Event-related fMRI of category learning: differences in classification and feedback networks

Eighteen healthy young adults underwent event-related (ER) functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain while performing a visual category learning task. The specific category learning task required subjects to extract the rules that guide classification of quasi-random patterns of dots into categories. Following each classification choice, visual feedback was presented. The average hemodynamic response was calculated across the eighteen subjects to identify the separate networks associated with both classification and feedback. Random-effects analyses identified the different networks implicated during the classification and feedback phases of each trial. The regions included prefrontal cortex, frontal eye fields, supplementary motor and eye fields, thalamus, caudate, superior and inferior parietal lobules, and areas within visual cortex. The differences between classification and feedback were identified as (i) overall higher volumes and signal intensities during classification as compared to feedback, (ii) involvement of the thalamus and superior parietal regions during the classification phase of each trial, and (iii) differential involvement of the caudate head during feedback. The effects of learning were then evaluated for both classification and feedback. Early in learning, subjects showed increased activation in the hippocampal regions during classification and activation in the heads of the caudate nuclei during the corresponding feedback phases. The findings suggest that early stages of prototype-distortion learning are characterized by networks previously associated with strategies of explicit memory and hypothesis testing. However as learning progresses the networks change. This finding suggests that the cognitive strategies also change during prototype-distortion learning.     

A paradoxical effect of presession attention on stereotypy: antecedent attention as an establishing, not an abolishing, operation

Previous studies have shown that presession attention for problem behavior can serve as an abolishing operation when attention functions as a positive reinforcer. In the current study, we show that the stereotypy of a child with severe disabilities was undifferentiated during standard analogue functional analysis conditions. However, when noncontingent presession attention was provided, stereotypy occurred for social attention as a positive reinforcer, suggesting that the antecedent manipulation functioned as an establishing operation.     

The effect of contingent reinforcement on target variables in outpatient psychotherapy for depression: a successful and unsuccessful case using functional analytic psychotherapy

The current study investigated a behavior-analytic treatment, functional analytic psychotherapy (FAP), for outpatient depression utilizing two single-subject A/A+B designs. The baseline condition was cognitive behavioral therapy. Results demonstrated treatment success in 1 client after the addition of FAP and treatment failure in the 2nd. This study highlights the challenges in measuring treatment progress and outcome idiographically in this population.     

Further examination of discriminated functional communication

One child with developmental disabilities was taught to mand for attention by saying "excuse me." Treatment effects were extended to multiple training contexts by teaching the participant to attend to naturally occurring discriminative stimuli through differential reinforcement of communication during periods of the experimenter's nonbusy activities (e.g., reading a magazine). Results are discussed in terms of future research on the generalization and maintenance of functional communication in the natural environment.     

Functional analysis and treatment of aggression maintained by preferred conversational topics

After an initial functional analysis of a participant's aggression showed unclear outcomes, we conducted preference and reinforcer assessments to identify preferred forms of attention that may maintain problem behavior. Next, we conducted an extended functional analysis that included a modified attention condition. Results showed that the participant's aggression was maintained by access to preferred conversational topics. A function-based intervention decreased aggression and increased an appropriate communicative response.     

A comparison of various forms of reinforcement with and without extinction as treatment for escape-maintained problem behavior

The present investigation compared the effects of reinforcing compliance with either positive or negative reinforcement for a participant who displayed escape-maintained problem behavior. The results indicated that positive reinforcement in the form of a highly preferred edible or leisure item produced higher levels of compliance and lower levels of problem behavior when compared to negative reinforcement in the form of escape from demands. In addition, an extinction procedure was unnecessary to achieve high levels of compliance.     

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND TREATMENT OF ELOPEMENT ACROSS TWO SCHOOL SETTINGS

The elopement of a child with Asperger syndrome was assessed using functional analyses and was treated in two school settings (classroom and resource room). Functional analyses indicated that elopement was maintained by access to attention in the resource room and obtaining a preferred activity in the classroom. Attention- and tangible-based interventions were compared in an alternating treatments design in both settings. Results validated the findings of the functional analyses. Implications for the assessment and treatment of elopement are discussed.     

Retrieval of names in face and object naming in an interference study

Two experiments using the interference paradigm are reported. In the first experiment, the participants spoke aloud the names of celebrities and the names of objects when presented with pictures while hearing distractors. In the case of proper names, we replicated the data obtained by Izaute and Bonin (2001) using the interference paradigm with a proper name written naming task. In the case of common names, the results replicated those obtained by Shriefers, Meyer, and Levelt (1990). In the second experiment, the participants produced the names of celebrities when presented with their faces while hearing distractors that were either proper names associated with the celebrities (associate condition), that belonged to a different professional category (different condition), or that corresponded to the proper names of the celebrities (identical condition). For negative SOAs, “associate” distractors were found to increase latencies compared to the “different category” condition. The implications of the findings for proper name retrieval are briefly discussed.     

There are Intentionalia of Which it is True that Such Objects Do Not Exist

Abstract

According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good metaphysical kinds.     

Intentional Objects,Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality

Abstract

Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did in the 1874 edition of PES. The question is what Brentano might have meant by this, given that he rejects a relational account of intentionality. The present paper suggests an answer. It draws on recent work on pretence theory to provide a model of Brentano’s notion of the quasi-relational nature of mental phenomena, as well as of the notion of mental reference to an object, and argues that the model helps to explain why Brentano might have been able discern a clear continuity between the views of the 1874 and 1911 editions of PES, despite the differences.