THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RHETORIC OF EXCESS

If militarism violates the ideals of liberty and justice in one way, and rapidly increasing social stratification violates them in another, then American democracy is in crisis. A culture of democratic accountability will survive only if citizens revive the concerns that animated the great reform movements of the past, from abolitionism to civil rights. It is crucial, when reasoning about practical matters, not only to admit how grave one's situation is, but also to resist despair. Therefore, the fate of democracy depends, to some significant degree, on how we choose to describe the crisis. Saying that we have already entered the new dark ages or a post‐democratic era may prove to be a self‐fulfilling prophecy, because anyone who accepts this message is apt to give up on the hard work of organizing and contestation that is needed to hold political representatives accountable to the people. This paper asks how one might strike the right balance between accuracy and hope in describing the democracy's current troubles. After saying what I mean by democracy and what I think the current threats to it are, I respond to Romand Coles's criticisms of reservations I have expressed before about rhetorical excess in the works of Stanley Hauerwas, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rorty. This leads to a discussion of several points raised against me by Hauerwas. A digression offers some of my reasons for doubting that John Howard Yoder's biblical scholarship vindicates Hauerwas's version of pacifism. The paper concludes by arguing that Sheldon Wolin's work on the evisceration of democracy, though admirably accurate in its treatment of the dangers posed by empire and capital, abandons the project of democratic accountability too quickly in favor of the romance of the fugitive.     

JUST WAR THEORY,HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,AND THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self‐defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth‐century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the “just authority” of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near‐unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions.     

Millennials’ national and global identities as drivers of materialism and consumer ethnocentrism

ABSTRACT

A major effect of globalization is one that occurs on the self-concept. This is especially the case for young consumers, and particularly for millennials. Despite this cohort’s idiosyncrasies, little attention has been paid to the study of their consumer identities, an important aspect of self-concept. The current research addresses this gap by examining the way millennial consumers’ global and national identities help explain two attitudinal outcomes associated with globalization: materialism and consumer ethnocentrism. Data were collected from millennials in two distinct socio-cultural contexts. A key finding suggests that distinct contexts (i.e., collectivist and ethnically homogeneous vs. individualistic and ethnically diverse) exhibit differences in the formation of materialism and consumer ethnocentrism among millennials. Additionally, results indicate that for similar consumer segments, each context’s configuration of millennials shows differences in global and national identities. Implications for future researchers and practitioners are discussed.     

Direct Democracy and Institutional Trust: Relationships and Differences Across Personality Traits

Direct democracy plays a prominent role in the explanation of institutional trust. To date, however, empirical findings on the effects of direct democracy remain inconclusive. In this article, we argue that this inconclusiveness can be partly ascribed to the diverse effects direct democracy has on individuals. In other words, direct democracy influences institutional trust, but how and to what degree depends on individuals’ personality traits. Running hierarchical analyses of unique survey data from a random sample of eligible Swiss voters, we document three findings: First, we show that the number of ballot measures is not directly associated with institutional trust. Second, we demonstrate that the Big Five personality traits affect the propensity to trust. Third, some of these traits also alter the relationship between direct democracy and institutional trust, suggesting that certain personality types are more likely to be sensitive to popular votes than others and that not everyone is equally likely to respond to political stimuli, even in highly democratic environments.     

Rawls's Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough

Res Publica - What sorts of reasons are i) required and ii) morally acceptable when citizens in a pluralist liberal democracy undertake to resolve pressing political issues? This paper presents and...     

The Complexity of Justice - A Challenge to the 21st Century

The author discusses two questions, the relation between liberalism and democracy, and the relation between ethics, morality and law. As to the first question, she argues that neither liberalism nor democracy are merely formal. Roughly spoken, it can be said that liberalism stands for negative liberties, whereas democracy stands for positive ones. She observes a non-contingent tension between the ethos of liberalism (personal freedom) and the ethos of democracy (equality; majority rule). It is the task of morality to maintain and restore the balance between these two kinds of ethos. As to the second question, she is worried about the balance between law (legal regulation), ethics, and morality. On the one hand, abolishing legal regulations would amount to abolishing the freedom of the moderns. On the other hand, the substitution of legal regulations for ethical regulations would lead to a similar result: the end of the freedom of the moderns through the homogenisation of life. In the former case, personal support, charity, magnanimity, and caring would get lost, while in the latter there would be no escape from community pressure towards uniformity.     

Imagining Membership: The Conception of Europe in the Political Thought of T. G. Masaryk and Václav Havel

A decade after the fall of Communism in Europe, the Czech Republic'smembership in the European Union is still a matter of a relatively shortwaiting period of 4 years. Not so the imagination of this membership andthe creation of a political concept created to promote this goal: thespecific Central European policy initiated by Thomas G. Masaryk andrevitalized by Václav Havel. Despite the deep differences in thepolitical thought and philosophical orientations of both Presidents, notto mention the historic rupture of 41 years of Totalitarianism, theirperceptions of Europe as an Imagined Community are identical.     

Central-Eastern European Collective Experiences

The social-psychological phenomena in the post-communist countries of Central-Eastern Europe can be understood only if studied in terms of their pre-communist past. These countries have a complex history. The events relating to dictatorship, democracy and nation are particularly conspicuous. The present study examines the meanings of the terms ‘dictatorship’, ‘democracy’ and ‘nation’ in Hungary, from 1973 until 1995, using the semantic differential. It is argued that the changes in the meanings of these terms can be explained in terms of socio-political changes in Hungary. (© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)     

In the Search for a Post-Communist Syndrome: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Assessment

A pattern of attitudes and behaviours in the recently freed, post-communist countries is hypothesized as a post-communist syndrome. This study describes the syndrome and its aetiology. The syndrome is viewed as a direct result of long-lasting, oppressive rule and suggests a host of individual and social disorders: learned helplessness, specific manifestations of immorality/incivility, lack of civic culture and civic virtues. Using Q-factor analysis of ‘civic culture’ in a sample of Czech, Hungarian and American students it was found that contrary to the hypothesis, the Czech respondents exhibited a robust civic culture. (© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)