An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games

A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes thatAnn believes that Bob’s assumption is wrongThis is formalized to show that any belief model of a certain kind must have a ‘hole.’ An interpretation of the result is that if the analyst’s tools are available to the players in a game, then there are statements that the players can think about but cannot assume. Connections are made to some questions in the foundations of game theory.Special Issue Ways of Worlds II. On Possible Worlds and Related Notions Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and Stig Andur Pedersen     

社会医疗保险道德风险博弈与防控措施研究

通过对社会医疗保险道德风险产生原因与特征的探讨,根据不完全信息重复博弈模型对社会医疗保险道德风险进行了系统分析,据此提出了社会医疗保险道德风险的防控措施,以期实现对道德风险的有效防控,提高社会医疗保险基金的安全。     

“To eat or not to be eaten?” Collective risk-monitoring in groups

The importance of risk-monitoring has been increasing in many key aspects of our modern lives. This paper examines how individuals monitor such risks collectively by extending a behavioral ecological model of animal foraging to human groups. Just as animals must forage for food under predatory risk, humans must divide valuable material and psychological resources between foraging activity and risk-monitoring activity. We predicted that game-theoretic aspects of the group situation complicate such a trade-off decision in resource allocation, eventually yielding a mixed equilibrium in a group. When the equilibrium is reached, only a subset of members engage in the risk-monitoring activity while others free-ride, concentrating mainly on their own foraging activity. Laboratory groups engaging in foraging under moderate risk provided a support to this prediction. When the risk-level was set higher, however, “herding behavior” (conforming to the dominant behavior) interfered with the emergence of equilibrium. Implications for risk management are discussed.     

The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making

People often do not realize they are being influenced by an incidental emotional state. As a result, decisions based on a fleeting incidental emotion can become the basis for future decisions and hence outlive the original cause for the behavior (i.e., the emotion itself). Using a sequence of ultimatum and dictator games, we provide empirical evidence for the enduring impact of transient emotions on economic decision making. Behavioral consistency and false consensus are presented as potential underlying processes.     

合作指数与描述方式对儿童囚徒困境博弈中合作行为的影响

本研究采用囚徒困境任务,考察了91名10~12岁儿童和101名成人在博弈决策中合作行为的特点。并分别考察合作指数和描述方式这两个变量对个体合作性的影响。结果表明:(1)描述方式对儿童的合作行为有显著影响,表现为"回避"描述中较之"趋向"描述有更多合作行为,而描述方式对成人则无影响。(2)儿童对合作指数不敏感,平均合作率显著高于成人,表现出合作倾向;成人平均合作率随合作指数的升高而升高,但始终处于几率水平之下,表现出竞争倾向。     

胃癌根治术中常规放置空肠营养管的博弈思考

规范化的胃癌根治术是我国胃癌治疗的发展方向,本文回顾性分析胃癌根治术中常规放置空肠营养管和术后早期肠内营养在胃癌规范化治疗中的作用。结果表明空肠营养管置入和对照组术后并发症率无显著性差异（P=0.501）,早期联合肠内营养可有效缩短住院时间（P=0.0115）。结合博弈论的观点分析,胃癌根治术中放置空肠营养管在并发症预防和治疗中有重要作用,可能避免不必要的二次开腹手术,因此是一种对于医患双方都最为有利的策略选择。     

变革型领导力和交易型领导力：团队绩效的预测指标

在高不确定,高度竞争,高度挑战的任务情景下,领导力在团队中将扮演怎样的角色？变革型领导力与交易型领导力又是如何预测团队任务绩效的？为了回答这些问题,该研究对130名学生被试,31个团队,用ERP沙盘模拟游戏来进行模拟实验。通过高度模拟现实中企业经营的情景,从而提高实验结果的外部效度。实验结果表明,变革型领导力与交易型领导力都能够积极地预测团队任务绩效,消极领导力与任务绩效呈负相关,虽然并没有达到统计学显著水平,但研究结果的方向都支持了实验假设。     

Signalling signalhood and the emergence of communication

A unique hallmark of human language is that it uses signals that are both learnt and symbolic. The emergence of such signals was therefore a defining event in human cognitive evolution, yet very little is known about how such a process occurs. Previous work provides some insights on how meaning can become attached to form, but a more foundational issue is presently unaddressed. How does a signal signal its own signalhood? That is, how do humans even know that communicative behaviour is indeed communicative in nature? We introduce an experimental game that has been designed to tackle this problem. We find that it is commonly resolved with a bootstrapping process, and that this process influences the final form of the communication system. Furthermore, sufficient common ground is observed to be integral to the recognition of signalhood, and the emergence of dialogue is observed to be the key step in the development of a system that can be employed to achieve shared goals.     

Delay, Probability, and Social Discounting in A Public Goods Game

A human social discount function measures the value to a person of a reward to another person at a given social distance. Just as delay discounting is a hyperbolic function of delay, and probability discounting is a hyperbolic function of odds-against, social discounting is a hyperbolic function of social distance. Experiment 1 obtained individual social, delay, and probability discount functions for a hypothetical $75 reward; participants also indicated how much of an initial $100 endowment they would contribute to a common investment in a public good. Steepness of discounting correlated, across participants, among all three discount dimensions. However, only social and probability discounting were correlated with the public-good contribution; high public-good contributors were more altruistic and also less risk averse than low contributors. Experiment 2 obtained social discount functions with hypothetical $75 rewards and delay discount functions with hypothetical $1,000 rewards, as well as public-good contributions. The results replicated those of Experiment 1; steepness of the two forms of discounting correlated with each other across participants but only social discounting correlated with the public-good contribution. Most participants in Experiment 2 predicted that the average contribution would be lower than their own contribution.     

青少年网络游戏行为的心理需求研究

在质的研究及理论分析的基础上,构建了16-24岁青少年网络游戏行为的心理需求模型,然后根据该模型编制问卷,进行了量的研究。探索性与验证性因素分析的结果表明:(1)青少年网络游戏心理需求问卷由现实情感的补偿与发泄、人际交往与团队归属、成就体验三个维度组成,具有良好的信度和效度指标,可以施用;(2)青少年对网络游戏的心理需求程度与其对网络游戏的使用程度显著相关。