从责任伦理的视角,提出临床决策支持系统(clinical decision support system,CDSS)在确保准确性、尊重自主性、保护隐私安全等责任中存在的合作意识缺失、职业责任薄弱、社会责任缺位等伦理责任问题,针对上述问题,通过以人为本、共存共生的责任伦理原则指出CDSS各方承担责任的主要路径,包括增强合作意识提高CDSS准确性、明确医生与开发者职业责任确保CDSS应用的自主性、加强企业社会责任保障隐私保护等,期望为责任相关者更好地承担伦理责任提供思路,为CDSS未来发展提供新的视角。
In this paper I address the conflict of interest (CoI) issue from a legal point of view at a European level. We will see that
the regulatory framework that exists in Europe does state the need for the independence of ethics committee involved in authorisation
of research and clinical trials. We will see that CoI is an element that has to be closely monitored at National and International
level. Therefore, Member States and Newly Associated States do have to address CoI in the authorisation process of research
and clinical protocols of biomedicine.
The opinions here expressed are personal and do not commit the European Commission.
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at a Conference on Conflict of Interest and Its Significance in Science and Medicine, 5–6 April, 2002, Warsaw, Poland.
The author is a Scientific Officer in the Programme Science and Society dealing with ethics and science (Unit C.3). 相似文献
Conceptual preparation mechanisms such as novel idea generation and selection from amongst competing alternatives are critical for language production and may contribute to age-related language deficits. This study investigated whether older adults show diminished idea generation and selection abilities, compared to younger adults. Twenty younger (18–35 years) and 20 older (60–80 years) adults completed two novel experimental tasks, an idea generation task and a selection task. Older participants were slower than younger participants overall on both tasks. Importantly, this difference was more pronounced for task conditions with greater demands on generation and selection. Older adults were also significantly reduced on a semantic, but not phonemic, word fluency task. Overall, the older group showed evidence of age-related decline specific to idea generation and selection ability. This has implications for the message formulation stage of propositional language decline in normal aging. 相似文献
Serious ethical violations in medicine, such as sexual abuse, criminal prescribing of opioids, and unnecessary surgeries, directly harm patients and undermine trust in the profession of medicine. We review the literature on violations in medicine and present an analysis of 280 cases. Nearly all cases involved repeated instances (97%) of intentional wrongdoing (99%), by males (95%) in nonacademic medical settings (95%), with oversight problems (89%) and a selfish motive such as financial gain or sex (90%). More than half of cases involved a wrongdoer with a suspected personality disorder or substance use disorder (51%). Despite clear patterns, no factors provide readily observable red flags, making prevention difficult. Early identification and intervention in cases requires significant policy shifts that prioritize the safety of patients over physician interests in privacy, fair processes, and proportionate disciplinary actions. We explore a series of 10 questions regarding policy, oversight, discipline, and education options. Satisfactory answers to these questions will require input from diverse stakeholders to help society negotiate effective and ethically balanced solutions. 相似文献
This paper concerns one of the undecided disputes of modern moral philosophy: the possibility of moral dilemmas. Whereas proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas often appeal to moral experience, many opponents refer to ethical theory and deontic logic. My aim in this paper is to clarify some of the tension between moral experience and ethical theory with respect to moral dilemmas. In Part One I try to show that a number of logical arguments against the possibility of moral dilemmas, though apparently very different, turn out to be basically the same, as they are all based on the following concept of ought: if A ought to be done, doing B is impermissible and doing A itself is permissible. In Part Two I present an overview of several definitions of moral dilemmas that have been given by proponents of moral dilemmas: definitions that define moral dilemmas in terms of oughts and definitions that define them in terms of reasons. I conclude that, while reason is to weak, ought is too strong a concept to define moral dilemmas with. In this way, the arguments from Part One create a logical problem for proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas to define moral dilemmas. 相似文献