Sentence processing deficits in two Cantonese aphasic patients

This paper reports the performances of two Cantonese aphasics on tasks examining their sentence processing deficits. The data on sentence comprehension show that thematically noncanonical sentences, full passives, and subject-gap sentences present greater difficulty to these patients than canonical sentences, truncated passives, and object-gap sentences, respectively. These patterns are consistent with previous observations on Chinese aphasics and are expected given the structural differences between Chinese and English. In a Cantonese grammaticality judgment test, a set of structures are identified that can elicit clear judgments from normal subjects and aphasics, contrary to the claim that grammaticality judgments in Chinese are probabilistic and fragile. Most interestingly, the patients' overall performance patterns reveal a double dissociation between sentence comprehension and judgment of sentence well-formedness, suggesting that the two tasks are supported by independent processing mechanisms.     

Hemispheric differences in semantic-relatedness judgments

Subjects judged the semantic relatedness of word pairs presented to the left or right visual field. The word pairs were presented one below the other. On critical trials, the words' referents had a typical spatial relation, with one referent oriented above the other (e.g. ATTIC/BASEMENT). The spatial relation of the words either matched or mismatched the spatial relation of their referents. When presented to the left hemisphere, the match or mismatch did not have an effect. However, there was a reliable mismatch effect for pairs presented to the right hemisphere. The results are interpreted in the context of perceptual theories of mental representation.     

A calibration explanation of serial position effects in evaluative judgments

Judges often evaluate stimulus series on dimensions for which no physical scale exists; for example, when judging academic ability in oral examinations. We propose that judges deal with this problem by calibrating an internal judgment scale that maps stimulus input onto available judgment categories. This calibration process implies serial position effects: Judges should initially avoid extreme categories, because using extreme categories reduces judgmental degrees of freedom, thereby increasing the possibility of internal consistency violations. In four experiments, we show that judgments become indeed more extreme later in a series of judgments. Judges evaluated the same good (poor) performances more positive (negative) at the end of a sequence compared to the beginning. Judges’ expertise did not prevent the effect, but allowing end-of-sequence judgments reduced serial position effects. We discuss the implications and possible remedies of these calibration effects on judgment extremity.     

Predictors of children's prosocial lie-telling: Motivation, socialization variables, and moral understanding

Children tell prosocial lies for self- and other-oriented reasons. However, it is unclear how motivational and socialization factors affect their lying. Furthermore, it is unclear whether children’s moral understanding and evaluations of prosocial lie scenarios (including perceptions of vignette characters’ feelings) predict their actual prosocial behaviors. These were explored in two studies. In Study 1, 72 children (36 second graders and 36 fourth graders) participated in a disappointing gift paradigm in either a high-cost condition (lost a good gift for a disappointing one) or a low-cost condition (received a disappointing gift). More children lied in the low-cost condition (94%) than in the high-cost condition (72%), with no age difference. In Study 2, 117 children (42 preschoolers, 41 early elementary school age, and 34 late elementary school age) participated in either a high- or low-cost disappointing gift paradigm and responded to prosocial vignette scenarios. Parents reported on their parenting practices and family emotional expressivity. Again, more children lied in the low-cost condition (68%) than in the high-cost condition (40%); however, there was an age effect among children in the high-cost condition. Preschoolers were less likely than older children to lie when there was a high personal cost. In addition, compared with truth-tellers, prosocial liars had parents who were more authoritative but expressed less positive emotion within the family. Finally, there was an interaction between children’s prosocial lie-telling behavior and their evaluations of the protagonist’s and recipient’s feelings. Findings contribute to understanding the trajectory of children’s prosocial lie-telling, their reasons for telling such lies, and their knowledge about interpersonal communication.     

Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self-favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.     

Younger and older adults weigh multiple cues in a similar manner to generate judgments of learning

One’s memory for past test performance (MPT) is a key piece of information individuals use when deciding how to restudy material. We used a multi-trial recognition memory task to examine adult age differences in the influence of MPT (measured by actual Trial 1 memory accuracy and subjective confidence judgments, CJs) along with Trial 1 judgments of learning (JOLs), objective and participant-estimated recognition fluencies, and Trial 2 study time on Trial 2 JOLs. We found evidence of simultaneous and independent influences of multiple objective and subjective (i.e., metacognitive) cues on Trial 2 JOLs, and these relationships were highly similar for younger and older adults. Individual differences in Trial 1 recognition accuracy and CJs on Trial 2 JOLs indicate that individuals may vary in the degree to which they rely on each MPT cue when assessing subsequent memory confidence. Aging appears to spare the ability to access multiple cues when making JOLs.     

On using what we know about ourselves in thinking about others: Not so fast

Abstract

We argue that the frequently assumed privileged role of the self as a habitual reference point in social judgments is often hindered by the fact that, unlike other persons, the self is typically represented primarily in terms of internal, unobservable characteristics. This idiosyncratic feature of self-representations may render them incompatible with many other social representations. Yet, such limitations are not universal. In particular, incompatibility is less of a problem when (1) the judgment target is someone psychologically close; (2) accessible self-representations involve distant (rather than recent) self-memories; (3) accessible self-representations are relatively abstract, (semanticized) rather than event-specific; or, (4) social judgements concern not a specific other person but more abstract social concepts such as traits.     

The future is now: the impact of present fluency in judgments about the future

Recent research has emphasised the role of episodic memory in both remembering past events and in envisaging future events. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly shown that judgments about past events are affected by the fluency with which retrieval cues are processed. In this paper we investigate whether perceptual fluency also plays a role in judgments about future events. For this purpose we conducted four experiments. The first experiment replicated recent findings showing that stimuli that are processed fluently tend to be wrongly recognised as having been encountered in the past outside the laboratory walls [Brown, A. S., & Marsh, E. J. (2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534–538. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337.x]. Two follow-up experiments using Brown and Marsh’s [(2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534–538. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337] task tested the influence of perceptual fluency on future judgments. The fourth and last experiment was designed to rule out a potential confounding factor in the two previous experiments. Across experiments, we found that people rely on fluency when making judgments about events that are yet to come. These results suggest that fluency is an equally valid cue for past and future judgments.     

Do Bettors Correctly Perceive Odds? Three Studies of How Bettors Interpret Betting Odds as Probabilistic Information

This paper reports on three studies investigating how accurately bettors (=people who regularly bet on sports events) interpret the probabilistic information implied by betting odds. All studies were based on data collected by web surveys prompting a total of 186 experienced bettors to convert sets of representative odds into frequency judgments. Bayesian statistical methods were used to analyze the data. From the results, the following conclusions were made: (i) On the whole, the bettors produced well‐calibrated judgments, indicating that they have realistic perceptions of odds. (ii) Bettors were unable to consciously adjust judgments for different margins. (iii) Although their interval judgments often covered the estimates implied by the odds, the bettors tended to overestimate the variation of expected profitable bets between months. The results are consistent with prior research showing that people tend to make accurate probability judgments when faced with tasks characterized by constant and clear feedback. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.