"诚"与"真"——论儒家之"诚"对当代真理论研究的启示

在儒家学说中,“诚”并不仅指人与人之间的真诚,“诚”也是一个本体论范畴。儒学认为人可以同天,“可以赞天地之化育”,这也是对人的主体性的强调。人能通过倾听自然的言说而得到一点局部真理,但永远不可能把握绝对真理,即大自然的全部奥秘。只有作为绝对主体的大自然才掌握着绝对真理。这种绝对真理是人类的信仰对象,而不是人类的认知对象。现代性的一个愚蠢错误是把这种绝对真理当作人类的认知对象。如果我们认为真理是存在或存在者的本真显现,则真并不仅是命题的属性,也是事物的属性,真理(truth)与真实性(reality)、真(true)与真实(real)密不可分。诚正体现着二者的统一。现代人将道德与自然知识截然分开,失去了诚,扭曲了德。真理论须有个伦理维度才能避免极端怀疑主义。     

厌而避额外之“利”；喜而趋额外之“害”

趋利避害是生物的本能。《管子·禁藏》云：夫凡人之情, 见利莫能勿就, 见害莫能勿避。“两利相权取其重, 两害相权取其轻”是规范性决策理论的一基本原则。本研究以金钱作为奖赏或惩罚刺激, 检验人们能否理性地遵循“价值最大化”原则。在实验中, 主试以检查硬币生产年代的数目为由, 让被试逐枚地感受两个金钱序列：10元硬币序列(由20枚五角硬币组成)和10.3元硬币序列(由20枚五角硬币和3枚一角硬币组成),随后评定获得(或损失)各金钱序列的高兴(或不高兴)程度, 并从中选择一金钱序列(与硬币等值的金钱)作为其奖赏(或惩罚)。实验为2 (3枚一角硬币在序列首vs. 3枚一角硬币在序列尾)´2(先检查10元硬币序列vs. 先检查10.3元硬币序列)´2(损失vs. 获得)三因素设计, 每种条件随机分配15名商学院学生被试。结果表明, 被试倾向选择获益少(10元)和损失多(-10.3元)的金钱序列; 且获益大(10.3元)时高兴程度小, 损失小(-10元)时不高兴程度大。这一结果意味着：“聊”并不胜于“无”,反而是“无”胜于“聊”。其中, 伴随着违背价值最大化原则所产生的情感亦有悖逻辑。负性情感的引发一般有其“逻辑正确”的原因(如, 无惠而不乐); 而引发本研究负性情感的原因实属“逻辑错误”(如, 惠多而不乐)。这种不曾被定义而类似于“冤”的情感不仅见于个人,也见于民族、国家间的持续交往, 值得进一步研究。     

价值取向与社会距离影响经济决策的合作与冲突行为：Chicken Game的证据

采用Chicken Game博弈任务,考察了不同社会价值取向个体（亲社会者与亲自我者）在面对不同社会距离的博弈对手（朋友和陌生人）时表现出的合作与冲突行为。研究结果发现：（1）社会价值取向与社会距离交互影响个体的合作与冲突行为;（2）社会价值取向影响选择策略的反应时,亲社会者选择合作的反应时长于选择冲突的反应时,亲自我者选择合作与选择冲突的反应时没有显著差异;（3）无论对亲社会者还是亲自我者,反馈类型都显著影响个体的合作与冲突行为的选择率以及随后决策的反应时。上述结果表明,个体的合作或冲突行为,并非单一地受到社会价值取向的影响,更可能是受到个人因素（社会价值取向）与其他社会因素（比如,社会距离）的共同调节,并且在这一过程中个体会根据决策后反馈信息不断的调整自己的行为策略。     

The influence of number line estimation precision and numeracy on risky financial decision making

This study examined whether different aspects of mathematical proficiency influence one's ability to make adaptive financial decisions. “Numeracy” refers to the ability to process numerical and probabilistic information and is commonly reported as an important factor which contributes to financial decision‐making ability. The precision of mental number representation (MNR), measured with the number line estimation (NLE) task has been reported to be another critical factor. This study aimed to examine the contribution of these mathematical proficiencies while controlling for the influence of fluid intelligence, math anxiety and personality factors. In our decision‐making task, participants chose between two options offering probabilistic monetary gain or loss. Sensitivity to expected value was measured as an index for the ability to discriminate between optimal versus suboptimal options. Partial correlation and hierarchical regression analyses revealed that NLE precision better explained EV sensitivity compared to numeracy, after controlling for all covariates. These results suggest that individuals with more precise MNR are capable of making more rational financial decisions. We also propose that the measurement of “numeracy,” which is commonly used interchangeably with general mathematical proficiency, should include more diverse aspects of mathematical cognition including basic understanding of number magnitude.     

Out-of-bag Prediction Error: A Cross Validation Index for Generalized Structured Component Analysis

Cross validation is a useful way of comparing predictive generalizability of theoretically plausible a priori models in structural equation modeling (SEM). A number of overall or local cross validation indices have been proposed for existing factor-based and component-based approaches to SEM, including covariance structure analysis and partial least squares path modeling. However, there is no such cross validation index available for generalized structured component analysis (GSCA) which is another component-based approach. We thus propose a cross validation index for GSCA, called Out-of-bag Prediction Error (OPE), which estimates the expected prediction error of a model over replications of so-called in-bag and out-of-bag samples constructed through the implementation of the bootstrap method. The calculation of this index is well-suited to the estimation procedure of GSCA, which uses the bootstrap method to obtain the standard errors or confidence intervals of parameter estimates. We empirically evaluate the performance of the proposed index through the analyses of both simulated and real data.     

Is the victim Max (Planck) or Moritz? How victim type and social value orientation affect dishonest behavior

Does the potential victim of dishonest behavior—a family or a bank, a pensioner or an insurance firm—affect the propensity to engage in such behavior? We investigate the effect of victim type—an individual person or an impersonal institution—on dishonest behavior and test whether it interacts with potential perpetrators' social value orientation (prosocial or proself). In a between‐subjects design, we allowed experimental participants (N = 368) to misreport private information in order to increase (decrease) their profit (loss) at the expense of either another participant or the experimenter's budget. Both prosocials and proselfs engaged in dishonesty, but proselfs did so much more. Furthermore, prosocials reduced their dishonesty when the victim was another person, rather than an institution, but proselfs did not. A direct implication is that the dishonesty of prosocials may be curbed by increasing the salience of the adverse effect their dishonesty has on other individual people but that such interventions will not be effective for proselfs. In contrast with recent results, we did not find a general effect of increased dishonesty under a loss (vs. gain) frame.     

方差分析效果大小报告的新指标

心理学期刊论文中可重复性不高的现象,原因之一是研究结果的效果普遍较小。并且在报告效果大小的文章中,效果大小指标使用不当。在方差分析中最经常报告的是η2和η2_p,但是在不同的研究设计中,这些效果大小是无法直接进行比较的。广义eta方(η²_G)是近年来新出现的一种新的效果大小指标,可克服的η2和η2_p不足,灵活处理重复测量等多种研究设计下个体差异的计算问题,实现跨研究设计效果大小的可比性。论文结合实例介绍了η²_G的原理和计算方法,并对其优缺点、使用和报告等问题进行了讨论。研究人员在报告效果大小时要考虑到不同的研究设计和研究假设,并选择恰当的指标防止过高估计效果大小。     

The relationship between attitudes toward suicide and willingness to pay for suicide prevention: a cross-sectional study in Japan

There are gaps in our knowledge of the role attitudes toward suicide play in determining people’s willingness to participate (WTP) for suicide prevention. We conducted a large nationwide cross-sectional study with the aim of clarifying the relationship between WTP for reducing suicide risk and attitudes toward suicide. Ordinal logistic regression analyses (n = 1771) showed that there were significant associations of WTP for suicide prevention with ‘Suicide as a right’ (β = ?.15, 95% CI: ?.25 to ?.04, p = .006), ‘Preventability/readiness to help’ (β = .81, 95% CI: .69–.94, p < .001) and ‘Common occurrence’ (β = .32, 95% CI: .19–.46, p < .001). ‘Incomprehensibility/unpredictability’ did not show an association with WTP. Taxpayer acceptance for suicide prevention is more likely to be achieved through provision of information that increases endorsement of ‘preventability/readiness to help’ and ‘common occurrence’ factors, and decreases ‘suicide as a right’ scores.     

The Relatively Infinite Value of the Environment

Some environmental ethicists and economists argue that attributing infinite value to the environment is a good way to represent an absolute obligation to protect it. Others argue against modelling the value of the environment in this way: the assignment of infinite value leads to immense technical and philosophical difficulties that undermine the environmentalist project. First, there is a problem of discrimination: saving a large region of habitat is better than saving a small region; yet if both outcomes have infinite value, then decision theory prescribes indifference. Second, there is a problem of swamping probabilities: an act with a small but positive probability of saving an endangered species appears to be on par with an act that has a high probability of achieving this outcome, since both have infinite expected value. Our paper shows that a relative (rather than absolute) concept of infinite value can be meaningfully defined, and provides a good model for securing the priority of the natural environment while avoiding the failures noted by sceptics about infinite value. Our claim is not that the relative infinity utility model gets every detail correct, but rather that it provides a rigorous philosophical framework for thinking about decisions affecting the environment.     

Philosophy Makes No Progress,So What Is the Point of It?

Philosophy makes no progress. It fails to do so in the way science and mathematics make progress. By “no progress” is meant that there is no successive advance of a well‐established body of knowledge—no views are definitively established or definitively refuted. Yet philosophers often talk and act as if the subject makes progress, and that its point and value lies in its doing so, while in fact they also approach the subject in ways that clearly contradict any claim to progress. This article presents evidence for, and a theoretical explanation of, the view that philosophy makes no progress, concluding with an account of what philosophy is and what the point and value of it is. Philosophy should not be shy about being what it is, nor should it pretend to be what it is not. What it is should be reflected in philosophizing and the way it is taught.