Fictionalism about musical works

The debate concerning the ontological status of musical works is perhaps the most animated debate in contemporary analytic philosophy of music. In my view, progress requires a piecemeal approach. So in this article I hone in on one particular musical work concept – that of the classical Western art musical work; that is, the work concept that regulates classical art-musical practice. I defend a fictionalist analysis – a strategy recently suggested by Andrew Kania as potentially fruitful – and I develop a version of such an analysis in line with a broad commitment to philosophical naturalism.     

Hermeneutic analysis of virtuous exemplar narratives of Cambodian-American Buddhists and Christians

Virtuous exemplars embody the virtues of a cultural community, a dynamic, contextual understanding that is best explored by critical hermeneutic analysis. In order to describe their lives and refine the mental-health treatment of Cambodian immigrants, 12 virtuous exemplars from a Cambodian-American Buddhist and 12 from a Cambodian-American Christian population were interviewed. Grounded theory and a mixed-methods analysis were used. Rigor-enhancing strategies include triangulation, collaboration, member checking, and researcher reflexivity, as well as interviewing a comparison group of 12 Euro-American Christians. Cambodian-American Buddhists and Christians take their religion seriously, and it influences their daily lives. These Buddhists focus on perseverence in the present life and gaining merit for the next. The Christians focus on serving God and nurturing relationships in this life. They report that they are more different from the Cambodian-American Buddhists than Latent Semantic Analysis indicates, providing evidence of both religious and cultural distinctives among the subgroups.     

走向完善：人本主义心理学研究方案

为了完善人本主义心理学方法论,人本主义心理学家发展了多种研究方案。每一种方案都设定了自己特定的研究问题,确定了自己独特的研究过程。现象学、解释学、启发式和体验研究方案是其中较为重要的几种。这些方案体现出人本主义心理学家试图将心理学作为人文科学的努力,使人本主义心理学方法论不再流于理论倡导,而是融入到人性研究的具体实践并因此走向完善。在未来,它尚需以辩证唯物主义实践观看待人的本质,确立心理学的整合视野。     

Argument as Inquiry in a Postmodern Context

Argumentation is a form of communication, rather than an application of(formal) logic, and is used in communicative activity as a means forinquiry, although it is more typically thought of as bringing inquiry toclosure. Thus interpretation is an intrinsic and crucial aspect ofconversational (interactive) argumentation. In order to further thisunderstanding of argumentative activity, I propose a procedure forinterpretation that draws upon hermeneutic phenomenology. In response tocriticisms by argumentation theorists (and others) who understand thistradition as oriented to psychological, perceptual, or textual objects, Iargue that hermeneutic phenomenology supports methods for analysis ofpublic communicative activity. The resulting conception of thick argumentation responds to contemporary (postmodern) claims that argumentation valorizes univocity, stasis, and certainty at the expense ofthe pluralism, fluctuation, and range of epistemic results thatcharacterize discourse in the public sphere.     

Abolishing Morality

Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking. After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists and moral fictionalists have always cherished.