社会判断偏差的分化研究：人物因素的影响

实验采用投射的方法,利用图片和问题材料,考察了128名本科生对物、事、人的社会判断偏差的分化现象。实验结果表明：1）社会判断内在的宽大效应存在局限性,它是有条件限制的,受到所介入的人物因素的影响而出现分化现象;2）对物与事的评价中,突出了对性别判断标准的差异;3）在社会人的对比中,容貌、性别、背景在对同一事件的判断中发挥着重要作用,使社会判断出现偏差分化。     

Reading is believing: the truth effect and source credibility

Five experiments explored how source reliability influences people’s tendency to rate statements as more credible when they were encountered earlier (the truth effect). Undergraduates read statements from one reliable source and one unreliable source. Statements read multiple times were perceived as more valid and were more often correctly identified on a general knowledge test than statements read once or not at all. This occurred at varying retention intervals whether the statements originated from a reliable or unreliable source, when people had little memory for the statements themselves or their source, and when the discrediting information about the sources came either before or after reading the facts. While repetition aided recognition and source accuracy, both were unaffected by the reliability of the source. Consistent with the source monitoring framework, familiarity may create an illusion of truth for statements when people lack source-specifying cues, especially cues regarding the reliability of the source.     

Anxiety-related differences in affective categorizations of lexical stimuli

Effects of emotional valence on attention have been shown to occur even when stimuli are presented outside awareness. The impact of negative valence on stimulus processing has been demonstrated to be particularly salient in anxiety. Therefore, it has been hypothesized that compared to nonanxious individuals, anxious individuals have an enhanced ability to detect the valence of negative stimuli. However, it remains unclear whether anxious individuals are better at identifying the valence of threatening stimuli or, rather, more likely to label ambiguous stimuli as threatening. To investigate these hypotheses, high and low anxious participants categorized lexical stimuli as "safe" or "dangerous." Stimuli were presented at durations that allowed for both conscious (unmasked) and nonconscious (masked) processing. Results show that on masked trials, anxious individuals evidenced an enhanced ability to correctly classify threatening information, whereas nonanxious participants demonstrated an enhanced ability to correctly classify neutral or positive information. Signal detection analyses indicated results were explained by a response bias, whereby anxious individuals were more likely than nonanxious individuals to categorize masked words as threatening and nonanxious individuals were more likely to categorize masked words as nonthreatening. No group differences for nonword stimuli emerged, suggesting that anxiety-related response bias tendencies are activated only after detection of a weak semantic signal.     

The asymmetric effect of regulatory fit on moral judgments of other-oriented lies

We examined whether regulatory fit effects are asymmetric—namely, whether they occur only among individuals with a promotion focus or a prevention focus. We adopted a task where individuals make moral judgments of other-oriented lies and conducted three studies. The results indicated that prevention-focused individuals judged other-oriented lies based on a vigilant strategy as more moral than lies based on an eager strategy (Studies 1 and 2). Meanwhile for promotion-focused individuals, there were no differences between eager and vigilant strategies on moral judgments of other-oriented lies. Additionally, the results suggested that the feeling of rightness is an underlying mechanism of the regulatory fit effects of prevention focus (Study 3).     

Rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>) succeed on a computerized test designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity

Conservation of quantity occurs through recognition that changes in the physical arrangement of a set of items do not change the quantity of items in that set. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were presented with a computerized quantity judgment task. Monkeys were rewarded for selecting the greater quantity of items in one of two horizontal arrays of items on the screen. On some trials, after a correct selection, no reward was given but one of the arrays was manipulated. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array without changing the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made another selection from the two rows of items. Monkeys were sensitive to these manipulations, changing their selections when the number of items in the rows changed but not when the arrangement only was changed. Therefore, monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the sets.Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available for this article at     

Judgments of associative memory

Judgments of associative memory (JAM) were indexed by ratings given to pairs of cue and response words. The normed probabilities, p(response|cue), were obtained from free association norms. The ratings were linearly related to the probabilities. The JAM functions were characterized by high intercepts ( approximately 50 on a 100 point scale) and shallow slopes (<0.5). The JAM function generalized across materials and method of rating. The function was not affected by expectancies or semantic similarity. Attempts to alter the function by making alternative responses more available were unsuccessful. A computer simulation model (MINERVA 2) exhibited the linear JAM function and successfully accounted for more complex phenomena (like the joint influence of forward and backward associative strengths on ratings). The shallow JAM slope appears to result from a fundamental lack of discrimination among associative strengths. The high intercept appears to result partly from an independent post-mnemonic source of bias producing over-estimation of association.     

Invisible Stimuli,Implicit Thresholds: Why Invisibility Judgments Cannot be Interpreted in Isolation

Some studies of unconscious cognition rely on judgments of participants stating that they have “not seen” the critical stimulus (e.g., in a masked-priming experiment). Trials in which participants gave invisibility judgments are then treated as those where the critical stimulus was “subliminal” or “unconscious,” as opposed to trials with higher visibility ratings. Sometimes, only these trials are further analyzed, for instance, for unconscious priming effects. Here I argue that this practice requires implicit assumptions about subjective measures of awareness incompatible with basic models of categorization under uncertainty (e.g., modern signal-detection and threshold theories). Most importantly, it ignores the potential effects of response bias. Instead of taking invisibility judgments literally, they would better be employed in parametric experiments where stimulus visibility is manipulated systematically, not accidentally. This would allow studying qualitative and double dissociations between measures of awareness and of stimulus processing per se.     

Episodic feeling-of-knowing relies on noncriterial recollection and familiarity: Evidence using an online remember-know procedure

We examined the hypothesis that feeling-of-knowing judgments rely on recollection as well as on familiarity prompted by the cue presentation. A remember-know-no memory procedure was combined with the episodic FOK procedure employing a cue–target pair memory task. The magnitude of FOK judgments and FOK accuracy were examined as a function of recollection, familiarity, or the “no memory” option. Results showed that the proportion of R and K responses was similar. FOK accuracy and magnitude of FOK judgments were higher for R and K responses than for N responses. FOK accuracy related to R and K responses were above chance level, but FOK was not accurate in the “no memory” condition. Finally, both FOK magnitude and FOK accuracy were related more to recollection than to familiarity. These results support the hypothesis that both recollection and familiarity are determinants of the FOK process, although they suggest that recollection has a stronger influence.     

知觉模糊度影响学习的延迟效应

基于迁移适当加工理论,采用连续识别任务范式,通过操纵字词和图片的模糊度来考察知觉模糊非流畅的延迟效应。结果发现：（1）模糊不流畅的材料学习判断值更低;（2） 知觉模糊程度对即时的再认成绩没有影响,但在延迟再认测试中流畅性较低的模糊材料成绩更好。该结果表明实验操纵方式所引发的编码过程和记忆测试所需的检索过程性质上相匹配,而且延迟测试时,知觉非流畅可以促进学习,说明该效应存在边界。     

Not Simply in the Eye of the Beholder: Authenticity as a Product of Candidate Preference and Unfettered Speech

Authenticity has emerged over recent decades as a prominent theme in both the press and in political research—and peaked in the 2016 presidential contest that pitted Donald Trump against Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Marco Rubio, and Ted Cruz. In this context, we attempted to answer the question: How do voters judge a presidential candidate's authenticity? Here we use motivated reasoning and correspondent inference theory as theoretical frameworks to examine how partisan preference combines with perceptions of unfettered speech and strategic impression management to influence voter judgments of a candidate's authenticity. An online survey of 525 respondents demonstrated that individuals' partisan preferences influenced both judgments of a candidate's authenticity and their perceptions of behaviors signifying authenticity (use of unfettered speech versus strategic impression management). These behavioral signals partially mediated the relation between candidate preferences and authenticity judgments. Moreover, voters, given their partisan preferences, differentially weighted candidates' use of unfettered speech and strategic impression management tactics in their judgments of authenticity. Finally, unfiltered/politically incorrect speech was found to have both positive and negative effects on authenticity judgments. Findings further elucidate the nature of authenticity as perceived in others and identify intermediary variables and boundary conditions that influence those perceptions.