Hybrid search in context: How to search for vegetables in the produce section and cereal in the cereal aisle

ABSTRACT

The own race bias (ORB) refers to a finding that faces of members of one's own racial or ethnic group are easier to recognize. Holistic processing theories suggest that the ORB might be moderated by viewing distance. Participants studied photographs of own and other race individuals and then took a recognition memory test. Viewing distance was simulated by varying the degree to which photographs were blurred (Experiment 1) and by varying photograph size (Experiment 2). Findings indicated that own race faces were better recognized, that recognition was impaired by simulated viewing distance, but the size of the ORB was not contingent upon distance.     

Context and structure: The nature of students' knowledge about three spatial diagram representations

The authors investigated whether college students possess abstract rules concerning the applicability conditions for three spatial diagrams that are important tools for thinking—matrices, networks, and hierarchies. A total of 127 students were asked to select which type of diagram would be best for organising the information in each of several short scenarios. The scenarios were written using three different story contexts: (a) neutral, presenting a real-life situation but not cueing a particular representation; (b) abstract, presenting only variable names and relations; and (c) incongruent, in which the context and informational structure cued different representations. The results indicated above-chance performance on the abstract scenarios, as well as comparable performance on the abstract and neutral context scenarios. In a follow-up study in which eight students thought out loud while selecting diagrams for the abstract scenarios, there were almost no references to concrete examples. The results of these studies suggest that students possess abstract rules concerning the applicability conditions for matrices, networks, and hierarchies.     

Intelligence and negation biases on the Conditional Inference Task: A dual-processes analysis

We examined a large set of conditional inference data compiled from several previous studies and asked three questions: How is normative performance related to intelligence? Does negative conclusion bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Does implicit negation bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Our analysis demonstrated that rejecting denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent inferences was positively correlated with intelligence, while endorsing modus tollens inferences was not; that the occurrence of negative conclusion bias was related to the extent of Type 2 processing; and that the occurrence of implicit negation bias was not related to the extent of Type 2 processing. We conclude that negative conclusion bias is, at least in part, a product of Type 2 processing, while implicit negation bias is not.     

Ageing faces in ageing minds: A review on the own-age bias in face recognition

Similar to the well-established own-race bias, participants are more accurate at remembering own- relative to other-age faces. An own-age bias (OAB) in face memory was demonstrated in participants older than approximately 5 years. Crucially, the OAB is modulated by contact—participants with substantial contact with other-age persons show either reduced or absent OAB effects. In line with a perceptual expertise account of the phenomenon, holistic processing of other-age faces is less efficient when tested with young adult versus child faces, and differential holistic processing may therefore reflect one mechanism contributing to the OAB. A possible additional contribution of sociocognitive factors to the OAB remains largely untested. Importantly, event-related brain potential studies suggest that the own-race and own-age biases are based on at least partly different mechanisms. Theoretical explanations for different group-based biases in face memory will need to consider these findings.     

Illusory line motion is not caused by object-differentiating mechanisms or endogenous attention

Christie and Klein [2005. Does attention cause illusory line motion? Perception & Psychophysics, 67(6), 1032–1043] published line motion ratings consistent with illusory line motion (ILM) after peripheral endogenous cues but not central arrow cues. When attention was directed endogenously on the basis of the shape of one of two peripherally presented objects, participants reported small, but significant motion away from the attended object, and this was attributed to participant bias, or to a peripherally directed object-based attention system endogenously recruited to differentiate the peripheral shapes. By using a unique cueing method with identical peripheral markers, but still allowing them to act as cues, the findings of Christie and Klein Experiment 4 were replicated. This reduces the likelihood that object discrimination or object attention mechanisms are responsible for the reported ILM-like effects.     

Shifts of the psychometric function: Distinguishing bias from perceptual effects

Morgan, Dillenburger, Raphael, and Solomon have shown that observers can use different response strategies when unsure of their answer, and, thus, they can voluntarily shift the location of the psychometric function estimated with the method of single stimuli (MSS; sometimes also referred to as the single-interval, two-alternative method). They wondered whether MSS could distinguish response bias from a true perceptual effect that would also shift the location of the psychometric function. We demonstrate theoretically that the inability to distinguish response bias from perceptual effects is an inherent shortcoming of MSS, although a three-response format including also an “undecided” response option may solve the problem under restrictive assumptions whose validity cannot be tested with MSS data. We also show that a proper two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) task with the three-response format is free of all these problems so that bias and perceptual effects can easily be separated out. The use of a three-response 2AFC format is essential to eliminate a confound (response bias) in studies of perceptual effects and, hence, to eliminate a threat to the internal validity of research in this area.     

Attitudes and cognitive distances: On the non-unitary and flexible nature of cognitive maps

Spatial relations of our environment are represented in cognitive maps. These cognitive maps are prone to various distortions (e.g., alignment and hierarchical effects) caused by basic cognitive factors (such as perceptual and conceptual reorganization) but also by affectively loaded and attitudinal influences. Here we show that even differences in attitude towards a single person representing a foreign country (here Barack Obama and the USA) can be related to drastic differences in the cognitive representation of distances concerning that country. Europeans who had a positive attitude towards Obama’s first presidential program estimated distances between US and European cities as being much smaller than did people who were skeptical or negative towards Obama’s ideas. On the basis of this result and existing literature, arguments on the non-unitary and flexible nature of cognitive maps are discussed.     

Associative priming and orthographic choice in nonword spelling

Abstract

An experiment is reported in which adult English-speaking subjects wrote nonwords to dictation in a free (unprimed) condition and in a primed condition in which the nonword was preceded by a word that was an associate of a word that rhymed with the nonword target (e.g. vatican—(pope)→ bope vs detergent—(soap)→boap). Choice of orthographic patterns in nonword spelling was additively influenced by the associative priming and by sound-spelling contingency (the proportion of words in the lexicon containing the critical pattern). However, an analysis of unprimed spellings suggested that contingency was no more than a partial determinant of orthographic choice. Some implications for models of spelling storage and retrieval are discussed.     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

Rapid-response versus free-time selection tasks using different logical connectives

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), people tend to display matching bias: Options that match the entities named in the rule are selected even when logically inappropriate. Three different Wason selection tasks were administered under free-time and rapid-response formats. For the latter, individual cards were presented for one second, and required a response within a further one second. Previous research using these formats (Roberts & Newton, 2001) has shown that this increases matching bias, in line with the action of preconscious heuristic processes which direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem, but whose action can be overturned if there is sufficient time to apply analytic reasoning processes. The selection tasks administered included a standard abstract conditional task, a disjunctive version (i.e., either [not] p or [not] q), and a conditional task in which the cards showed explicitly negated values. Both conditional tasks demonstrated matching bias, but under rapid-response presentation, matching bias only increased for the standard conditional and disjunctive tasks. Overall, the data support Evans’ (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats, and it is suggested that the broad question, of whether individual selection task formats show or do not show matching bias, requires more detailed investigation.