游戏暴力合理性对攻击性的影响:一个有中介的调节模型

本研究基于道德推脱和道德自我调节理论,以62名大学生为被试,通过实验探讨了游戏暴力合理性对个体攻击性的影响,并考察了内疚感的中介作用以及游戏经验的调节作用。结果表明：游戏经验调节了游戏暴力合理性对内疚感和攻击性的影响。对无经验的被试来说,不合理暴力条件下的内疚感显著高于合理暴力条件,攻击性显著低于合理暴力条件;而对有经验的被试来说,合理与不合理暴力条件下的内疚感和攻击性均无显著差异。同时,研究还发现了有中介的调节作用模型,内疚感在暴力合理性对攻击性的影响中发挥中介作用,而游戏经验是有中介的调节变量。     

利他行为的内隐启动研究

通过视觉与组词任务启动范式的两个实验考察了利他人物形象与利他词语对利他行为的内隐启动效应。结果发现,完成利他人物形象视觉启动(实验1)与完成利他组词任务启动(实验2)的实验组被试,在独裁者分配任务中分配给他人的钱数显著多于控制组被试。研究结果表明:利他人物形象视觉和利他语义组词都可以使个体的利他行为被显著直接无意识启动,即内隐启动。研究对设计能更好地启动人们的利他行为的一般情境有重要的启示。     

Perceiving high social mindfulness during interpersonal interaction promotes cooperative behaviours

Social mindfulness refers to individual's respect and protection of others’ options in interpersonal interaction. The object‐choosing task is a traditional paradigm to assess social mindfulness. Individuals with high social mindfulness would choose the nonunique object so that others would have more options; on the contrary, individuals with low social mindfulness would choose the unique object, which limits others’ choices. No prior study has examined whether perceiving people with different levels of social mindfulness affects one's cooperation. Based on this background, two experiments were conducted to address this question. In both experiments, a confederate participant's (Player A's) social mindfulness was manipulated by setting the frequency that Player A chose the unique and the nonunique objects. Then, participants were asked to interact with Player A in the public goods game (Experiment 1) or in the centipede game (Experiment 2). Convergent results showed that compared to those interacting with a socially unmindful person, participants interacting with a person perceived as socially mindful contributed more resources in the public goods game and chose to pass on more rounds in the centipede game. These findings suggest that perception of others’ high social mindfulness enhances one's own cooperative behaviour.     

信任还是设防？互动博弈中社会善念对合作行为的促进效应

社会善念是个体在人际互动中充满善意地关注、尊重并保护他人选择的需要和权利的行为,通过实施社会善念有助于提升他人的合作行为。为检验这一假设,本实验设置了“施—受”双方的互动博弈情境,采用“物品选择游戏”操纵实施者的社会善念水平,分别利用信任博弈和公共物品游戏测查接受者在互动过程中的信任水平和合作行为。结果发现：相比于低社会善念组,被试在高社会善念组中表现出更高的信任水平和合作行为。进一步路径分析也发现,信任在感知社会善念与合作行为间发挥着部分中介作用。由此可见,社会善念行为的实施为互动双方建立信任关系提供了重要线索,降低了人们时时“设防”的监控动机,使合作带来的利益双赢成为可能。     

抑郁对社会决策的影响

从社会决策角度出发,依托博弈论的经典范式是研究抑郁症病人人际与社会功能障碍的一个切入点。Ruff和Fehr （2014）提出在社会决策中存在三类情境,即社会反馈、替代性评价、社会原则。我们从这个理论框架出发,发现抑郁症病人在社会反馈加工中存在社会性快感缺失,对社会拒绝的敏感性增强;在替代性评价过程中,共情和心理理论能力减弱;抑郁症病人对决策中的社会原则（公平、合作）存在适应不良现象,如过度利他性。未来的研究一方面可进一步探索抑郁症病人的社会性快感缺失现象,另一方面可采用经颅电/磁刺激与脑成像技术结合或超扫描技术,提高研究结果的解释力和生态效度。     

信任及其对公共财物两难博弈中合作行为影响

社会两难的行为动机研究认为,害怕和贪婪是人们选择不合作的原因。信任的心理学研究为社会两难的合作行为提供了另一种观点,即害怕被利用的背后实际上体现了博弈者对对方的信任的缺失。鉴于传统社会两难范式存在难以区分信任和合作两个因素的问题,本研究设计了“信任一合作”二阶段模拟实验,通过操作重复信托博弈中的信息反馈,研究虚拟多人信托博弈中初始信任和基于经验的信任对随后的公共财物两难博弈中合作行为的影响,结果发现：（1）初始信任对基于经验的信任的建立具有一定的积极影响,但是它对合作行为的作用远不如随后的基于经验的信任;（2）基于经验的信任水平高的被试在随后的公共财物两难博弈中也表现出较高的合作行为。     

网络游戏成瘾者对成瘾相关线索的注意偏向：一项ERP研究

近年来,网络病态使用的一个子类-网络游戏成瘾已经引起了学术研究的兴趣。本研究采用修正版 Stroop实验范式-Online Game Stroop探讨网络游戏成瘾者的注意偏向过程。结果发现,在网络游戏成瘾组中,网络游戏相关词语与中性词语相比诱发了更高的P200以及P300的振幅,但在正常对照组中未发现相同结果。此线索-反应证实了网络游戏成瘾者对特有的成瘾相关线索的高度敏感化引起的注意偏向可能是其成瘾行为产生和维持的重要基础。     

最后通牒游戏中接收者拒绝行为的情绪义务模型

公平偏好使人们在面对不公平的分配时通常会有所表示,在最后通牒游戏中具体表现为对不公平报价的拒绝,有很多研究把拒绝的原因归结为不公平厌恶和互惠主义等社会偏好,但这并不能解释一些最后通牒变体游戏中的拒绝行为。但这恰恰支持了情绪义务模型。     

Cooperation,Knowledge, and Time: Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic and its Applications

Branching-time temporal logics have proved to be an extraordinarily successful tool in the formal specification and verification of distributed systems. Much of their success stems from the tractability of the model checking problem for the branching time logic CTL, which has made it possible to implement tools that allow designers to automatically verify that systems satisfy requirements expressed in CTL. Recently, CTL was generalised by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman in a logic known as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). The key insight in ATL is that the path quantifiers of CTL could be replaced by cooperation modalities, of the form , where is a set of agents. The intended interpretation of an ATL formula is that the agents can cooperate to ensure that holds (equivalently, that have a winning strategy for ). In this paper, we extend ATL with knowledge modalities, of the kind made popular in the work of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, Vardi and colleagues. Combining these knowledge modalities with ATL, it becomes possible to express such properties as group can cooperate to bring about iff it is common knowledge in that . The resulting logic — Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) — shares the tractability of model checking with its ATL parent, and is a succinct and expressive language for reasoning about game-like multiagent systems.