An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis

This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics of conceptual analysis are similar to those in other interesting areas of scholarship, and so hypotheses generated by it are of the right form to be applicable to diverse areas. The article shows that the explanationist criterion in epistemology was developed and applied in this way. The epistemic value of conceptual analysis is oblique because it contributes not towards the main purpose of conceptual analysis but towards the reliable development of epistemically valuable hypotheses in philosophy and scholarship.     

Interpretation and method

Abstract

Interpretation started as the central tool of psychoanalytic theory, but it has undergone changes, just as the theory it was based on has evolved. Not only have these significant changes been determined by cultural trends, but different authors have also contributed to their evolution through their approaches to various other pathologies besides neurosis. Today, the cure process is divided between those who believe that therapeutic efficiency should be based on the different interpretation models, and those who maintain that it can be only sustained by the modifying capacity of the therapeutic relationship. Both positions are supposedly upheld by the results of tests that both models believe are sufficient proof but that, in the current author's opinion, lead back to the type of pathology they arose from, although they may at times attempt to cover the entire theoretical spectrum. The position upheld by Gedo—who considers that the psychoanalyst's intervention will depend on the degree of evolution that the pathology has achieved—is of great interest for specific practice. Hence, the more primitive levels require a treatment founded on holding, whereas more evolved pathologies require a more classic level of interpretation. This implies that the stages of a particular patient's evolution may require interventions at different levels, even though these may be founded on different theoretical models. This model, which we may brand as eclectic, is basically the one we find underpinning different theoretical models, which effectively appear to integrate others.     

Which Scientificity for the social Sciences?

Since their emergence in the nineteenth century, the epistemology of social sciences has oscillated from aiming at the classical model of scientificity to emphasizing its own specificities. We argue here that the existence of unambiguous, well defined objects has allowed discoveries and cumulativity in the natural sciences. Whereas, in the social sciences, the term is most often used in a metaphorical meaning, as it represents a basically fluid and changing reality. Its apprehension partly depends on the emotional/intellectual identity of the researcher, which makes it difficult to achieve a full consensus. Yet, beside real, natural or created objects, we do find structures, regularities and objectivations in society.     

Book reviews

This paper begins with a critical evaluation of British counselling psychology's aspirations for a scientific basis and considers some of the consequences in terms of theoretical assumptions and research practice. Through identifying certain empirical, theoretical and ideological problems inherent in the dominant tradition of quantifying inferred cognitive constructs (using the example of trainee self-talk), an alternative framework of discursive psychology is simultaneously introduced. the argument is made for a discursive study of storied meanings by trainee counselling psychologists about themselves and their work. This would potentially address two pivotal research areas. First, it affords both a personal and yet socially embedded framework for an increased understanding and more sensitive evaluation of the training process (with its acquisition of skills, knowledge, experience, competencies, etc.). Second, it offers an alternative approach to the problematic area of understanding unique and generic interactions between practitioners and their preferred psychological model(s) of therapy, thus challenging the theoretical and research cul-de-sac of competing modernist visions of purism, eclecticism and integration. Extending from these observations two research possibilities are suggested.     

The Nature of Evil

Abstract

We readily claim that great moral catastrophes such as the Holocaust involve evil in some way, although it' not clear what this amounts to in a secular context. This paper seeks to provide a secular account of what evil is. It examines what is intuitively the most plausible account, namely that the evil act involves the production of great suffering (or other disvalue), and argues that such outcomes are neither necessary nor sufficient for an act to be evil. Only an appeal to distinctive patterns of motivation, so it is argued, will allow us to accommodate our intuitionsabout which acts are evil, and hence will provide an adequate account of the nature of evil.     

Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account

In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of moral intuition as a seeming whose seemingness resides in special, phenomenological features such as a felt veridicality, appropriateness, familiarity, or confidence, and whose justificatory force is influenced by the reliability of the belief-producing procedures and by a subject's competence in applying moral concepts. I argue that subjects can come to realise that the beliefs expressed in their intuitive judgements evoke a sense of non-inferential credibility. In section 5, I first discuss the contribution of moral expertise to the non-inferential credibility of a person's intuitions. Subsequently, I discuss whether Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is right in saying that we can never claim non-inferential justification for our intuitions because they are subject to all kinds of distorting influences.     

Children's and Adults’ Judgments of the Certainty of Deductive Inferences,Inductive Inferences,and Guesses

Children and adults rated their own certainty following inductive inferences, deductive inferences, and guesses. Beginning in kindergarten, participants rated deductions as more certain than weak inductions or guesses. Deductions were rated as more certain than strong inductions beginning in Grade 3, and fourth-grade children and adults differentiated strong inductions, weak inductions, and informed guesses from pure guesses. By Grade 3, participants also gave different types of explanations for their deductions and inductions. These results are discussed in relation to children's concepts of cognitive processes, logical reasoning, and epistemological development.     

Recovery of affect and structural conflict

This paper deals with fragmented or dispersed affects states with special reference to deep depression. The clinical material presented consists of two patients; a seriously depressive man, and a female patient with a schizoaffective psychosis which has been treated and followed up by the author since the end of the 60s. The hypothesis is that, in a serious depression, as well as in traumatic states in general, the genuine affect tends to be dissected into its two constituents: a diffuse bodily excitation and dismantled drive-instinctual urges devoid of affective meaning. The author arrives at the conclusion that the analytic situation represents a metaphorical frame where the recovery of affect becomes possible when the disruptive experiences of the past are dealt with in the transference. The integration of affect signifies a major structural achievement, making the perception of reality possible without sacrificing affective experience and genuine interest in life. The author deals with the foundations of the structural theory and proposes that the early frame of primary identification comes to play a crucial rôle in the advanced psychic organisation. On the one hand, it carries the capacity of psychic representation and metaphorical thinking. On the other hand, as projected onto the future, it defines the frame of the ego-ideal and forms the basis for metaphorical interpretation of the superego demand.