Engineering ethics, individuals, and organizations

This article evaluates a family of criticism of how engineering ethics is now generally taught. The short version of the criticism might be put this way: Teachers of engineering ethics devote too much time to individual decisions and not enough time to social context. There are at least six version of this criticism, each corresponding to a specific subject omitted. Teachers of engineering ethics do not (it is said) teach enough about: 1) the culture of organizations; 2) the organization of organizations; 3) the legal environment of organizations; 4) the role of professions in organizations; 5) the role of organizations in professions; or 6) the political environment of organizations. My conclusion is that, while all six are worthy subjects, there is neither much reason to believe that any of them are now absent from courses in engineering ethics nor an obvious way to decide whether they (individually or in combination) are (or are not) now being given their due. What we have here is a dispute about how much is enough. Such disputes are not to be settled without agreement concerning how we are to tell we have enough of this or that. Right now we seem to lack that agreement—and not to have much reason to expect it any time soon. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 conference, Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology, Linking Workplace Ethics and Education, co-hosted by Gonzaga University and Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, USA, 9–10 June 2005.     

Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict

In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such ‘evaluative consistency’ are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict.     

Is that all there is?

I take issue with two suggestions of Joel Feinberg's: first, that it is incoherent to suppose that human life as such is absurd, and, second, that a particular human life may be absurd and yet saved from being tragic by being fulfilled. I also argue that human life as such may well be absurd and I consider various responses to this.     

The linear utility model for optimal selection

A linear utility model is introduced for optimal selection when several subpopulations of applicants are to be distinguished. Using this model, procedures are described for obtaining optimal cutting scores in subpopulations in quota-free as well as quota-restricted selection situations. The cutting scores are optimal in the sense that they maximize the overall expected utility of the selection process. The procedures are demonstrated with empirical data.     

Ego-Identity Achievement and Perception of Risk in Intimacy in Survivors of Stranger and Acquaintance Rape

One hundred twenty-two women participated in a study of the relationship between acquaintance/stranger rape and the respective variables of ego-identity achievement (attainment of self-image during adolescence that integrates one's ideas of what one is and what one wants to be) and perception of risk in intimacy (perception of close interpersonal relationships as a risky proposition). Results showed that compared to women who had not been sexually assaulted, survivors of rape in general reported lower ego-identity achievement and greater perception of risk in intimacy. Focusing on acquaintance rape and stranger rape with age at the time of assault as possible moderator, it was found that lower ego-identity achievement was systematically related to acquaintance rape in women who had been raped during their adolescent years, but not in survivors of rape during adulthood. Perception of risk in intimacy was significantly higher among women who had been raped when adolescents compared to those who had been raped during adulthood, but only in relation to acquaintance rape.     

New Evolutionary Perspectives on Altruism: Multilevel-Selection and Costly-Signaling Theories

Social psychological theories tend to be primarily concerned with the immediate causes of altruism, whereas evolutionary explanations focus more on the origins and ultimate functions of altruistic behavior. Recent developments in the evolutionary psychology of altruism promise an even richer understanding of this important category of social behaviors. Specifically, new perspectives offered by multilevel-selection theory and costly-signaling theory may help to shed light on some of the more problematic issues in the study of altruism.     

Review

Book reviewed in this article:
David Ray Griffin, Religion and Scientific Naturalism: Overcoming the Conflicts     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

Perceived Stress and Comorbid Illness Predict Depressive Symptomatology in People with Coeliac Disease

A high prevalence of depression is found in people with coeliac disease (CD). People with CD who are depressed are less likely to manage their illness effectively, which may lead to complications. Identification of variables associated with depression in people with CD may facilitate early detection and intervention. Participants were 749 members (125 males, 622 females) of the Queensland Coeliac Society (aged 18–88 years), recruited via a mailout. Participants completed the Modified Zung Self‐Rating Depression Scale, the Perceived Stress Scale, and the Perceived Consequences Subscale (from the Revised Illness Perception Questionnaire). Stress (p = .001) and comorbid medical illness (p = .01) were significantly associated with depression in CD. The current study made an original contribution to the body of literature by identifying stress and comorbid medical illness as predictors of depression in CD.     

Sex,Sexual Orientation,and Sexism: What Influence Do These Factors Have on Verdicts in a Crime-of-Passion Case?

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the influence of defendant sex, sexual orientation, and participant sex on perceptions of a crime-of-passion. An online sample of 458 individuals read a scenario describing a homicide and provided judgments of verdict, sentence length, legal elements, and sexism. We hypothesized heterosexual female defendants would most likely receive a verdict of manslaughter, be found less guilty, and receive shorter sentences. We were also interested in whether benevolent sexism would contribute to defendant culpability decisions. Lastly, perceptions of legal elements for manslaughter (e.g., great provocation) and murder (e.g., intentionality of actions) were explored. Results demonstrated heterosexual female defendants were less guilty and received the shortest sentences. Also, heterosexual defendants were most likely to meet the manslaughter legal elements. Benevolent sexism contributed significantly to guilt perceptions.