Beyond the qualitative paradigm: A framework for introducing diversity within qualitative psychology

The case for qualitative research in psychology is considered. We argue against the idea that qualitative research is merely a matter of technique or method, and question the utility of viewing it as a unitary paradigm. Rather, the links between epistemology, methodology, and method are explored within three theorized strands of qualitative inquiry, making reference to illustrative projects. Each strand is organized around a different approach to the issues of justifying and warranting psychological knowledge: (1) reliability and validity; (2) generativity and grounding; and (3) discourse and reflexivity. These are exemplified in Miles and Huberman's ‘data display’ model, Glaser and Strauss' method of ‘grounded theory’, and in various forms of ‘discourse’ analysis. Reflections upon points of contact between the three strands address two main issues: (1) rendering research publicly accountable; and (2) challenging relativism.     

Naturalisms and Religion

Such terms as materialism , naturalism , and near synonyms evoke strong negative reactions among many believers. However, the notion of naturalism has various meanings; implications for religion differ for the several varieties of naturalism. In this paper I analyze epistemological and ontological variants of naturalism and explore the perspectives for religion within a nonreductive ontological naturalism.     

Making psychology incorruptible

This paper is a response to criticisms, by Peterson (1995) and others, of positions I took in an earlier article, “Manifesto for a science of clinical psychology” (McFall, 1991). I had argued that professional practice and training in clinical psychology must be governed by a scientific epistemology, and had outlined some of the specific reasons and implications. In this article, I attempt to correct misinterpretations of my previous arguments, to clarify ambiguities, and to fill any serious omissions. The fundamental points of the original Manifesto are defended, buttressed, and extended. In response to issues highlighted by the criticisms, two new corollaries are added to those offered in the original article. These summarize the arguments presented in this paper, with special emphasis on the essential role of skepticism as the best protection against the corruption of knowledge and practice in psychology.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed:
Raymond D. Boisvert, John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time
Larry A. Hickman, ed., Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation
Jennifer Welchman, Dewey's Ethical Thought
Richard Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life
Richard E. Hart and Douglas R. Anderson, eds., Philosophy in Experience: American Philosophy in Transition
Richard Kearney, Poetics of Modernity: Toward a Hermeneutic Imagination     

Some Varieties of Particularism

Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral wrongness are about particular acts rather than general principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what makes true moral judgments true is not general principles but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological particularism claims that studying particular acts apart from general principles can justify beliefs in moral judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at each particular decision as it arises and give up the search for a complete moral theory. This paper raises problems for each of these versions of particularism.     

Argument Quality and Cultural Difference

Central to argumentation theory is a concern with normativity. Argumentation theorists are concerned, among other things, with explaining why some arguments are good (or at least better than others) in the sense that a given argument provides reasons for embracing its conclusion which are such that a fair- minded appraisal of the argument yields the judgment that the conclusion ought to be accepted -- is worthy of acceptance -- by all who so appraise it.This conception of argument quality presupposes that the goodness of arguments is characterizable in terms of features of the argument itself. It makes no reference either to the attributes of the persons appraising the argument and judging its normative force, or to the context in which that appraisal is carried out. But recent work by a wide range of philosophers, argumentation theorists, and social theorists rejects such an abstract, impersonal notion of argument goodness. Instead, these theorists insist upon taking seriously, in the evaluation of arguments, the features of the evaluators themselves. In particular, such theorists emphasize the importance of cultural difference in argument appraisal. Often locating themselves under the banner of multiculturalism, they argue that the quality of an argument depends upon culturally-specific beliefs, values, and presuppositions; that an argument may be of high quality in one cultural context but of low quality in another. Consequently, they contend, no abstract, impersonal characterization of argument quality can succeed.In this paper I consider this multiculturalist approach to argument quality. I argue that while there is much merit in the general multiculturalist perspective, the multiculturalist argument against impersonal conceptions of argument quality fails. It fails for several reasons detailed below; most fundamentally, it fails because it itself presupposes just the kind of impersonal account of argument quality it seeks to reject. I call this presupposition that of transcultural normative reach. I identify this presupposition in the multiculturalist argument, and show how it undercuts the multiculturalist challenge to abstract, impersonal, transcultural conceptions of argument quality. I conclude with an evaluation of the strengths, and weaknesses, of the multiculturalist challenge to such conceptions of argument quality.     

ON THE TRANSDISCIPLINARY NATURE OF THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISCOVERY

Abstract. Despite the by now historical tendency to demarcate scientific epistemology sharply from virtually all others, especially theological "epistemology ," it has recently been recognized that both enterprises share a great deal in common, at least as far as the epistemology of discovery is implicated. Such a claim is founded upon a psychological analysis of figuration, where, it is argued, metaphor plays a crucial role in the mediation of discovery, in the domains of science and religion alike. Thus, although the conventionally conceived scientific method is crucial to the enterprise, primacy must nonetheless be accorded to discovery , which drives virtually all disciplines.     

DARWINISM: STILL A CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHY

Charles Darwin died in 1882—more than a hundred years ago. His doctrine, however, is still alive. Recently there has been particular interest in his ideas among philosophers. These ideas are indeed a challenge to (traditional) philosophy: To take Darwin seriously means to revise—or even to destroy—some positions in (traditional) philosophy. Among the philosophical disciplines which have been affected by Darwin's ideas are epistemology and moral philosophy (ethics). In the present paper I shall discuss the epistemological and ethical consequences of Darwin's doctrine from the point of view of contemporary philosophy of biology; I shall give a brief outline of evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics which both have caused many controversies.     

康德哲学与广松涉"交互主体的共同主观性"理论

广松涉认为,对近代认识论基础的问题式及其构成机制和局限进行反思,首先需要将着眼点放在康德哲学的问题式及其构成机制上。康德哲学的总的问题式就是在以先验逻辑学为基础的逻辑学、认识论和本体论“三位一体”的哲学构架中,探讨人的认识以及纯粹理性的先天综合判断及其能力何以可能。这一问题式潜含着一个意义非常重大的认识论问题——即“主体际共同主观性”问题．需要我们认真地加以研究。