Do Smarter People Employ Better Decision Strategies? The Influence of Intelligence on Adaptive Use of the Recognition Heuristic

Within the adaptive toolbox approach, it has repeatedly been shown that, on average, people tend to adapt their decision strategies to the decision context. Building upon these results, we investigated whether individuals systematically differ in their ability to successfully adapt to the situation when applying the fast‐and‐frugal recognition heuristic (RH). In decisions between recognized and unrecognized choice objects, individuals can base their choices solely on recognition, as predicted by the RH, or they can use further knowledge retrieved from memory. Since intelligence has been conceived as the ability to successfully adapt to different situations, we expected intelligence to influence the degree of adaptive use of the RH. To test this hypothesis, we first re‐analyzed data that referred to a decision domain for which RH‐use is known to perform well. As expected, individual RH‐use increased with general intelligence. Next, we designed an experiment addressing individual RH‐use in two new decision domains, one domain for which RH‐use was less effective than knowledge‐use and another domain for which both strategies were about equally effective. In addition, we tested whether fluid or crystallized intelligence best predicts adaptive use of the RH. RH‐use was found to decrease with fluid but not crystallized intelligence when RH‐use was less effective than use of further knowledge. In contrast, there was no significant association between either type of intelligence and RH‐use when none of the two strategies was optimal. We conclude that adaptive use versus non‐use of the RH is moderated by fluid intelligence. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Powerful Qualities,Phenomenal Concepts,and the New Challenge to Physicalism

Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy have to explain how both physical and phenomenal concepts provide a substantive grasp on the nature of their referents, whilst referring to the very same experience. This is the ‘new challenge’ to physicalism. In this paper, I argue that if the physicalist adopts the powerful qualities ontology of properties then a new and powerful version of the phenomenal concept strategy can be developed, which answers the new challenge.     

对相容和不相容析取关系下析取句与条件句之间推理的比较

研究析取句和条件句之间的推理能检验推理心理学中的主要理论解释。一个实验考察了析取句和条件句中两个基本成分之间的关系(相容析取与不相容析取)和推理方向(由析取句推条件句与由条件句推析取句)对析取句与其等值的条件句之间推理的影响。结果发现,推理方向的影响取决于条件句和析取句中基本成分间的关系,在不相容析取关系下的推理成绩好于在相容析取关系下的推理成绩。现有的推理理论不能解释被试的整体反应模式,作者提出的特殊知识启发式与一般的句法意义对比启发式的竞争能统一解释被试的主导反应模式。     

具身道德隐喻映射机制的双向性及其问题——基于具身效应“可重复性危机”的思考

具身认知研究虽已取得令人瞩目的进展,但某些具身效应存在可重复性较低的问题。若长期忽视这一问题,将严重损害心理学的科学性,甚至引发一定程度的“可重复性危机”。本文从道德概念清洁隐喻的两大映射方向出发,基于两大实验类型对相关研究中可能存在的问题因素分别展开分析。未来研究应关注更注重社会互动的组织道德,将道德概念具身隐喻研究引申到现实问题中,并借助认知神经科学技术更全面地考察身体经验、情绪体验和认知加工在道德清洁隐喻加工中的作用。     

情感启发式对风险选择的影响

本研究旨在考察情感启发式对风险选择的影响。研究1采用线上和线下结合的方式对687名大学生进行问卷施测,修订并检验中文版情感启发式问卷的信效度,以该问卷测试的风险−收益相关系数作为衡量情感启发式倾向的指标。研究2采用极端被试法,在103名大学生完成问卷后,将风险−收益相关系数绝对值前20%和后20%的被试分为高、低情感启发式组,完成风险选择任务。结果发现：（1）中文版情感启发式问卷具有较好的信度与效度,可以作为情感启发式倾向的测试问卷。（2）风险选择任务激活负性情绪时,相比于低情感启发式倾向,高情感启发式倾向的被试更容易受负性情绪的影响,其风险判断的主观值更高。研究揭示了情感启发式对风险选择的影响,为情感启发式作为个体进行风险判断的重要依据提供了实证支持。     

An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis

This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics of conceptual analysis are similar to those in other interesting areas of scholarship, and so hypotheses generated by it are of the right form to be applicable to diverse areas. The article shows that the explanationist criterion in epistemology was developed and applied in this way. The epistemic value of conceptual analysis is oblique because it contributes not towards the main purpose of conceptual analysis but towards the reliable development of epistemically valuable hypotheses in philosophy and scholarship.     

内在锚与外在锚对锚定效应及其双加工机制的影响

通过2（外在锚类型：高锚VS低锚）×2（内在锚类型：有VS无）被试间设计,考察不同锚定信息来源：由外部世界提供的外在锚与个体自身内部产生的内在锚信息对锚定效应及其加工机制的影响。结果发现：（1）当内在锚不存在时,外在高低锚组的估计值有显著差异,当内在锚存在时此种差异变得不显著;（2）当内在锚存在时,外在高低锚组被试的答题反应时有显著差异,内在锚与外在锚一致时反应时比不一致时更快,当内在锚不存在时,此种差异变得不显著。实验结果表明,当锚定调整机制与选择通达机制同时存在时,前者更占优势;锚定信息一致性会影响不同加工机制的启动,一致的信息会激活选择通达机制,不一致的信息则会激活锚定调整机制。     

Maimon’s Theory of Differentials As The Elements of Intuitions

Abstract

Maimon’s theory of the differential has proved to be a rather enigmatic aspect of his philosophy. By drawing upon mathematical developments that had occurred earlier in the century and that, by virtue of the arguments presented in the Essay and comments elsewhere in his writing, I suggest Maimon would have been aware of, what I propose to offer in this paper is a study of the differential and the role that it plays in the Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (1790). In order to do so, this paper focuses upon Maimon’s criticism of the role played by mathematics in Kant’s philosophy, to which Maimon offers a Leibnizian solution based on the infinitesimal calculus. The main difficulties that Maimon has with Kant’s system, the second of which will be the focus of this paper, include the presumption of the existence of synthetic a priori judgments, i.e. the question quid facti, and the question of whether the fact of our use of a priori concepts in experience is justified, i.e. the question quid juris. Maimon deploys mathematics, specifically arithmetic, against Kant to show how it is possible to understand objects as having been constituted by the very relations between them, and he proposes an alternative solution to the question quid juris, which relies on the concept of the differential. However, despite these arguments, Maimon remains sceptical with respect to the question quid facti.