公平--精神道德观念还是互利合作机制?

公平概念一直都是儿童道德发展研究的一个重要课题。传统上认为公平作为一个道德概念,属于人类精神层面,指导人类行为,是高于社会物质生活的。然而进一步研究关注,公平,作为人类生活中的一个重要而普遍的现象,是如何产生的,又为何能保持在人类社会生活中的。结果表明,公平在是人们在互利的目的下表现出来的一种策略,受到社会信息透明度的影响。一个社会中信息越透明,个体的名声越容易形成,则公平越成为一种最优的策略。     

In money we trust? The use of financial compensations to repair trust in the aftermath of distributive harm

Trust is vital yet vulnerable in economic exchange relations. In these relations, a widely used strategy in response to distributive harm consists of having the transgressor pay a financial compensation to the victim. This research examines whether financial compensations can increase trust towards a transgressor, and whether the size of the compensation is relevant to this process. We hypothesized and found that whether larger compensations will elicit more trust, depends on how clear the perpetrator’s intention to transgress was. Experiment 1 revealed that trust perceptions increased more by a slight overcompensation of the inflicted harm as compared to an exact or a partial compensation, but not if the transgressor’s bad intentions became clear through the use of deception in the violation. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated these findings and further showed that it is not the use of deception per se, but rather the attribution of bad intent that moderates the effect of compensation size. Experiment 4, using a trust game paradigm revealed that this effect not only occurs for small overcompensations, but also for larger overcompensations.     

Impact of Jin‐Shang teachings on Chinese people's trust

Three studies are reported that explore the impact of Jin‐Shang teachings (a specialized Confucius teaching of trust on business practices) on mainland Chinese people's trust. In Study 1 , we primed Confucius and Jin‐Shang teachings on trust, and compared their effects on trusting tendency to a control prime. We found that these teachings made mainland Chinese participants score higher on three different trusting scales. In Study 2 , we found that the Jin‐Shang prime made mainland Chinese participants invest more money in a trust game than those in the control prime. In Study 3 , we compared the Jin‐Shang prime to Protestant teachings and contemporary writings on reciprocity, and found that only the Jin‐Shang prime induced a significantly higher trusting tendency from Chinese participants than the control condition.     

Beliefs and preferences in cultural agents and cultural game players

Two laboratory experiments demonstrated that Japanese participants did not conform to the majority unless negative social implications of not conforming were clear. When their behaviour had no implications for others, they rather exhibited preference for uniqueness. Results of Study 2 further demonstrated that participants' conformity to the majority was particularly prevalent among those who were chronically concerned with how other people would perceive them. Participants in these studies were shown to be cultural game players who changed their behaviour in response to anticipated responses of others based on culturally shared beliefs.     

Effects of general-case training, instructions, rehearsal, and feedback on the reduction of sight-reading errors by competent musicians

We used general-case training, instructions, rehearsal, and feedback to teach 3 advanced flute students to improve their sight-reading skills. Training resulted in systematic decreases in note errors, rhythm errors, repetitions, and hesitations for each participant. The procedures and outcomes were socially validated through subjective evaluation by the participants and music teachers not involved with the study.     

Behaving as expected: Public information and fairness norms

What is considered to be fair depends on context‐dependent expectations. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation—that is, upon normative expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their beliefs about which choices are considered fair. We discuss how these results fit into a theory of social norms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public good provision in inter‐team conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit‐sharing rule

A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free‐riding. Extending existing literature, we focus on asymmetric competitions between teams of unequal size, and competitions between more than two teams. Comparing two protocols for sharing the prize—egalitarian and proportional profit‐sharing rules—we find that (i) free‐riding diminishes and (ii) team members contribute more toward their team's effort when they belong to the larger team and when the profit‐sharing rule is proportional. (iii) Additionally, under the egalitarian profit‐sharing rule team members contribute more than predicted by the equilibrium solution. We discuss implications of our findings for eliciting contributions in competitive environments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

父母与青少年的信任水平及代际传递

以往研究指出,人际信任有其家庭根源。本研究以198个家庭中的青少年及其父母为研究对象,采用投资博弈任务测量子女及其父母的信任水平,考察他们的信任水平的特点及父母和子女之间是否存在信任的代际传递现象。研究结果发现:(1)青少年男生的信任水平稍高于女生,父亲的信任水平高于母亲;(2)父亲和母亲的信任水平都不能预测女生的信任水平;但父亲信任水平能线性预测其儿子的信任;母亲与儿子的信任水平则呈倒U型曲线关系。本研究结果证实了信任存在代际传递的现象,并揭示了父母角色及子女性别在信任代际传递中的调节作用,对于进一步理解信任在家庭内的传递过程有启发意义。     

Fairness and bargaining power in threshold public goods experiments

Experiments on three two‐person threshold public good provision games, namely, the simultaneous, sequential, and dictator games, are conducted to explore the motives behind giving. Players who move simultaneously are endowed with equal bargaining power, and players who move first are endowed with more bargaining power than players who move subsequently. Dictators are indubitably endowed with complete bargaining power. Since the differences between the bargaining powers of two players increase from the simultaneous to the sequential to the dictator game, comparisons among games allow us to trace whether the contribution behavior is motivated by fairness or is simply due to the strategic concern. The experimental evidence shows that the strategic concern explains the overall contribution behavior better than the motive of fairness. However, in the final round 26% of the dictators share the threshold evenly with their opponents, suggesting that some subjects do play fairly. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

有效测量元认知监控的新方法：Mastermind任务分析

元认知监控是元认知的核心成分,而且是内隐程度较高的心理活动。研究采用认知操作法,对经典的Mastermind游戏任务加以改编,结合访谈分析,探讨了适合考察元认知监控的任务难度和有效的元认知监控指标。研究结果发现：（1）对于大学生来说,在游戏4（要求从六种颜色中选出四种正确的颜色,且排列位置也要正确）中当知觉难度最大且又可以经过努力选择策略、根据反馈进行有效选择时,才会在最大程度上激发元认知监控,使得游戏成绩提高;（2）“监测时间”是元认知监测的有效测量指标,而“违背反馈次数”是元认知控制的有效测量指标。