How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: Evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased → biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased → logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.     

Coherence shifts in probabilistic inference tasks

The fast‐and‐frugal heuristics approach to probabilistic inference assumes that individuals often employ simple heuristics to integrate cue information that commonly function in a non‐reciprocal fashion. Specifically, the subjective validity of a certain cue remains stable during the application of a heuristic and is not changed by the presence or absence of another cue. The parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model, in contrast, predicts that information is processed in a reciprocal fashion. Specifically, it assumes that subjective cue validities interactively affect each other and are modified to coherently support the favored choice. Corresponding to the model's simulation, we predicted the direction and the size of such coherence shifts. Cue validities were measured before, after (Experiment 1), and during judgment (Experiments 2 and 3). Coherence shifts were found in environments involving real‐world cue knowledge (weather forecasts) and in a domain for which the application of fast‐and‐frugal heuristics has been demonstrated (city‐size tasks). The results indicate that subjective cue validities are not fixed parameters, but that they are interactively changed to form coherent representations of the task. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preadolescent Decision‐Making Competence Predicts Interpersonal Strengths and Difficulties: A 2‐Year Prospective Study

Recent research has demonstrated that decision‐making competence (DMC), a latent construct reflecting individual differences in rational thought, is predictive of real‐world decision outcomes at various stages of life. This construct has been shown to be associated with concurrent and retrospective accounts of health‐risking behavior, but its predictive validity has yet to be demonstrated. In the present study, we examine this issue using a 2‐year prospective, multiple‐informant design. Specifically, we tested the degree to which preadolescent DMC (PA‐DMC) obtained at ages 10–11 years (Time 1; N = 101) predicted both self‐reports and caregiver reports of emotional, behavioral, and peer‐related difficulties obtained 2 years later (Time 2; N = 76). Holding variables such as numeracy and inhibitory control constant, lower Time 1 PA‐DMC scores predicted greater reported Time 2 psychosocial difficulties (i.e. peer, conduct, emotional, and hyperactivity/inattention problems). Additionally, higher PA‐DMC scores were associated with greater self‐reported prosocial behaviors at Time 2. These results highlight the utility of testing individual differences in rational responding. We discuss the potential for improving children's decision‐making processes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Finding a place for elimination in inter-level reductionist activities: Reply to Wimsatt

According to Wimsatt, a proper treatment of reduction must distinguish between two types of reductionist activities scientists engage in. One of the benefits of better understanding the nature of reduction, he believes, is that it shows that eliminativism, that is, the elimination of concepts and theories from science, is a rather circumscribed and limited affair, especially in the case of inter-level reductionist activities. While I agree with Wimsatt that it is important to distinguish the two types of reductionisms, I show that elimination in inter-level reductionist activities can be a powerful heuristic in science, driving both inter-level and successional reduction.     

Expertise effects in the Moses illusion: detecting contradictions with stored knowledge

People frequently miss contradictions with stored knowledge; for example, readers often fail to notice any problem with a reference to the Atlantic as the largest ocean. Critically, such effects occur even though participants later demonstrate knowing the Pacific is the largest ocean (the Moses Illusion) [Erickson, T. D., &; Mattson, M. E. (1981). From words to meaning: A semantic illusion. Journal of Verbal Learning &; Verbal Behavior, 20, 540–551]. We investigated whether such oversights disappear when erroneous references contradict information in one's expert domain, material which likely has been encountered many times and is particularly well-known. Biology and history graduate students monitored for errors while answering biology and history questions containing erroneous presuppositions (“In what US state were the forty-niners searching for oil?”). Expertise helped: participants were less susceptible to the illusion and less likely to later reproduce errors in their expert domain. However, expertise did not eliminate the illusion, even when errors were bolded and underlined, meaning that it was unlikely that people simply skipped over errors. The results support claims that people often use heuristics to judge truth, as opposed to directly retrieving information from memory, likely because such heuristics are adaptive and often lead to the correct answer. Even experts sometimes use such shortcuts, suggesting that overlearned and accessible knowledge does not guarantee retrieval of that information.     

Transformed Facial Similarity as a Political Cue: A Preliminary Investigation

Experimental subjects evaluated a political candidate whose face was digitally altered to absorb the subjects' facial structure. For half of the subjects, the photograph of the candidate was morphed such that the image presented was a blend composed of 60% of the unfamiliar Caucasian male and 40% of the subject. For the other half the photograph was unaltered. Given previous research on implicit familiarity (Zajonc, 1968, 1980), we predicted that the morph would advantage the candidate. The results demonstrated no main effect of the similarity manipulation. However, there was a robust similarity by gender interaction. Male subjects evaluated the morphed candidate more favorably than the unaltered photograph, while female subjects rated him more negatively. We discuss potential explanations for this interaction effect and explore the possible implications of facial similarity as a political cue in both high- and low-information elections.     

Stimulus format and working memory in fast and frugal strategy selection

The necessity of retrieving complex attribute information from long‐term memory has been shown to elevate processing costs and boost the use of simple decision heuristics. This effect was confined to verbal as opposed to pictorial attribute information. In a large‐scale experiment (N = 151), either verbal or pictorial information for inferences had to be retrieved from long‐term memory. Concurrent secondary tasks either interfered with the Central Executive, the Phonological Loop, or the Visuo‐Spatial Sketchpad. These are hypothetical components of working memory responsible for processing different information formats. Whereas the information format massively affected strategy selection, there was an additive rather than interactive effect of secondary task, suggesting enhanced retrieval costs irrespective of the information format. An additional analysis in terms of a similarity match as proposed by exemplar‐based models did not enhance the explanation of the data. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

人非理性且难教化?论支持自由家长主义的证据

基于心理学的研究, 自由家长主义者认为人们的思维有个体难以克服的、根深蒂固的系统性缺陷, 并难以通过教育来避免和消除, 因此主张因势利导, 仰仗外部专家的“助推”把人们的行为引导到正确方向。然而, 从生态理性的角度看, 人们依照自由家长主义者所谓的认知偏差做出的选择未必导致糟糕的结果, 而依照自由家长主义者所推崇的理性方法做出的选择也未必导致理想的结果。本文分析了自由家长主义者用来支持助推的证据后发现：(1)它们源于一些研究者对“何为理性”的狭隘定义, 误解了人类理性的本质; (2)它们对研究结果进行了选择性的报告, 忽视了与这些证据相反的证据。通过这些分析, 我们认为“人非理性且难教化”这一自由家长主义者的论断过于武断并有失偏颇。投入教育, 教会人们如何精明老练地处理风险不仅是可行的, 而且是替代助推的一个更为持久有效的解决方案。