Scrutinizing the Emotional Nature of Intuitive Coherence Judgments

Dual‐system models propose that cognitive processing can occur either intuitively or deliberately. Unlike deliberate decision strategies, intuitive ones are assumed to have an emotional component attached to the decision process. We tested if intuitive decisions are indeed accompanied by an emotional response while deliberate decisions are not. Specifically, we conducted a psychophysiological study in which participants were instructed to decide either intuitively or deliberately if three simultaneously presented words were semantically coherent or incoherent (triad task). The degree of emotionality of these two decision strategies (intuitive vs. deliberate) was compared using changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and the reaction time (RT) effect of an affective priming paradigm as primary measurements. Based on a valence‐arousal model, our results revealed that intuitive and deliberate judgments do not differ as to their emotional valence but that they do differ in emotional arousal. Most notably, sympathetic activation during intuitive judgments was significantly lower compared to sympathetic activation during deliberate judgments. Our results reflect that a relaxed state of mind—manifested in low sympathetic activity—could underlie the holistic processing that is assumed to facilitate the proliferation of semantic associations during coherence judgments. This suggests that coherence judgments made under an (instructed) intuitive decision mode have a specific psychophysiological signature and that arousal is the differentiating component between intuitive and deliberate decision strategies. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

道德概念净脏隐喻及其对道德判断的影响

通过3个实验考察道德概念净脏隐喻的心理现实性以及道德概念净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻对道德判断的影响及其差异。结果表明：（1）道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,即被试在洁净背景上判断道德词的反应时更快,在肮脏背景上判断不道德词的反应时更快。（2）当将道德两难故事呈现在肮脏背景上时,相比于呈现在洁净背景上,被试更容易将故事主人公的行为判断为不道德,表现出隐喻一致性效应。（3）相比于肮脏自身启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事主人公的行为判断为更加不道德,表现出隐喻补偿性效应。（4）相比于洁净背景启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加严厉;相比于肮脏背景启动,被试在肮脏自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加宽松。研究结果证明,道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻均影响个体的道德判断,并且二者对道德判断的影响不同。     

How Do Lay People Weight Information About Instrumentality, Expressiveness, and Gender-Typed Hobbies When Judging Masculinity–Femininity in Themselves, Best Friends, and Strangers?

To study how people weight information when judging their own and others’ masculinity–femininity (M–F), I asked 170 male and 205 female participants to rate themselves and their best friends on M–F, instrumentality, expressiveness, and gender-typed hobby preferences. Also, each participant judged the M–F of eight fictitious women (or men) described as possessing low or high instrumentality, low or high expressiveness, and hobbies typical of men or women. Regression analyses showed that gender-typed hobby preferences predicted M–F ratings of self and friends more strongly than instrumentality or expressiveness did. Similarly, analyses of participants’ judgments of fictitious people showed that participants weighted gender-typed hobbies more strongly than instrumentality and expressiveness when judging targets’ M–F. All results converged to show that lay people’s judgments of M–F are based more on information about gender-typed interests than on information about instrumentality or expressiveness.     

Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: the case of Change Blindness Blindness

Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” (CB). They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” (CBB) is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and perceived success in prior trials. These cues were found to influence self-evaluation in two orthogonal ways: success-feedback influenced self-evaluation in a global, contextual way, presumably by recalibrating the norm of adequacy for the task. Search time influenced it in a local way, predicting the success of a given trial from its duration.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

学习判断与学习时间分配的关系

学习判断与学习时间分配的关系是元认知领域的重要问题, 对学习判断的研究在于使个体了解自己的学习和记忆活动, 从而有效控制学习过程, 合理分配学习时间, 这是元记忆监测影响控制的典型例子。近来有研究者提出学习时间分配不仅表现控制功能, 而且还表现监测功能。于是围绕学习时间的双重功能, 他们提出了元记忆监测与控制至少存在两种关系模型—— MC(监测影响控制)模型和CM(控制影响监测)模型, 后来又提出了两模型相互协同作用的合并动态模型—— 连续波浪型模式和同时发生模型。未来的研究应在继续验证MC模型和完善CM模型的基础上, 尝试检验两模型的合并动态模型。     

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) succeed in a test of quantity conservation

Nonhuman animals demonstrate a number of impressive quantitative skills such as counting sets of items, comparing sets on the basis of the number of items or amount of material, and even responding to simple arithmetic manipulations. In this experiment, capuchin monkeys were presented with a computerized task designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity. Monkeys first were trained to select from two horizontal arrays of stimuli the one with the larger number of items. On some trials, after a correct selection there was no feedback but instead an additional manipulation of one of those arrays. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array but not the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made a second selection from the two arrays of items. Previous research had shown that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) succeeded with this task. However, there was no condition in that study in which items were added to the smaller array without increasing its quantity to a point where it became the new larger array. This new condition was added in the present experiment. Capuchin monkeys were sensitive to all of these manipulations, changing their selections when the manipulations changed which array contained the larger number of items but not when the manipulations changed the physical arrangement of items or increased the quantity in one array without also reversing which of the two arrays had more items. Therefore, capuchin monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the arrays. The data indicate that capuchins are sensitive to simply arithmetic manipulations that involve addition of items to arrays and also that they can conserve quantity.     

Triangulating Political Responsibility: The Motivated Formation of Responsibility Judgments

This article analyzes the process through which partisan bias arises during the formation of citizens' judgments of political responsibility. Informed by theories of motivated political reasoning, it argues that exposure to partisan cues motivates partisans to pursue directional goals, goals which bias the cognitive processing of information and, in turn, overall judgments of responsibility. It further argues that the nature of this biased processing will be such that partisans devalue information inconsistent with their partisan affect. Using a pair of experiments, I test these hypotheses by manipulating both objective evidence concerning gubernatorial responsibility for a state's fiscal imbalance and the presence of partisan cues. Findings support both sets of expectations. The results also suggest that the effects of partisan bias are greater in judgments tied to institutional actions than in those tied to institutional roles and expectations.     

Biases in social comparisons: Optimism or pessimism?

Social comparisons typically lead to two kinds of biases: A comparative optimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as more likely than others to be the beneficiaries of positive outcomes) or a comparative pessimism bias (i.e., a tendency for people to view themselves as less likely than others to be such beneficiaries); rarely are people fully calibrated in terms of how they compare to others. However, there is little systematic research on the factors that determine when a comparative optimism versus pessimism bias will occur, how they can be attenuated and whether such attenuation is always desirable. In this paper, we report four studies which demonstrate the following key results: First, we show that perceived level of control over the outcome drives whether a comparative optimism or pessimism bias will occur (Study 1). Second, an increase in perceived similarity between self and a comparison target person attenuates the comparative optimism bias in domains that people view as highly controllable (Study 2a) and attenuates the comparative pessimism bias in domains that people view as less controllable (Study 2b). Finally, we show that people are willing to work harder when they experience more comparative optimism in higher control scenarios and when they experience less comparative pessimism in lower control scenarios, illustrating that motivating people to strive harder for positive outcomes can result from exacerbated or attenuated bias, depending on the context (Study 3).