变革型领导力和交易型领导力：团队绩效的预测指标

在高不确定,高度竞争,高度挑战的任务情景下,领导力在团队中将扮演怎样的角色？变革型领导力与交易型领导力又是如何预测团队任务绩效的？为了回答这些问题,该研究对130名学生被试,31个团队,用ERP沙盘模拟游戏来进行模拟实验。通过高度模拟现实中企业经营的情景,从而提高实验结果的外部效度。实验结果表明,变革型领导力与交易型领导力都能够积极地预测团队任务绩效,消极领导力与任务绩效呈负相关,虽然并没有达到统计学显著水平,但研究结果的方向都支持了实验假设。     

Signalling signalhood and the emergence of communication

A unique hallmark of human language is that it uses signals that are both learnt and symbolic. The emergence of such signals was therefore a defining event in human cognitive evolution, yet very little is known about how such a process occurs. Previous work provides some insights on how meaning can become attached to form, but a more foundational issue is presently unaddressed. How does a signal signal its own signalhood? That is, how do humans even know that communicative behaviour is indeed communicative in nature? We introduce an experimental game that has been designed to tackle this problem. We find that it is commonly resolved with a bootstrapping process, and that this process influences the final form of the communication system. Furthermore, sufficient common ground is observed to be integral to the recognition of signalhood, and the emergence of dialogue is observed to be the key step in the development of a system that can be employed to achieve shared goals.     

Delay, Probability, and Social Discounting in A Public Goods Game

A human social discount function measures the value to a person of a reward to another person at a given social distance. Just as delay discounting is a hyperbolic function of delay, and probability discounting is a hyperbolic function of odds-against, social discounting is a hyperbolic function of social distance. Experiment 1 obtained individual social, delay, and probability discount functions for a hypothetical $75 reward; participants also indicated how much of an initial $100 endowment they would contribute to a common investment in a public good. Steepness of discounting correlated, across participants, among all three discount dimensions. However, only social and probability discounting were correlated with the public-good contribution; high public-good contributors were more altruistic and also less risk averse than low contributors. Experiment 2 obtained social discount functions with hypothetical $75 rewards and delay discount functions with hypothetical $1,000 rewards, as well as public-good contributions. The results replicated those of Experiment 1; steepness of the two forms of discounting correlated with each other across participants but only social discounting correlated with the public-good contribution. Most participants in Experiment 2 predicted that the average contribution would be lower than their own contribution.     

青少年网络游戏行为的心理需求研究

在质的研究及理论分析的基础上,构建了16-24岁青少年网络游戏行为的心理需求模型,然后根据该模型编制问卷,进行了量的研究。探索性与验证性因素分析的结果表明:(1)青少年网络游戏心理需求问卷由现实情感的补偿与发泄、人际交往与团队归属、成就体验三个维度组成,具有良好的信度和效度指标,可以施用;(2)青少年对网络游戏的心理需求程度与其对网络游戏的使用程度显著相关。     

影响博弈结果的方法效应研究

最后通谍博弈和独裁者博弈是实验经济学的经典博弈,也被心理学家用来研究人的公平和利他行为。该研究考查了经济学和心理学通常的报酬支付方式、博弈中待分配的金额是否影响博弈结果,以及两个博弈进行组内实验时是否会产生顺序效应。结果发现支付方式和金额不影响博弈结果,但有顺序效应产生。该研究对国内研究者进一步借用这两个博弈的相关研究打下了一定的方法学基础。     

身体姿势启动的内隐权力感对公平决策的影响

已有研究表明, 扩张身体姿势可启动个体的权力感。基于具身认知的视角, 实验1考察身体姿势对免惩罚游戏的提议者进行金钱分配时的影响, 实验2和实验3分别考察最后通牒游戏、免惩罚游戏的回应者在蜷缩和扩张姿势下对各种分配类型方案的拒绝率。结果表明, 与蜷缩姿势相比, 扩张姿势使个体更倾向于在免惩罚游戏提议者角色时做出更多的利己不公平分配, 同时使个体更倾向于拒绝最后通牒游戏和免惩罚游戏中的不公平分配。本研究证明了扩张姿势启动的权力感可影响个体的公平决策。     

Whorf and Wittgenstein. Language, world view and argumentation

Whorf and Wittgenstein are perhaps the most famous names in linguistics and philosophy associated with the assumption that language plays a decisive role in shaping our view of reality. After a critical discussion of Whorf's linguistic relativity principle I conclude that it is not language as a system, but the use of language according to the rules of language games which connects language thought and world view, especially if some particular usage becomes the commonly accepted norm. This traditional norm also enters argumentative discourse in the form of background assumptions occuring in the premises of arguments. Thus, traditional points of view and prevailing ideologies in a society, even if challenged in discussions, can become reinforced and stabilized. This is illustrated with a critical analysis of the role and function of tautological utterances in argumentative discourse, which only apparently are compelling means of argumentation.     

The Effects of a Self-sacrificing Minority on Pro-environmental Norms and Behavior: An Investigation Using a Sea Pollution Game

This research investigated how a minority member sacrificing his/her personal benefits to protect the environment might influence the attitudes and behavior of others. The experiment, using a sea pollution game, employed a 2(minority factor)×2(cost factor) factorial design. Under the high-cost condition, in which an ecological minority bears the substantial cost it was hypothesized that the rate of subjects' pro-environmental behavior would be higher in the one-minority case than in the no-minority case. In contrast, under the low-cost condition, the differences between these two cases would decrease. The results supported this assumption. In prompting pro-environmental behavior, a self-sacrification minority member is more influential than one whose behavior is not self-sacrificing. Moreover, under the one-minority condition, path analyses indicated that the subjects' cost evaluation did not affect their behavior. It was concluded that when the subjects saw an ecological minority, the inhibiting effects of cost on their pro-environmental behavior would decrease.     

Rhétorique et dialectique chez Aristote

Rhetoric and dialectic are two distinct circles, but in intersection. Rhetoric is an application (among others) of the dialectic to public debates. The dialectic is then the intellectual tool of rhetoric, distinct from its emotive means of persuading. But each of them can be antistrophos to the other one because both of them belong to the same sublunar world, our world. Such is Aristotle's answer, both to the sophists and to Plato.

     

Psychological distance to reward: A human replication

Choice behavior in college students was examined in two experiments using the concurrent-chains procedure. In both experiments, the concurrent chains were presented on a microcomputer in the form of an air-defense game in which subjects used two radar systems to detect and subsequently destroy enemy aircraft. Access to one of two radar systems was controlled by a pair of independent concurrent variable-interval 60-s schedules with a 4-s changeover delay always in effect. In the terminal link, the appearance of an enemy aircraft was determined by a pair of differentially segmented fixed-time schedules (Experiment 1) or fixed-interval schedules (Experiment 2) of equal overall duration. In Experiment 1, the terminal-link duration was either 20 s or 40 s, and subjects preferred the unsegmented to the segmented intervals. In Experiment 2, the duration was either 10 s or 60 s, and the reinforcement contingencies required responding during the terminal link. Prior to the reinstatement of the initial link, subjects estimated the duration of the terminal-link schedule. Segmentation affected choice in the 60-s conditions but not in the 10-s ones. Preference for the unsegmented schedule was correlated with an overestimation of the durations for the segmented schedules. These results replicated those found in animal experiments and support the notion of increasing the psychological distance to reward by segmenting a time-based schedule of reinforcement.