损失规避源于得失程数多于获得？——损失规避的得失程数变化视角的再检验

刘欢、梁竹苑 和 李纾（2009a）在证明损失规避的得失程数变化视角时所取的损益值取值范围、对安于现状偏差影响的控制以及所选取的得两程失一程和得三程失两程的决策对象这四个方面存在的缺陷。本研究通过弥补上述缺陷并设计无关变量得到更严格控制的得三程失两程的决策情景,对得失程数变化视角重新进行了检验。结果发现,寿命“得一程失一程”的属性并未导致损失规避消失;在广泛的损益值范围内以自由为对象的决策同样表现为损失规避;将自由感知为生而拥有和后天获得的人数大致相当;因而得失程数变化视角需作出重要修正,同时前景理论与情绪预测误差理论亦不可完全预测损失规避出现的条件。     

The Priority of “Liberty” or “Ping An ”: Two Different Cultural Value Priorities and Their Impacts

“Liberty” is a core, prior value of modern Western culture, and particularly of Anglo-American political and economic discourse. For more than a century, the US and other Western countries have been doing their utmost to promote the value of liberty around the world. However, different nations and cultures have different value priorities. Considering “liberty” as the essential, unassailable prior value is an Anglo-American cultural particularity without universal applicability. In China, “liberty” as a high value is a new idea imported from the West at the beginning of the modern era which never enjoyed a very important position in ancient China. Generally speaking, in Chinese culture, the value of “ping an,” with its connotations of peace, safety, equality, health, harmony, and tranquility, is obviously a prior value. Different value priorities have different impacts on culture. This paper tries to compare the American value priority of “liberty” with the Chinese value priority of “ping an,” while discussing their different historical backgrounds and cultural impacts. It argues that values and value priorities are neither absolute nor universal, but that they are rather historical, situational, and dynamic. Value priority in a society should be based on that society’s particular social reality and on the stage of development and the life requirements of its people, rather than on an outside imperative. In the era of globalization, different and even sometimes contradictory human values may actually mutually complement and counterbalance one another.     

Open Theism: An Answer to My Critics

Abstract :  Open theism is a version of historic free will theism which posits God as granting to human beings significant freedom to cooperate with or to resist the will of God for their lives. God's goal is to make possible relationships of mutual love between God and creatures and therefore set up a dynamic give and take situation in which God can even be said to risk failure to the degree permitted by the overall plan. A debate has broken out as to whether open theism goes too far in its revision. I myself see it as a mere adjustment to standard Arminian thinking on the point of understanding the divine foreknowledge. In this article, I argue that, despite a goodly number of objections, the position deserves to be viewed as a legitimate option for Christian theology, yea even for "evangelical" theology.     

Religion and Religions in Prisons: Observations from the United States and Europe

Despite manifest differences and internal variety, this article attempts to integrate the histories and present landscapes of religious practice in prison in the United States and in Western Europe. We identify, among incarcerated people in the United States, Italy, and Germany, discernible drifts toward religious pluralization, privatization, and individualization. Over the past half‐century, the administration of religion in prison has been loosened to allow for a wider variety of religious beliefs and practices. Meanwhile, as subsidized by outside volunteers, religion, especially of a socially “useful,” capitalism‐friendly sort, remains a cost‐effective means for prison administrators to efficiently subcontract their mandate to rehabilitate. Due to the decentralization and diversification of religion in contemporary prisons on both sides of the northern Atlantic, this article concludes by encouraging would‐be ethnographers of the prison interested in religion to venture beyond the expressly delineated religious space and into what we call “religious gray zones.”     

Our inalienable ability to sin: Peter Olivi’s rejection of asymmetrical freedom

From the time of Augustine to the late thirteenth century, leading Christian thinkers agreed that freedom requires the ability to make good choices, but not the ability to make bad ones. If freedom required the ability to sin, they reasoned, neither God nor the angels nor the blessed in heaven could be free. This essay examines the work of Peter Olivi, the first medieval philosopher known to reject the asymmetrical conception of freedom. Olivi argues that the ability to sin is essential to creaturely freedom and remains even in heaven. While Anselm is the nominal target of Olivi’s arguments on this topic, they form part of a wider critique directed even more at Aquinas and his followers. Olivi faults them for misunderstanding the nature of the created will and for failing to provide a foundation for a particular kind of moral responsibility: personal merit.     

Ethics, Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure

Universities can and have existed without academic freedom and academic tenure. But academic freedom is necessary for a university dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge in a democratic society. Both academic freedom and academic tenure are not only rights but also carry with them moral obligations. Furthermore academic tenure is the best defense of academic freedom that American universities have found. Academic tenure can be successfully defended from the many contemporary attacks to which it is being subjected only insofar as it is necessary to defend academic freedom, and only if all involved in the system of tenure observe the ethical requirements that the system demands.     

两个世界与历史理念--一种历史观念的考察

两个世界与理性自由的理念构成了古希腊时代以来西方哲学-文化的基本传统和基本精神。这一传统直到马克思哲学产生后才受到了实践批判的深刻挑战。本文对这一历史过程作了概括性考察,认为在两个世界的张力结构与理性自由的基本理念之间存在着深刻的内在关联。本文不同意把持续了数千年之久的这样一种精神传统仅仅批判为唯心主义的简单化做法,认为有必要深入考察这种传统在西方哲学-文化史上的基本意义。在本文看来,两个世界与理性自由的理念在历史的前进发展中不断发生着内容的更新与转换,但只有在马克思唯物史观的实践批判中才得到了彻底的革命性变革。     

Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: The Use and Abuse of Examples

The philosophical debate over the compatibility between causaldeterminism and moral responsibility relies heavily on ourreactions to examples. Although we believe that there is noalternative to this methodology in this area of philosophy, someexamples that feature prominently in the literature are positivelymisleading. In this vein, we criticize the use that incompatibilistsmake of the phenomenon of ``brainwashing,' as well as the Frankfurt-styleexamples favored by compatibilists. We provide an instance of thekind of thought experiment that is needed to genuinely test thehypothesis that moral accountability and causal determinism arecompatible.     

Is Europe, Along with its Bioethics, Still Christian? Or Already Post-Christian? Reflections on Traditional and Post-Enlightenment Christianities and Their Bioethics

This introduction explores the relationship between Europe andits Christianities. It analyses different diagnostic and evaluativeapproaches to Europe's Christian or post-Christian identity.These are grouped around the concepts of diverse traditional,and, on the other hand, post-Enlightenment Christianities. Whilethe first revolves around a liturgical and mystical accountof the church, a Christ-centred humanism, an emphasis on man'sfuture life, noetic theology and a foundationalist claim touniversal truth, the second endorses a moralization of the "Christianmessage," political implementation of "Christian goals," rationalism,a this-worldly humanism, and tolerance for religious diversity.Since even the concepts of "traditional" and "post-Enlightenment"Christianity turn out to be deeply ambiguous, the essay concludeswith exploring the different ways in which the Christianityof the Apostolic Church, the Enlightenment (along with the "Western"Christianities it shaped), and contemporary liberalism eachconceive of their respective endorsements of human freedom aseither normative, that is obligatory, value-laden, or contingent,and arbitrary. In each case, a different notion of "tradition"(as well as familial and church authority) is placed eitherin harmony or in opposition to such freedom. As a result ofthis conceptual analysis, the deeply fractured identity of Europe,as exemplified by the diverse bioethical positions adopted bythe authors in this issue, becomes visible.     

From active imagination to active life: at the roots of Jungian social activism

Our traditional Western worldview is often unconsciously based on a polarized, dichotomous perspective. However, many of Jung's ideas hint at a deep interrelation between opposites, such as inside and outside, which are, as the principle of synchronicity shows, rooted in a conceptualization of psyche and matter conceived as intertwined. Another pair of philosophical concepts, traditionally considered as opposites, needs further investigation: that between imagination and reality. If we are lucky in our daily practice as analysts, we can use imagination as a powerful tool to help people discover themselves as individuals and to get in deeper, more lively and responsible touch with reality. This paper explores the difference that Jung outlined between ‘active imagination’ and ‘passive fantasies’, and the transformative power of taking an active part in what imaginatively happens – he called it ‘active participation’ – rather than being passively overwhelmed by invasive fantasies. It is argued that it makes a great difference whether we become the actors and not just the spectators of our lives, and this is linked with the core of the individuation process in which, if individuals discover their particular place and meaning in the universe, they can live an ‘active life’, playing a heartfelt and responsible role in the collective world to which they belong. These ideas are at the heart of Jung's work, and they represent one of the roots of Jungian social activism.