Justice,instruction, and the good: The case for public education in Aristotle and Plato's Laws

This paper develops an interpretation and analysis of the arguments for public education which open Book VIII of Aristotle's Politics, drawing on both the wider Aristotelian corpus and on examination of continuities with Plato's Laws.Part II: Sections IV–VII examine the arguments for the first of the two conclusions which Aristotle advances in VIII. 1, namely that education is important enough to merit the legislator's attention. It is shown, through a development of links between Politics V and the arguments of VIII. 1, that Aristotle's two arguments for this conclusion are calculated to appeal to two distinct subgroups within his intended audience, those who would be moved by a desire to promote the common good, and those who could only be counted on to desire the preservation of their own rule.     

Choice freedom

Individuals seek and value choice freedom, firms provide consumers ever-increasing opportunities to exercise it, citizens worry about protecting their right to choose freely, and scholars across different disciplines study the topic around the globe. We adopt a consumer psychology perspective to systematize the vast literature on choice freedom, and we present a framework to examine the relationship between choice freedom and personal and societal well-being. We begin by proposing choice freedom as an antecedent of autonomy and personal control and by clarifying the meaning of these interrelated constructs. We then use autonomy and personal control as separate processes to explain benefits and limits of choice freedom for well-being, and we review interventions that mitigate the limits. Finally, we discuss future research questions related to autonomy and personal control. Whereas extant literature focuses on the presence of freedom and on the relationship between choice freedom and the individual, we reflect on the extent to which consumers actually have freedom of choice and on the role of others in the provision and exercise of choice freedom.     

意义疗法的理论、方法与技术:基于存在积极心理学的视角

意义疗法是以存在积极心理学为理论基础,以构建个体生命意义为目的,实现生活正负两极性的动态平衡,从而解决其心理困扰获得心理治愈与成长的一种整合性心理咨询与治疗方法。起源于Frankl意义学说的意义疗法是通往人类美好生活的路径,它源于对苦难生活所隐含意义的本质认识。在理论上,意义疗法以意义定向看世界为中心,以意义管理理论和双系统模型为支架; 在方法上,为保障意义获得,应遵循8个基本问题和12条原则,充分发挥意义源的作用,实现意义获得的双路径统一; 在技术上,灵活采用趋向性(PURE)策略、回避性(ABCDE)策略、以及双视角双通道策略或其它策略的整合。意义疗法因包含了精神成分而超越了心理动力学和个体心理学等传统心理治疗方式。未来研究还需明确意义疗法整合了哪些流派的具体方法和技术,细化意义疗法主要的技术与策略的操作步骤,考察成熟幸福感量表在中国文化下的适用性,以及充分整合质性与量化研究方法检验意义疗法在中国的适用性     

Perceived Sources of Happiness: A Network Analysis

This study investigated the perceived sources of happiness among young men and women. Rank scores of the perceived reasons for happiness were compared between the two groups and seven significant differences were discerned. Men ranked “sexual activity”, “sports”, being “liked” and having a “good social life” significantly higher than women. Women ranked “helping others”, having a “close family” and being “loved by loved ones” significantly higher than men. A modified form of network analysis was also conducted. Both networks demonstrated similar core representations of happiness with a focus on self-confidence, being free of stress, occupational and social factors, family support and personal relationships. However, the networks show an association between sexual activity and male personal relationships, whereas emotional factors are associated with female personal relationships. The male network also demonstrates the importance of sports and physical activity in male happiness. Despite some gender differences, it is suggested that the similarities within the mean rank scores and networks form the core elements of a shared social representation of happiness.     

Happiness Trends Under Democracy: Where Will the New South African

Five years after South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, life satisfaction and happiness still reflect societal divides sowed by apartheid social engineering. The paper reports the indicators: life satisfaction, happiness and expectations for the future, from national surveys conducted between 1983 and 1999 for the South African Quality-of-Life Trends Project. Post-election euphoria, which saw all South Africans happy and satisfied with life for a brief moment in 1994, raises the question where the new set-level of subjective well-being will eventually come to rest. In 1999, in spite of some gains in living conditions, the level of life satisfaction of blacks has not risen above the mid-point and happiness is only slightly above the mid-point. Meanwhile, whites, who have forfeited their political dominance, continue to score above the mid-point on happiness and life satisfaction. The paper draws on the literature, particularly on quality-of-life trends in reunified Germany and paradoxical trends in African-American life satisfaction when discussing the dynamics underlying South African subjective well-being. It is argued that coping mechanisms may play an important role in determining levels of subjective well-being in the complex situation of South Africa.     

Adaptation and the Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-Being: Does Happiness Change After Major Life Events?

ABSTRACT— Hedonic adaptation refers to the process by which individuals return to baseline levels of happiness following a change in life circumstances. Dominant models of subjective well-being (SWB) suggest that people can adapt to almost any life event and that happiness levels fluctuate around a biologically determined set point that rarely changes. Recent evidence from large-scale panel studies challenges aspects of this conclusion. Although inborn factors certainly matter and some adaptation does occur, events such as divorce, death of a spouse, unemployment, and disability are associated with lasting changes in SWB. These recent studies also show that there are considerable individual differences in the extent to which people adapt. Thus, happiness levels do change, and adaptation is not inevitable.     

Happiness,Rationality, Autonomy and the Good Life

The paper starts with a general discussion of the concepts of happiness and the good life. I argue that there is a conceptual core of happiness which has to do with one’s life as a whole. I discuss affective and attitude or life satisfaction views of happiness and indicate problems faced by those views. I introduce my own view, the life plan view, which sees happiness as the ongoing realizing of global desires of the person. I argue that on such a view one’s life could be happy without a high level of rationality or a high level of autonomy; such rationality and autonomy are not built into the concept of happiness. So while happiness is a final value, and good for the person, it is not the only final value. Rationality and autonomy are also final values and, where they exist, are good as ends for the person, part of the good life.     

Happiness theories of the good life

The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory.     

Religion and Subjective Well‐Being Across Religious Traditions: Evidence from 1.3 Million Americans

I examine the relationship between religious service attendance and two domains (cognitive and affective) of subjective well‐being using Gallup Daily Poll data, which has a sample size over 1.3 million. I find that religious attendance is positively associated with both domains of subjective well‐being in all religious traditions examined, including non‐Christian traditions and “religious nones.” The strength of the association varies significantly across the traditions: stronger among Christian groups—particularly among the groups that are, on average, more observant—than among non‐Christian religions or “religious nones.” The stronger association among the observant groups is partly due to the lower level of well‐being among nonattendees in those groups than nonattendees in less observant groups. I also find that the association is stronger among individuals who consider religion an important part of life than among those who do not. Finally, my findings suggest that religious service attendance is equally strongly related to both domains of subjective well‐being.     

Well-being on campus: testing the effectiveness of an online strengths-based intervention for first year college students

The present research examined the effectiveness of an 8-week online strengths-based intervention in promoting subjective and psychological well-being of first year university students. The intervention was composed of five modules pertaining to (a) finding and cultivating on character strengths, (b) regulation of emotions and increasing positive emotions, (c) constructive communication, establishing social connectedness and positive relationships (d) effective decision-making and problem solving and (e) achieving flow and practicing gratitude. A total 92 students volunteered to participate in the study. They were randomly assigned to either the intervention or a control group. Students’ quality of life (psychological health and social relations domains), life satisfaction, subjective happiness and ontological well-being were measured before and after the intervention. Significant improvements in well-being of intervention group participants were observed over an 8-week period whereas control group participants did not show a significant increase in any of these well-being variables.