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131.
Norbert A. Wetzel 《Family process》2024,63(1):17-33
Family systems therapy originated in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s through the work of innovative thinkers and clinicians. However, despite the creative contributions of the mentioned colleagues and of later innovations in family therapy theory and practice, it seems as though the dominant culture of establishment psychiatry in the United States (and in most Western countries) to this day has not seriously incorporated relationships, social context, or community connectedness into the treatment of individuals with psychiatric diagnoses. For the “psychiatric” patients diagnosed according to the DSM-5, the dominant underlying epistemological perspective is the medical “scientific” paradigm. Within this approach there is a dearth of reflections about the truthfulness of so-called “empirical facts” and a lack of skepticism about the techniques of “measurement” of the psychiatric illness. The alternative, relationship-oriented, context-sensitive, and community-connected thinking paradigm is highlighted here in contrast to the “psychiatric” foundation. This paradigm consists of (a) the awareness that all human Subjects (including “psychiatric” clients) are constituted as such by their relational connection to others; (b) the awareness of our sensitivity to and embeddedness in a socio-economic, cultural, and racial context; and (c) the awareness of our involvement in and connectedness with many kinds of communities. 相似文献
132.
133.
Montero M 《American journal of community psychology》2002,30(4):571-584
An expression of community social psychology based on the need to transform social reality, and to consider people as the constructors of that reality, is examined from an epistemological point of view. Dualism, the position considering that object and subject are separate entities, and monism, the perspective stating that there is only one substance, are discussed. The consequences of both conceptions for community social psychology, and their incompatibility, as well as the notions of reality and truth are analyzed. That analysis deals with the problems of defining reality, of separating subject and object of knowledge, of language's role, and of relativism and truth. Finally, a constructionist view of monism based on relatedness, and action, is proposed, stating the mutually influencing union of subject and object in the construction of reality. 相似文献
134.
In this paper we analyse some misleading theses concerning the oldcontroversy over the relation between mind and body presented incontemporary medical literature. We undertake an epistemologicalclarification of the axiomatic structure of medical methods. Thisclarification, in turn, requires a precise philosophical explanation ofthe presupposed concepts. This analysis will establish two results: (1)that the mind-body dualism cannot be understood as a kind of biologicalvariation of the subject-object dichotomy in physics, and (2) that thethesis of the incompatibility between somatic and psychosomatic medicineheld by naturalists and others lacks solid epistemologicalfoundation. 相似文献
135.
Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According
to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity
to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt
a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism – which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological
credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors
innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I
contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the
traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions
are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly
less sublime conception of virtue. 相似文献
136.
Philip Nickel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2001,4(3):253-266
A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person's moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person's actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this requirement when she relies on another person's moral testimony, and so there are moral limits on such reliance. 相似文献
137.
Adam Leite 《Philosophical Studies》2007,134(2):111-129
Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account
of assertion, yields a direct argument that ’knows’ is semantically contextsensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation
on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain
the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson’s
suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the extent to which adherence to the constitutive
norm of assertion matters. 相似文献
138.
Patrice Philie 《Philosophical Studies》2007,134(2):183-210
On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis
of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll’s regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant
cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll’s regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to
the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws.
Such a standpoint can take two forms. One can adopt either a broadly externalist model of inference or a sceptical stance.
I will attempt, in what follows, to defend a version of internalism which is not affected by the regress. The main strategy
will be to show that externalism and scepticism are not satisfying standpoints to adopt with regard to our inferential practice,
and then to suggest an internalist alternative. 相似文献
139.
140.
Davis JK 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(1):1-30
Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems
indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However,
intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense
with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions.
However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be
understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would
have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive
justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics
more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical
training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and
user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern
about intuition. 相似文献