Can God or the Market Set People Free?

Both Protestant theologians and “preference” economists believe that freedom is necessary for moral action, but such theologians and economists have seemingly irreconcilable accounts of freedom and, thus also, morality. Instead of learning from each other, they typically ignore each other or claim that one field reigns supreme over the other. This essay digs into the theological and economic traditions of each side to find points of similarity between them. It engages Adam Smith and Ernst Troeltsch to develop a view of “ethical freedom” that pulls together the “libertarian freedom” emphasized by preference economics and the “egalitarian freedom” emphasized in much Protestant theology. The three‐part view of freedom draws the disciplines together and opens possibilities for a more robust theory of moral action.     

Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being

From its inception psychoanalysis claimed not merely to be an effective therapy for psychological suffering, but to shed light on the human condition. But what kind of insight does psychoanalysis offer? This paper locates psychoanalysis in the western philosophical tradition, arguing that psychoanalysis provides not only theoretical wisdom about the human, but practical wisdom of a peculiar kind. The human mind, through its self‐conscious understanding can be immediately and directly efficacious in shaping its own structure.     

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EVITABILITY IN NATURE

Assessing the current situation of the religion–science dialogue, it seems that a consensus of nonconsensus has been reached. This nonconsensus provides a pluralistic context for the religion and science dialogue, and one area where this plurality is clear is the discourse on relational models of God and creation. A number of interesting models have gained attention in contemporary theological dialogue with science, yet there is an overriding theme: an emphasis on God's involvement with the world. In this article, I argue that theology has been preoccupied with this emphasis. It is suggested that the theme of the freedom of nature has been underrepresented. This theme of the freedom of nature I argue carries important theological implications. It is suggested that acts or events gain their significance largely by way of being contextualized by the fact that such acts or events could have been otherwise, a realization that might provide the various relational models of God and the world food for thought.     

COVID-19防控的责任伦理考量

在积极应对疫情防控引发的法律及现实问题的同时,应该更加关注其责任伦理问题。如个人自由与公共责任冲突的问题,特殊从业者与职业责任冲突的问题,政府公权力的行使主体与个人知情同意的冲突问题。针对上述问题,基于责任伦理原则,提出培养个人责任伦理意识,形成群体认知共识、制定特殊人员免责条款,约束集体无意识的责任迷失、政府明确社会组织主体行使公权力的权利及限度等具体对策完善COVID-19防控机制,以保护人民的生命健康权益,促进当前及未来社会的稳定发展。

     

Echoes of the Danish Cartoon Crisis 10 Years Later: Identity,Injury and Intelligibility from Copenhagen to Paris and Texas

ABSTRACT

The tenth anniversary of the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005–06 invites reflection on its historical significance and contemporary relevance. In the Danish context 10 years ago, the events generated substantial debate about issues such as terrorism, immigration, blasphemy and the place of Islam in Denmark and in the Danish folk. Furthermore, they raised complex questions about Danish identity in a society that had become significantly more religiously and culturally diverse in the preceding decades. Most of these questions, however, were eclipsed by the polarized public debate about free speech and religious respect. The year 2015 brought many of these questions back to the fore after the murders that January of 12 journalists at the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo and attacks at a kosher market in Paris, followed in February by shootings at a free speech event in Copenhagen and at a synagogue, and later attacks in May at a Muhammad cartoon contest exhibit in Garland, Texas. Despite their disparate contexts, these violent events have echoes of the original Danish cartoon crisis. This article suggests that the three concepts of identity, injury and intelligibility can together help to add complexity to popular interpretations of the original Danish cartoon crisis and recent related events, and prompt us to think beyond the dualistic categories of free speech and blasphemy.     

Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.     

Mastering balance: The use of balance bicycles promotes the development of independent cycling

Children who learn to cycle at a young age do this by using training bicycles that simplify control requirements compared with regular bicycles, such as bicycles with training wheels or balance bikes without pedals. The primary purpose of the current study was to investigate whether the two types of training bicycles result in a different age of onset of independent cycling on a regular bicycle. We asked parents of 4- to 6-year-old children (n = 173) to complete a questionnaire regarding their child's bicycling history. The results showed that children who had practised with a balance bicycle started practising at a younger age, had shorter practice duration, and were able to cycle independently at a younger age in comparison to children who had practised with a bicycle with training wheels (or with both training bicycles). We argue that the observed advantage of balance bicycle is associated with the balance bicycle actively challenging postural control. Further research is needed to uncover the impact of training bicycles on the further development of the foundational skill of cycling.     

Adoption as Spiritual Praxis in Individualized Times

Abstract : This article reflects on the motive of child adoption as a counterpart to postmodern individualization. In western culture, where ideals like freedom of choice and self‐expression are almost self‐evident, a theological interpretation of child adoption is presented that questions the very foundation of individualization. It is argued that adoption as spiritual praxis reminds us of our dependence on the wider community and on God. The perception of children, parents, family, and human acting are further modified by the use of the adoption motive.     

Incompatibilism proved

The consequence argument attempts to show that incompatibilism is true by showing that if there is determinism, then we never had, have or will have any choice about anything. Much of the debate on the consequence argument has focused on the “beta” transfer principle, and its improvements. We shall show that on an appropriate definition of “never have had, have or will have any choice”, a version of the beta principle is a theorem given one plausible axiom for counterfactuals (weakening). Instead of being about transfer principles, the debate should be over whether the distant past and laws are up to us.     

THE EMOTIONS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain ambiguous claims he makes about causation. I attempt to provide a coherent interpretation of his view of causality that is consistent with both human choice and the causal sequence of change. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy.