Western culture, and looking at ways in which scientific and theological practitioners may collaborate on practical problems—are all offered as potential ways in which science and religion may engage with one another, in ways which move beyond Harrison's critique.     

Exile and return: from phenomenology to naturalism (and back again)

Abstract

Naturalism in twentieth century philosophy is founded on the rejection of ‘first philosophy’, as can be seen in Quine’s rejection of what he calls ‘cosmic exile’. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology falls within the scope of what naturalism rejects, but I argue that the opposition between phenomenology and naturalism is less straightforward than it appears. This is so not because transcendental phenomenology does not involve a problematic form of exile, but because naturalism, in its recoil from transcendental philosophy, creates a new form of exile, what I call in the paper ‘exile from within’. These different forms of exile are the result of shared epistemological aspirations, which, if set aside, leave open the possibility of phenomenology without exile. In the conclusion of the paper, I appeal to Merleau-Ponty as an example of what phenomenology without epistemology might look like.     

Just methods in revolting times

This article takes up the challenge of critical methods in “revolting times,” as we conduct qualitative research on (in)justice festering within repulsive inequality gaps, and yet surrounded by the thrill of radical social movements dotting the globe. I introduce a call for “critical bifocality,” a term coined by Lois Weis and myself, to argue for research designs that interrogate how history, structures, and lives shape, reveal, and refract the conditions we study. Borrowing from critical researchers long gone, W. E. B. Du Bois in his text The Philadelphia Negro and Marie Jahoda in her stunning case study Marienthal, I offer up a set of epistemological muddles and methodological experiments, hoping to incite a conversation about our responsibilities as critical psychologists in deeply contentious times, refusing downstream analyses and resurrecting instead what Edward Said called “lost causes.”     

Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion

Abstract

I can, given the right conditions, transmit my knowledge to you by telling you some information. If I know the time, and if all goes well, I can bring it about that you know it too. If conditions are right, all I have to do is assert to you what time it is. Paradigmatically, speakers use assertions to transmit what they know to their hearers. Clearly, assertion and testimony are tightly connected. The nature of this connection, however, is not so clear. According to many accounts, assertion has an epistemic constitutive norm. This norm appears to be able to account for some important features of testimony: first, testimonial knowledge transmission, second, the reliability of testimony, and third, the epistemic rights exchanged in cases of testimony. In this paper, however, I argue against this apparent ability. The constitutive norm of assertion, I argue, plays no role in accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission, or of the epistemic rights that testimony confers. This is especially clear when we consider the general norms to which we’re held. Epistemological accounts of testimony can and should, therefore, avoid the difficult debate over the constitutive norm of assertion.     

论皮亚杰的方法论及其当代意义

皮亚杰从生物学的适应性和平衡化概念出发, 论证了有机体和外部环境之间的双向互动关系, 进一步通过认知过程与生物学过程的“同构”, 建立了一种结构论的发生认识论。发生认识论的主要论题包括:主客体相互作用论、认知结构的建构论, 以及心理逻辑论等。皮亚杰的理论建构方法有两个重要特征:第一, 皮亚杰强调功能相对于结构的逻辑先在意义。功能是有机体对环境的适应与平衡化。因此, 皮亚杰的方法论是一种功能论。第二, 皮亚杰方法论的思想基础是辩证法。皮亚杰的发生认识论一方面批判唯理论, 另一方面批判经验论, 最终形成了一套独特的认识论体系。皮亚杰的发生认识论对当今心理学和心灵哲学研究中诸多“难问题”, 诸如“他心问题”、“归纳问题”等, 可能提供了元理论层面和方法层面的引领和启发。     

Evaluation of aggressive interactions in interpersonal and intergroup contexts

The article deals with possible differences in the evaluation of interpersonal and intergroup aggression. Study I investigated whether the typical perspective-specific divergence in judgments about aggressive interactions (with actors evaluating their behavior as more reasonable and less inappropriate than recipients) varied in interpersonal and intergroup contexts. Additionalty, the possible mediating influence of lay epistemic motivation and subjective judgmental confidence was explored. Results indicated that the social context had an important impact on the evaluation of aggressive interactions: there was a lower dissent between actors and recipients in the intergroup than in the interpersonal condition. However, the direction of this pattern of data differed from what could be derived from theories of aggressive and intergroup behavior. Subjective confidence and lay epistemic motivation did not influence the inappropriatencess ratings. Study II tried to shed some further light on the context-specific evaluation of aggressive interaction by presenting episodes of different severity and by obtaining judgments on both actions as well as reactions. Results showed that-irrespective of severity-aggressive reactions were evaluated more negatively in intergroup contexts. It is proposed that this effect stemmed from context-specific differences in the application of the norm of reciprocity.     

From Interpretation to Commentary: Truth and Meaning in Psychotherapy

Some of the epistemological consequences of adopting the narrative point of view in psychotherapy are explored. Attempts to apply principles and norms from the philosophy of science to psychotherapy are criticized, since psychotherapy is not a science, but a technique. In addition, those models, related to the acquisition of knowledge, that consider that knowledge could increase by apposition without transforming the subject who is knowing are discussed. Natural science and hermeneutic metaphors are not suitable for understanding the practice of psychotherapy. Traditionally, the interpretation of symptoms or problems to solve has been the main instrument in therapy. In other words, the therapist tries to look for the truth hidden under the symptom, which then becomes a sign. Our proposition is to substitute these metaphors for the paradigm of text commentary. Text commentary, instead of providing a unique truth, provides a set of meanings suggested by a commentary. Characteristics that allow one to distinguish a good and a bad commentary, and implications of the paradigm described for the training of psychotherapists, are discussed.     

Characteristically Lutheran Leanings?

Is there a distinct Lutheran epistemology? I contend that there is. This epistemology, coming from the writings of (and subsequent reflections upon the writings of) Martin Luther, is uniquely poised–due to its emphasis on history, its affirmation of "the ordinary" and embodied life, its ability to have genuine dialogue with "secular" disciplines, and its built–in humility–for addressing the interdisciplinary political, social justice, environmental, and other issues that face us today. Likewise, one is able to embrace this epistemology whether he or she is a geneticist, a priest, a teacher, or a doctor; in fact it is this epistemology that can enable us to discern vocational goals.     

Science and the Future of Theology: Critical Issues

The ambivalent reputation of theology as an academic discipline is attributed to the often circular character of its procedures based on presumed authoritative sources. Recently, science too has come under the shadow of "postmodernist" critiques but, it is argued, has been able to withstand them successfully and make epistemologically warrantedclaims to be depicting reality—thereby vindicating human rationality. Evolutionary epistemological considerations also reinforce confidence in the more general deliverances of the human exploration of reasonableness through inference to the best explanation (IBE). The consequences of applying IBE, with its associated criteria, in theological investigation are considered in relation to theology as it is and as it might be. A number of issues critical for thedevelopment of a credible theology are identified. In spite of the challenging and somewhat negative view of contemporary theology to which this leads, hope is expressed that a genuinely credible "evangelical,""catholic," and liberal theology may yet emerge for the new millennium.