青少年未来时间洞察力与学业成绩的关系:坚韧性的中介作用

对756名青少年进行问卷调查,考察未来时间洞察力、坚韧性与学业成绩之间的关系。结果发现：（1）未来消极、未来迷茫显著负向预测学业成绩,未来坚持和未来计划能显著正向预测学业成绩;（2）坚韧性在未来时间洞察力的六个维度与学业成绩之间的关系各不相同。具体而言,坚韧性在未来积极和未来清晰与学业成绩之间无中介效应,坚韧性在未来消极与学业成绩之间起部分中介作用,坚韧性在未来迷茫、未来坚持、未来计划与学业成绩之间起完全中介作用。     

The influence of future time perspective on work engagement and job performance: the role of job crafting

This two-wave study aimed to examine future time perspective (FTP) as an antecedent of job crafting, and in turn job crafting as a mediator in associations between FTP and work outcomes. Based on the lifespan socio-emotional selectivity theory, we expected that open-ended and limited FTP would evoke different forms of job crafting, which in turn would be associated with changes in work engagement and job performance. In line with our expectations, we found that employees whose open-ended FTP increased over a 1-year time period also crafted more job resources and challenging job demands such that their job provided them with more opportunities for knowledge acquisition, which in turn resulted in increased levels of work engagement and job performance. However, contrary to our expectations, employees whose limited FTP increased over the 1-year time period did not proactively reduce their hindering job demands. Hence, although crafting fewer hindering job demands was directly related to decreased levels of work outcomes as expected, we found no indirect effect of changes in limited FTP on changes in work engagement and performance via changes in this job crafting behaviour. These findings have important implications for the literature on job crafting and FTP.     

Future self-appraisals and global self-esteem: Who benefits more from thinking about the future,and why?

People tend to think positively about their future selves. However, it remains unclear to what extent this tendency depends on the positivity of their current self-appraisal. To study this problem, we employed the assumptions of construal level theory, the concept of self-enhancement, and the assumptions of temporal self-appraisal theory, and we examined the role of global self-esteem in the relationship between temporal distance and future self-appraisals measured in absolute (Study 1), comparative temporal (Study 2), or comparative social (Study 3) ways. In all three studies, when assessed in terms of specific dimensions, future self-appraisals increased with temporal distance only in people with low self-esteem, but when assessed in terms of general dimensions, self-appraisals were higher in the distant compared to the near future irrespective of self-esteem level.     

Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time

Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.

Truth Values,Neither-true-nor-false,and Supervaluations

The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that caters to special kinds of sentences. In many cases, this facility is said to produce truth values for sentences that on the face of it seem neither true nor false. Often enough, in this situation appeal is made to the method of supervaluations, which operate by “quantifying out” auxiliary parameters, and thereby produce something like a truth value. Logics of this kind exhibit striking differences. I first consider the role that Tarski gives to supervaluation in first order logic (§2.2), and then, after an interlude that asks whether neither-true-nor-false is itself a truth value (§2.3), I consider sentences with non-denoting terms (§2.4), vague sentences (§2.5), ambiguous sentences (§2.6), paradoxical sentences (§2.7), and future-tensed sentences in indeterministic tense logic (§2.8). I conclude my survey with a look at alethic modal logic considered as a cousin (§2.9), and finish with a few sentences of “advice to supervaluationists” (2.10), advice that is largely negative. The case for supervaluations as a road to truth is strong only when the auxiliary parameter that is “quantified out” is in fact irrelevant to the sentences of interest—as in Tarski’s definition of truth for classical logic. In all other cases, the best policy when reporting the results of supervaluation is to use only explicit phrases such as “settled true” or “determinately true,” never dropping the qualification.     

More lives, better lives

Although many people believe that more people would be better, arguments intended to show this are unconvincing. I consider one of Parfit's arguments for a related conclusion, that even when both are worth living, we ought to prefer the better of two lives. Were this argument successful, or so I claim, then it would follow that more people would be better. But there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives. Nor is an attempted rejoinder effective. We can agree that there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives, and yet still maintain there are reasons for improving lives.     

Overtensing and the effect of regularity

Regularly inflected forms often behave differently in language production than irregular forms. These differences are often used to argue that irregular forms are listed in the lexicon but regular forms are produced by rule. Using an experimental speech production task with adults, it is shown that overtensing errors, where a tensed verb is used in place of an infinitive, predominantly involve irregular forms, but that the differences may be due to phonological confounds, not to regularity per se. Errors involve vowel‐changing irregular forms more than suffixing inflected forms, with at best a small difference between regular ‐ed and irregular ‐en. Frequency effects on overtensing errors require a model in which the past‐tense and base forms of the verb are in competition and in which activation functions are nonlinear, and rule out models with specialized subnetworks for past‐tense forms. Implications for theories of language production are discussed.     

Search of a God for Evolution: Paul Tillich and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin challenged theology to reach for an understanding of God that would take into account the reality of evolution. Paul Tillich's notion of New Being goes a long way toward meeting this challenge, and a theology of evolution can gain a great deal from Tillich's religious thought. But Teilhard would still wonder whether the philosophical notion of being , even when qualified by the adjective new , is itself adequate to contextualize evolution theologically. To Teilhard a theology attuned to a post–Darwinian world requires nothing less than a revolution in our understanding of what is ultimately real. It is doubtful that Tillich's rather classical theological system is radical enough to accommodate this requirement. For Teilhard, on the other hand, a metaphysics grounded in the biblical vision, wherein God is understood as the future on which the world rests as its sole support, can provide a more suitable setting for evolutionary theology.     

Three-Valued Temporal Logic <Emphasis Type="Italic">Q</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis></Subscript> and Future Contingents

Prior’s three-valued modal logic Q was developed as a philosophically interesting modal logic. Thus, we should be able to modify Q as a temporal logic. Although a temporal version of Q was suggested by Prior, the subject has not been fully explored in the literature. In this paper, we develop a three-valued temporal logic Q _t and give its axiomatization and semantics. We also argue that Q _t provides a smooth solution to the problem of future contingents. Presented by Daniele Mundici