On the binary quality of recognition and the inconsequentiality of further knowledge: two critical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic is claimed to be distinguished from notions of availability and fluency through its categorical or “binary” treatment of information and the “inconsequentiality” of further knowledge to inferences based on recognition. Using the city‐size task of Goldstein and Gigerenzer ( 2002 ) we demonstrate that: (1) increasing the validity of other information in the environment decreases the reliance on recognition; (2) cities that are both recognized and have other information known about them (e.g. they have a soccer team) are chosen more often than those which are simply recognized; and (3) there is a negative correlation between the time taken to identify a city and the proportion of times it is selected as the larger of a pair. None of these results is predicted by the process model of the recognition heuristic. The implication of the results for the distinction between the recognition, availability and fluency heuristics is discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contingent approaches to making likelihood judgments about polychotomous cases: the influence of task factors

Two experiments tested the influence of three task factors on respondents' tendency to use normative, heuristic, and random approaches to making likelihood judgments about polychotomous cases (i.e., cases in which there is more than one alternative to a focal hypothesis). Participants estimated their likelihood of winning hypothetical raffles in which they and other players held various numbers of tickets. Responding on non‐numeric scales (vs. numeric ones) and responding under time pressure (vs. self‐paced) increased participants' use of a comparison‐heuristic approach, resulting in non‐normative judgment patterns. A manipulation of evidence representation (whether ticket quantities were represented by numbers or more graphically by bars) did not have reliably detectable effects on processing approaches to likelihood judgment. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the further development of likelihood judgment theories, and they discuss parallels between contingent processing in choice and contingent processing in likelihood judgment. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The easily learned,easily remembered heuristic in children

A previous study with adults [Koriat, A. (2008a). Easy comes, easy goes? The link between learning and remembering and its exploitation in metacognition. Memory & Cognition, 36, 416–428] established a correlation between learning and remembering: items requiring more trials to acquisition (TTA) were less likely to be recalled than those requiring fewer trials. Furthermore, learners’ judgments of learning (JOLs) seemed to rely on the easily learned, easily remembered (ELER) heuristic, that items requiring fewer TTAs are more likely to be recalled. This study extended investigation of these effects to 2nd- and 4th-grade children. When the list included hard and easy paired-associates (Experiment 1, N = 40, 7–10 years), recall and JOL decreased with increasing TTAs for both grades, supporting the validity of the ELER heuristic and its utilization in monitoring one's own learning. When presented only with hard pairs (Experiment 2, N = 60, 7–10 years), however, 4th graders’ but not 2nd graders’ JOLs evidenced reliance on this heuristic. The results suggest an early development of metacognitive heuristics that incorporate information about the links between characteristics of the encoding process and subsequent remembering.     

Criterion knowledge: A moderator of using the recognition heuristic?

The recognition heuristic (RH) claims that people base inferences on recognition only. This has been questioned by several studies which found that additional knowledge was influential. However, in some of these studies, participants' additional knowledge might have encompassed criterion knowledge thus rendering any inferential strategy superfluous. The present study was therefore designed to test the effect of criterion knowledge on use or non‐use of the RH. Eighty‐one participants made pair‐wise comparisons with respect to the size of Belgian cities and also provided estimates of the cities' actual size. We found that relative criterion knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the relative position of an object on the criterion dimension) did indeed play some role, but its exclusion left the main critical findings intact, nonetheless. We thus conclude that previous studies conducted in the paradigm of natural recognition should not be generally refuted by the argument of participants possessing criterion knowledge. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Gaussian model‐based partitioning using iterated local search

The emergence of Gaussian model‐based partitioning as a viable alternative to K‐means clustering fosters a need for discrete optimization methods that can be efficiently implemented using model‐based criteria. A variety of alternative partitioning criteria have been proposed for more general data conditions that permit elliptical clusters, different spatial orientations for the clusters, and unequal cluster sizes. Unfortunately, many of these partitioning criteria are computationally demanding, which makes the multiple‐restart (multistart) approach commonly used for K‐means partitioning less effective as a heuristic solution strategy. As an alternative, we propose an approach based on iterated local search (ILS), which has proved effective in previous combinatorial data analysis contexts. We compared multistart, ILS and hybrid multistart–ILS procedures for minimizing a very general model‐based criterion that assumes no restrictions on cluster size or within‐group covariance structure. This comparison, which used 23 data sets from the classification literature, revealed that the ILS and hybrid heuristics generally provided better criterion function values than the multistart approach when all three methods were constrained to the same 10‐min time limit. In many instances, these differences in criterion function values reflected profound differences in the partitions obtained.     

Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The cognitive reflection test revisited: exploring the ways individuals solve the test

Individuals’ propensity not to override the first answer that comes to mind is thought to be a crucial cause behind many failures in reasoning. In the present study, we aimed to explore the strategies used and the abilities employed when individuals solve the cognitive reflection test (CRT), the most widely used measure of this tendency. Alongside individual differences measures, protocol analysis was employed to unfold the steps of the reasoning process in solving the CRT. This exploration revealed that there are several ways people solve or fail the test. Importantly, 77% of the cases in which reasoners gave the correct final answer in our protocol analysis, they started their response with the correct answer or with a line of thought which led to the correct answer. We also found that 39% of the incorrect responders reflected on their first response. The findings indicate that the suppression of the first answer may not be the only crucial feature of reflectivity in the CRT and that the lack of relevant knowledge is a prominent cause of the reasoning errors. Additionally, we confirmed that the CRT is a multi-faceted construct: both numeracy and reflectivity account for performance. The results can help to better apprehend the “whys and whens” of the decision errors in heuristics and biases tasks and to further refine existing explanatory models.     

认知抑制——问题解决研究的新视角

抑制是一种领域一般(domain-general)的认知过程,它使儿童和成人能够抗拒习惯、自动化、诱惑、分心物或干扰从而适应存在冲突的情境(Diamond,2013)。抑制控制模型认为儿童或成人在问题解决中的失败并非是缺少相关知识与概念,而是抑制控制失败造成的。研究者采用负启动研究范式和脑成像技术在类皮杰任务、数学和科学问题解决中证实了认知抑制的作用。未来研究应把认知抑制与元认知的研究结合起来,探究认知抑制的发展轨迹及二者在问题解决中的相对重要性。同时,针对认知抑制训练的干预研究也值得重视。     

The formalising tendency in philosophy and experimental psychology

This paper is an exercise in the phenomenology of science. It examines the tendency to prefer formal accounts in a familiar body of experimental psychology. It will argue that, because of this tendency, psychologists of this school neglect those forms of human cognition typical of the humanities disciplines. This is not a criticism of psychology, however. Such neglect is compatible with scientific rigour, provided it does not go unnoticed. Indeed, reflection on the case in hand allows us to refine the characterisation of the formalising tendency.