Bringing (Contingent) Loss Aversion Down to Earth — A Comment on Gal & Rucker's Rejection of “Losses Loom Larger Than Gains”

Although we disagree with some of Gal and Rucker's (2018 – this issue) specific evidence and with their overstated conclusion regarding loss aversion, their overarching message makes a worthwhile contribution. In particular, loss aversion is less robust and universal than has been assumed while its most prominent empirical support — the endowment effect and the status quo bias — is susceptible to multiple alternative explanations. Instead of accepting loss aversion as true unless proven otherwise, we should treat it like other decision properties and psychological accounts that are contingent on various moderators and call for an analysis of psychological mechanisms. In this commentary, we suggest that gatekeepers, such as reviewers, tend to favor loss aversion and other widely accepted tendencies, while demanding a much higher support‐threshold for alternative or newer accounts. Although building on prior theories and concepts is of course important, the bias in favor of incumbent assumptions can impede scientific progress, bar new ideas from the literature, and reinforce well‐established but contingent notions that may apply under some conditions but not others.     

Detecting drivers’ cognitive load from saccadic intrusion

In this paper, we have explored use of Saccadic Intrusion to detect drivers’ cognitive load and instantaneous perception of developing road hazards. Saccadic Intrusion is a type of eye gaze movement which was earlier found to be related to change in cognitive load. We have developed an algorithm to detect saccadic intrusion from a commercially available low-cost eye gaze tracker and conducted four user studies involving a driving simulator and cognitive and hazard perception tests. Our results show that average velocities of saccadic intrusion increases with increase in cognitive load and recording saccadic intrusion and eye blinks for 6 s duration can predict drivers’ instantaneous perception of developing road hazards.     

Present but invisible: Physical obscurity fosters social disconnection

Research suggests that we feel invisible and disconnected when others avoid our gaze. In three studies, we examine whether similar feelings may arise when others are unable to meet our gaze—when they are unaware of our presence altogether. We posit that feelings of loneliness and disconnection can arise when others are unable to sense one's physical presence. To test whether invisibility engenders loneliness, we primed participants with the invisibility construct (Studies 1 and 2) and manipulated actual visibility (Study 3) prior to assessing feelings of loneliness and isolation. Results revealed that being present, but unseen, is sufficient to induce loneliness. Findings are related to the ostracism and intersectional invisibility literatures, and the social costs of physical obscurity are discussed.     

Task-irrelevant emotional faces impair response adjustments in a double-step saccade task

Cognitive control enables us to adjust behaviours according to task demands, and emotion influences the cognitive control. We examined how task-irrelevant emotional stimuli impact the ability to inhibit a prepared response and then programme another appropriate response. In the study, either a single target or two sequential targets appeared after emotional face images (positive, neutral, and negative). Subjects were required to freely viewed the emotional faces and make a saccade quickly upon target onset, but inhibit their initial saccades and redirect gaze to the second target if it appeared. We found that subjects were less successful at inhibiting their initial saccades as the inter-target delay increased. Emotional faces further reduced their inhibition ability with a longer delay, but not with a shorter delay. When subjects failed to inhibit the initial saccade, the longer delay produced longer intersaccadic interval. Especially, positive faces lengthened the intersaccadic interval with a longer delay. These results showed mere presence of emotional stimuli influences gaze redirection by impairing the ability to cancel a prepared saccade and delaying the programming of a corrective saccade. Therefore, we propose that the modulation of response adjustment exerted by emotional faces is related to the stage of initial response programming.     

Newborns’ attention is driven by the translational movement

The present study investigated whether 2-day-old newborns are able to discriminate two translating meaningless Point-Light Displays (PLD) videos, in which the shape of one of them changes compared to that of the other along the trajectory, independently from movement kinematics, and if this ability is present both when stimuli differed at the end or at the beginning of the movement. To manipulate the instant in which along the movement the difference between stimuli was evident, and to maintain every unspecific dissimilarity possibly determining the preference, videos were played in a loop either forward or backwards. In Experiment 1, PLD stimuli moved with natural accelerated-decelerated kinematics; in Experiment 2 they moved at constant velocity. Four groups of newborns were submitted to the preferential looking technique experiments. Results showed that newborns looked longer at natural kinematics and that, irrespective of the type of kinematics, they discriminated the two stimuli only when videos were played forward, that is, only when stimuli differed at the end of the movement. These data suggest that, independently from kinematics, movement translational components induce newborns to allocate attention at the end of the observed movement. Given the strict link between attention and eye movements, we suggest that this effect may bootstrap the system and give rise to proactive gaze, the typical gaze behaviour present during executed and observed goal-directed actions.     

Goal saliency boosts infants’ action prediction for human manual actions,but not for mechanical claws

Previous research indicates that infants’ prediction of the goals of observed actions is influenced by own experience with the type of agent performing the action (i.e., human hand vs. non-human agent) as well as by action-relevant features of goal objects (e.g., object size). The present study investigated the combined effects of these factors on 12-month-olds’ action prediction. Infants’ (N = 49) goal-directed gaze shifts were recorded as they observed 14 trials in which either a human hand or a mechanical claw reached for a small goal area (low-saliency goal) or a large goal area (high-saliency goal). Only infants who had observed the human hand reaching for a high-saliency goal fixated the goal object ahead of time, and they rapidly learned to predict the action goal across trials. By contrast, infants in all other conditions did not track the observed action in a predictive manner, and their gaze shifts to the action goal did not change systematically across trials. Thus, high-saliency goals seem to boost infants’ predictive gaze shifts during the observation of human manual actions, but not of actions performed by a mechanical device. This supports the assumption that infants’ action predictions are based on interactive effects of action-relevant object features (e.g., size) and own action experience.     

Effects of post-session wheel running on within-session changes in operant responding

This study tested the effects of post-session wheel running on within-session changes in operant responding. Lever-pressing by six rats was reinforced by a food pellet under a continuous reinforcement (CRF) schedule in 30-min sessions. Two different flavored food pellets were used as reinforcers. In the wheel conditions, 30-min operant-sessions with one of the flavored pellets were followed by 30-min free-wheel running sessions. Meanwhile, in the home conditions, rats’ operant responding was reinforced by the other flavored pellets during 30-min operant-sessions, and the rats were then returned to their homecages. All rats were exposed to 4 wheel and 4 homecage sessions. Operant responding was lowered during the wheel conditions. However, post-session running did not alter the within-session pattern of operant responding. These effects were practically identical to the effects of drug-induced taste-aversion learning on within-session changes in operant responding, suggesting similar mechanisms in both taste-aversion preparations.     

Humans (Homo sapiens) fail to show an inequity effect in an “up-linkage” analog of the monkey inequity test

Brosnan and de Waal (Nature 425:297–299, 2003) claimed that if a capuchin sees another capuchin receiving a superior food, she tends to reject an inferior, previously acceptable food. They related this phenomenon to human inequity aversion. This phyletic extension is “down linkage,” because nonhuman research is interpreted in terms of human research. The present experiment makes an “up-linkage” test of this claimed connection by attempting to reproduce the capuchin-inequity effect in humans. In Experiment 1’s equity condition, a subject and an adjacent confederate each clicked a computer mouse to mark the number “7” from a random numbers table, earning 0.5 yen per mark. In the inequity condition, the confederate’s pay rate was twice that of the subject. There was no between-condition difference in quitting times or likelihoods. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 except, before beginning, the subject and confederate clicked a mouse over a rapidly switching message that said they would earn either 0.5 or 1 yen per marked seven. For the equity condition in this rigged test, subject and confederate stopped the message at 0.5 yen, while in the inequity condition, these values were 0.5 and 1 yen, respectively. Now, inequity-condition subjects quit sooner than equity-condition subjects. Experiment 1 found no inequity effect, but Experiment 2 did. These results show that: (a) a sense of control/responsibility may be critical to an inequity effect and (b) the inequity effect putatively present in capuchins cannot be reproduced in an up-linkage human analog of that research, thereby calling this linkage into question. This report exemplifies that up- and down-linkage tests are often requisite to establish commonality of psychological process between nonhuman primates and humans.     

Reference-dependent expected utility with incomplete preferences

An important reason why people deviate from expected utility is reference-dependence of preferences, implying loss aversion. Bleichrodt [Bleichrodt H. (2007). Reference-dependent utility with shifting reference points and incomplete preferences. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 51, 266-276] argued that in the empirically realistic case where the reference point is always an element of the decision maker’s opportunity set, reference-dependent preferences have to be taken as incomplete. This incompleteness is a consequence of reference-dependence and is different in nature from the type of incompleteness usually considered in the literature. It cannot be handled by existing characterizations of reference-dependence, which all assume complete preferences. This paper presents new preference foundations that extend reference-dependent expected utility to cover this case of incompleteness caused by reference-dependence. The paper uses intuitive axioms that are easy to test. Two special cases of reference-dependent expected utility are also characterized: one model in which utility is decomposed into a normative and a psychological component and one model in which loss aversion is constant. The latter model has been frequently used in empirical research on reference-dependence.