Freedom Beyond Practical Reason: Duns Scotus on Will-Dependent Relations

Most acts of the will have a complex structure, i.e. wanting A in relation to B (e.g. as a means for an end or as a good for another person or for oneself). Duns Scotus makes the innovative claim that the will itself is responsible for the order of this complex structure. It does this by causing its own will-dependent relations, which he construes as a kind of mind-dependent relations (relationes rationis). By means of these relations, the will can arrange the terms of its will-acts independently of any arrangement proposed by the intellect. This not only allows the structure of one's will-act to diverge from the structure proposed by the intellect's final practical judgement; the structure of the will-act need not even have been considered by the intellect at all. One could, therefore, even will an inconceivable state of affairs. I argue that this theory, which scholars have virtually ignored, is fundamental to Scotus's account of divine, angelic, and human freedom, and that it follows necessarily from his voluntarist understanding of freedom. For Scotus, if the will could not structure its acts independently of the intellect, it would not be free.¹¹Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte (Leuven), the Cornell Summer Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy, and at UCLA. I am grateful for the discussion with those present on these occasions. Special thanks are due to Joshua Benson, Francis Feingold, Gloria Frost, Michael Gorman, Bonnie Kent, Calvin Normore, and Nick Kahm for helpful comments.     

Freedom of the Will in Plato and Augustine

There has been a recent surge of interest in ancient accounts of free will. It is surprising, then, that there have been virtually no attempts to discuss whether Plato had such an account. Those who have made an attempt quickly deny that such an account is present in the dialogues. I shall argue that if we draw a distinction between two notions of free will, it is plausible that some account of free will is, in fact, present in the dialogues, the Republic in particular. This is the first in depth search into the question and I demonstrate that the defender of a Platonic free will thesis has more resources than she first appears to. It also has the benefit of giving us an obvious source material for Augustine's discussion.     

The Therapist’s Needs: Beyond Mutual Recognition

Abstract

As early as 1965, Harold Searles argued that therapists’ needs for healing and growth are part and parcel of their work with patients. Since then, the relational movement has corroborated this idea by articulating the healing function of treatment for both patient and clinician. In this article, the authors examine therapists’ needs that have been overlooked or those that have not been considered fully in the literature. Using various ideas related to the concept of what the authors call therapeutic freedom, this article argues that clinicians must strive to adopt a therapeutic vision that aims to loosen their own ties to safe, familiar modes of engaging with patients, particularly in moments of enactment or impasse. The authors elucidate these ideas with case material from their clinical work and show how embracing various forms of therapeutic freedom results in a type of mutual surrender on the part of both patient and therapist, creating opportunistic conditions that generate therapeutic action and new possibilities for the dyad.     

Adaptive Mechanisms in Perceptual-Motor Coordination

Aftereffect measures of visual shift and proprioceptive shift were obtained for prism exposure conditions in which, at the end of a sagittal pointing movement, most of the arm was visible (concurrent exposure) or only the first finger joint was visible (terminal exposure). Intermediate exposure conditions permitted view of the hand or the first two finger joints. Under the concurrent exposure condition, proprioceptive shift was greater than visual shift but, as view of the pointing hand decreased, the relative magnitude of the two components gradually reversed so that, under the terminal exposure condition, visual shift was greater than proprioceptive shift. These results are discussed in terms of a model of perceptual-motor organization (Redding, Clark, & Wallace, 1985) in which the direction of coordinative linkage between eye-head and hand-head systems determines the locus of discordance and adaptive recalibration.     

Organization of Compensatory Postural Coordination Patterns

The authors investigated whether compensatory postural coordination patterns are organized according to the same dynamical principles as are nonequilibrium phase transitions. Eight participants were asked to maintain upright balance on a moving platform that was sinusoidally translated in the anterior-posterior direction and was systematically increased and decreased 0.19 Hz as a step function every 10 platform cycles through the frequency range 0.19–1.46 Hz. At low platform frequencies, all participants exhibited small joint angular motions with high variability, and the relative phase between the joint motions exhibited drifting patterns and large fluctuations. As platform frequency increased, the amplitude of joint motion increased systematically and joint-specific oscillatory patterns emerged. The findings provided no evidence for a Hopf bifurcation or hysteresis in the transitions of postural coordination modes, however, or, mote generally, a basis for distinguishing the relevance of linear versus nonlinear models of postural control.     

Consciousness and the self

With his notion of absolute consciousness, Sartre tries to rethink the relation between consciousness and the self. What is the origin of subjectivity in relation to a consciousness that is characterized as impersonal and as a radical lucidity? In this article, I attempt to question that origin and the nature as such of the subject in its relation to a consciousness that in its essence is not yet subjective. On the contrary, it is characterized by a selfpresence that is so radical that it threatens every form of self‐knowledge.     

Subjectivity,Reflection and Freedom in Later Foucault

Abstract

This paper proposes a new reading of the interaction between subjectivity, reflection and freedom within Foucault’s later work. I begin by introducing three approaches to subjectivity, locating these in relation both to Foucault’s texts and to the recent literature. I suggest that Foucault himself operates within what I call the ‘entanglement approach’, and, as such, he faces a potentially serious challenge, a challenge forcefully articulated by Han. Using Kant’s treatment of reflection as a point of comparison, I argue that Foucault possesses the resources to meet this challenge. The key, I contend, is to distinguish two related theses about reflection and freedom: Foucault’s position is distinctive precisely because he accepts one of these theses whilst rejecting the other. I conclude by indicating how this reading might connect to the longstanding question of Foucault’s own right to appeal to normative standards.     

Free(z)ing Degrees of Freedom in Skill Acquisition

This study reports an empirical investigation into Bernstein's (1967) ideas that in the early stages of the acquisition of a movement skill the coordination problem is reduced by an initial freezing out of degrees of freedom, followed later in the learning process by the release of these degrees of freedom and their incorporation into a dynamic, controllable system. “Freezing” degrees of freedom was made operational both as a rigid fixation of individual degrees of freedom and as the formation of rigid couplings between multiple degrees of freedom. Five subjects practiced slalom-like ski movements on a ski apparatus for 7 consecutive days. Results showed that at the early phases of learning, the joint angles of the lower limbs and torso displayed little movement, as expressed by their standard deviations and ranges of angular motion, whereas joint couplings were high, as shown by the relatively high cross correlations between joint angles. Over practice, angular movement significantly increased in all joint angles of the lower limbs and torso, although the cross correlations decreased. Support for the processes of freezing and releasing degrees of freedom was thus given at both levels of operationalization. In addition, a consistent change from laterally symmetric to laterally asymmetric cross-correlation patterns were observed as a function of practice. Overall, the findings provide empirical support for Bernstein's ideas regarding the mastery of redundant degrees of freedom in the acquisition of coordination.     

On Learning to Move Randomly

In 2 experiments, the authors examined whether and to what degree young adults can learn to produce random planar motion of the index finger or fingers. Three different types of information feedback were provided to the participants (N = 8 in each experiment) over up to 5 days of practice across the 2 experiments. The results from both experiments revealed that the participants produced a relatively low level of movement randomness in finger motion and that they did not learn through practice to enhance the stochastic properties of their movement under any feedback conditions. The findings provide further evidence that there are relatively tight constraints on the number of dimensions that are regulating single-limb planar motion and that those constraints are not susceptible to change through typical learning protocols.     

Strokes of Luck

This essay aims to reorient current theorizing about luck as an aid to our discerning this concept's true philosophical significance. After introducing the literature's leading theories of luck, it presents and defends counterexamples to each of them. It then argues that recent luck theorists’ main target of analysis—the concept of an event's being lucky for a subject—is parasitic on the more fundamental notion of an event's being a stroke of luck for a subject, which thesis serves as at least a partial diagnosis of the leading theories’ failure. Next, it develops an analysis of strokes of luck that utilizes insights from the recent luck literature. Finally, having set out a comprehensive new analysis of luck—the Enriched Strokes Account of lucky events—the essay revisits the initial counterexamples to the literature's leading theories and argues that the Enriched Strokes Account properly handles all of them.