Terror in the countertransference: extreme anxiety as a clinician and organisational leader and its effects

Experiencing fear is a central feature of managing disturbed states of minds. In this paper, I will describe the experience of being terrified by a patient who was overtaken by extreme anxiety. Aetiologically, I will suggest that the lack of containment created terror in her mind. I will also describe my experience of leadership in a voluntary organisation. Using Hopper’s concept of a fourth basic assumption, I will highlight the omnipresence of annihilatory anxiety in an example of organisational trauma. I will suggest that focusing on the issues of countertransference, working through experiences of being terrorised and paying attention to how you emotionally respond are crucial to lessening terror.     

加强我国农民工职业病防治工作的思考

我国现有两亿多农民工,且遭受不同程度的职业病危害,以致近年新发现的职业病人几乎是农民工,但他们却没享受法律规定的平等待遇,为此中央领导多次批示,要求制定有利于《职业病防治法》贯彻落实和职业病防治工作的制本之策。结合广西开展农民工职业病防治工作的实践,指出其6个方面的主要原因和防治对策。     

ACTIONS AS THE TIES THAT BIND Love, Praxis, and Community in the Thought of Gustavo Gutiérrez

Gustavo Gutiérrez develops an account of human action or praxis that I—borrowing the language of Charles Taylor—label expressivist. Human action must be understood as expressing an underlying potential or impulse that only becomes real through expression in action. Gutiérrez's expressivism is fundamental to his view of the relationship between faith and love, his notion of three dimensions of liberation/salvation, and his understanding of the fundamental option as a yes or no in response to grace. Moreover, it supports a valuable approach to community as defined more by shared actions than a shared tradition or narrative. The final section briefly indicates two limitations to Gutiérrez's vision—especially with regard to the conception of community—and suggests the direction that a constructive appropriation of his thought might take.     

Blame and Responsibility

This paper looks at judgments of guilt in the face of alleged wrong-doing, be it in public or in private discourse. Its concern is not the truth of such judgments, although the complexity and contestability of such claims will be stressed. The topic, instead, is what sort of activities we are engaged in, when we make our judgments on others' conduct. To examine judging as an activity it focuses on a series of problems that can occur when we blame others. On analysis, we see that these problems take the form of performative contradictions, so that the ostensible purposes of assigning guilt to others are undermined.There is clear evidence from social psychology that blame is especially frequently and inappropriately attributed to individuals in modern Western societies. On the other hand, it has often been observed how suspicious we are about the activity of judging – thus a widespread perception that a refusal to judge is somehow virtuous. My suggestion is that the sheer difficulty of attributions of responsibility, in the face of a complex and often arbitrary moral reality, frequently defeats us. This leads to a characteristic set of distortions when we blame, so that it is no surprise that we have become suspicious of all blaming activities.Yet, the paper argues, these problems need not arise when we hold others responsible. This paper therefore investigates what, exactly, can be questionable about attempts to assign guilt, and the structural logic that lies behind these problems – what will be called, adapting a term from social psychology, a belief in a just world. Such a belief takes for granted what needs to be worked for through human activity, and therefore tends to be counter-productive in dealing with misdeeds and adverse outcomes.     

Why Do Conceptual Analysts Disagree?

The practice of a priori conceptual analysis requires that the concept being analyzed be available in the analyst's mind. The difficulties of analysis and the existence of disagreements among analysts are explained by distinguishing the implicit knowledge we have of these concepts from the explicit knowledge we seek. This view of disagreement assumes that those who disagree are typically attempting to analyze a single shared concept. In this paper, reasons are developed for replacing this guiding assumption with the alternative assumption that members of a conceptual community often have similar, but not identical, concepts. Adopting this alternative requires that we rethink the nature and aims of conceptual analysis.     

Prediction of valency and productivity: An empirical study of longterm group psychotherapy

With reference to W. R. Bion's theory about individual's reactions to group stimuli the main hypothesis was formulated thus: individual's Valency (V) and Productivity (W) undergo changes in certain (definable) directions under the influence of longterm group psychotherapy. The main hypothesis was refined into seven sub-hypotheses. These were measured by four projective tests: Reaction Group Situation Test (RGST), Self Perceptual Q-sort (SPQ), Q-SORT(overt) and Q-SORT(covert). 48.0% of the total number of modalities, 120 out of 252, developed in a predicted and eligible direction. 29.0%, 74 modalities out of 252, remained unchanged whereas 23.0%, 58 modalities out of 252, developed in an opposite to predicted and non-eligible direction. Group members' Productivity (W) developed most of all the modalities in a predicted (eligible) direction. Group members' Valency and Productivity pattern (VP) changed least of all the modalities. The group members Valency (V) for the basic assumption Dependency (baD) developed most of all the modalities in an opposite to predicted, i.e. non-eligible direction.     

Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology

In this paper I examine and reply to a deflationary challenge brought against virtue ethics. The challenge comes from critics who are impressed by recent psychological evidence suggesting that much of what we take to be virtuous conduct is in fact elicited by narrowly specific social settings, as opposed to being the manifestation of robust individual character. In answer to the challenge, I suggest a conception of virtue that openly acknowledges the likelihood of its deep, ongoing dependence upon particular social relationships and settings. I argue that holding this conception will indeed cause problems for some important strands of thought in virtue ethics, most notably in the tradition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But an approach to virtue ethics modeled on David Hume's treatment of virtue and character in A Treatise of Human Nature promises to escape these problems.     

Scharffs' Application of Hopper's Concept: “Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification”

We begin by stating our understanding of the concepts presented in Hopper's paper, then comment on the clinical illustration, and conclude by describing two group situations in which we have applied the concepts we have taken from Hopper's paper. Hopper's fourth basic assumption applies to our work as individual psychoanalysts, family therapists, and group leaders because it integrates psychoanalytic and social understanding. We demonstrate how and why we find Hopper's idea to be a useful advance.