Circular definitions,circular explanations,and infinite regresses

This paper discusses some of the ways in which circular definitions and circular explanations entail or fail to entail infinite regresses. And since not all infinite regresses are vicious, a few criteria of viciousness are examined in order to determine when the entailment of a regress refutes a circular definition or a circular explanation.I would like to thank Professors Robert Tully, Howard Sobel, and Derek Allen for their constructive comments.     

Developing the matrix representation grid (MRG): A method for observing group processes. Findings from time-limited group psychotherapy for alcohol-dependent patients

The MRG was published 1988 in order to support developments in group psychotherapy methods as one of the all too few process observation research methods for studying group-as-a-whole. After 9 years of what pilot studies have labeled successful clinical trials, this study aims at validating the MRG against the established SAVI: Structural Analysis of Verbal Interaction (Agazarian & Simon 1989). Videotaped group sessions from short-term groups for alcohol dependent patients conducted along two therapy methods, one behaviorally oriented and the other group analytic, are used as material. The MRG is validated in the study, confirmed to be clinically valuable, and some interesting comparisons between the two treatment modalities are also made.     

RESPONSE TO CRITIQUES OF ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

Abstract. Both Roger Shinn and Robert Stivers ask whether technology has a momentum of its own that is difficult if not impossible to control (“autonomous technology” or “technological inevitability”). I reply that the difficulty in controlling technology is a product of economic and political institutions (such as corporate lobbying and campaign contributions) rather than of any inherent characteristics of technology. Against Stivers's assertion that the ecosystem should be the center of value in environmental ethics, I defend the process view that all beings are valuable, but they are not equally valuable in their richness of experience or their contribution to the experience of others. I also consider his caveats about ambiguities in the concept of sustainability. Two questions raised by Mary Gerhart are taken up: the difficulties of interdisciplinary writing and the role of theological ethics in discussions of public policy. In dialogue with Frederick Ferre I explore the role of alternative visions of the good life as a source of social change. In the face of diminished concern about social justice and environmental sustainability among citizens and in Congress since the book was written, I express long-range hope, but not optimism about the short-term prospects for change.     

The second offspring of General Process Learning Theory: Overt behavior as the ambassador of the mind

Wasserman suggested in a recent book review that the study of intervening cognitive processes represents a current focus of interest in animal learning and that this has led to a revitalization of comparative psychology. An examination of the volume reviewed suggests that he may have overstated the case. Most of the authors to whom he refers expressed dissatisfaction with traditional stimulus-response associationism but few argued for the extreme (information processing) sort of cognitive approach described by Wasserman.     

On Herrnstein's equation and related forms

In 1970, Herrnstein proposed a simple equation to describe the relation between response and reinforcement rates on interval schedules. Its empirical basis is firm, but its theoretical foundation is still uncertain. Two approaches to the derivation of Herrnstein's equation are discussed. It can be derived as the equilibrium solution to a process model equivalent to familiar linear-operator learning models. Modifications of this approach yield competing power-function formulations. The equation can also be derived from the assumption that response strength is proportional to reinforcement rate, given that there is a ceiling on response rate. The proportional relation can, in turn, be derived from a threshold assumption equivalent to Shimp's “momentary maximizing”. This derivation implies that the two parameters of Herrnstein's equation should be correlated, and may explain its special utility in application to internal schedules.     

Fitting cross-classification table data to models when observations are subject to classification error

Individuals are classified in a cross-classification table where two behavioral observations on each individual determine the classification. The problem is to test certain structural models assumed to underlie the cross-classified observations. A minimum chi-square test procedure is proposed.     

回报谨慎对谈判过程和谈判结果的影响

回报谨慎是人们害怕在人际关系中被他人利用的一种信念。研究考察了回报谨慎对谈判者的动机倾向、谈判行为及谈判结果的影响。184人组成92个两人小组参加了一项模拟商业谈判,谈判前研究者成功地进行了回报谨慎的操纵,谈判结束后,参加谈判的人完成谈判协议和谈判后问卷。研究者假设,低回报谨慎的谈判者比高回报谨慎的谈判者在谈判中更可能持有合作倾向、更多地与谈判对手分享信息,研究者还预测回报谨慎与谈判双方的联合收益以及谈判后对谈判对手的看法都有关系。研究结果支持了上述假设。研究对从事商业谈判的人具有实际意义。     

阅读过程中眼动特征的发展研究

对国内外有关阅读过程中眼动特征的发展研究进行了综述。国外在该领域的研究大致经历了三个阶段,而国内的有关研究虽然起步较晚,但却取得了不少研究成果,对相关内各进行了扼要的介绍,最后作者对阅读过程眼动特征的发展研究发表了自己的看法。     

Giving,Fast and Slow: Reflection Increases Costly (but Not Uncostly) Charitable Giving

Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson‐Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016 ; Tinghög et al., 2016 ), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007 ), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014 ). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation (Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson‐Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016 ; Tinghög et al., 2016 ), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007 ), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014 ). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation ($0.40) or costly donation condition (e.g., $100), and randomly assigning them to decide under time pressure or after reflecting. Reflection increased their willingness to give costly amounts, but did not influence their willingness to give uncostly amounts. Similarly, the relationship between decision time and giving was positive when the stakes were costly but was relatively flat when the stakes were uncostly (Study 4). Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.