Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.     

Authority and Legitimisation: the Intraecclesial Strategy of Archbishop Ieronymos of Athens

Abstract?

The election of Ieronymos as archbishop of Athens took place at a critical moment for the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG). On the one hand, the social credibility of religious bureaucracy was waning. On the other, a fundamentalist faction within the Synod was essentially questioning his authority. In order to confront these problems, Ieronymos found the necessary social and religious legitimisation via the partial democratisation of the administrative function of the OCG as well as the restoration of its relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople (the Ecumenical Patriarchate). The decoding of this intraecclesial strategy, starting from his election in February 2008 until October 2009, is the topic of the present article.     

Kierkegaard’s Analysis of Human Existence in Either/Or: There is No Choice Between Aesthetics and Ethics

Abstract

According to Alasdair MacIntyre, Kierkegaard fails to provide rational reasons to choose between an aesthetic lifestyle and an ethical lifestyle. This claim subsequently initiated a significant discussion that investigated whether one can rationally choose between ethics and aesthetics. I will be challenging both MacIntyre’s criticism and in large part the basis of the subsequent discussion by arguing that there is no choice between aesthetics and ethics at all. Specifically, I will be arguing that in Either/Or Kierkegaard demonstrates that the essence of human existence is the freedom to make choices. Given that the ethical is the existential reality of having to make choices, human existence is therefore necessarily ethical. This conclusion follows from my thesis that the essential difference between the aesthete and the ethicist in Either/Or is their opposing views on whether choices are necessary elements of experience.     

Interplay of Biomechanical Constraints and Kinematic Strategies in Selecting Arm Postures

In this study, the authors examined the interplay between biomechanics and control strategies in the resolution of excess degrees of freedom at the joint level. Seven participants made aimed arm movements from 30 starting points and several starting postures to targets. Final arm postures for movements to a target exhibited substantial joint angle variation. Through regression modeling and by comparing observed final arm postures with biomechanically plausible postures, the authors identified 3 kinematic strategies: (a) Maintain deviations from the average angle at the starting point to the joint's final posture; (b) make torso rotations that are a fixed proportion of shoulder rotations; and (c) adopt a characteristic combination of 4 wrist-positioning approaches. The results demonstrated that kinematic strategies can account for substantial variance in final arm postures, if one takes into account 2 types of individual differences—those that arise inevitably from biomechanical constraints and those that reflect choices in movement strategy.     

The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View

In this paper I propose and develop a social account of global autonomy. On this view, a person is autonomous simply to the extent to which it is difficult for others to subject her to their wills. I argue that many properties commonly thought necessary for autonomy are in fact properties that tend to increase an agent's immunity to such interpersonal subjection, and that the proposed account is therefore capable of providing theoretical unity to many of the otherwise heterogeneous requirements of autonomy familiar from recent discussions. Specifically, I discuss three such requirements: (i) possession of legally protected status, (ii) a sense of one's own self-worth, and (iii) a capacity for critical reflection. I argue that the proposed account is not only theoretically satisfying but also yields a rich and attractive conception of autonomy.     

萨特在人的发展问题上的"责任"困境

在萨特的人学理论中,“自由”无疑是一个最重要的范畴。存在就是自由,自由的绝对性使得它成为一切事物及其自身的根据。然而,为了保证人的发展的合理性,在高扬了自由之后,萨特力图在最后解决的却一直是“自由”与“责任”的统一,这样,萨特将自己陷于一个无从解脱的困境之中：由于绝对自由论的前提,他所倡导的对自己、对他人,乃至对世界的“责任”,最后却成了人们逃避责任的一种托辞。     

Collective Responsibility

The basic bearer of responsibility is individuals, because that isall there are – nothing else can literally be the bearer of fullresponsibility. Claims about group responsibility therefore needanalysis. This would be impossible if all actions must be understoodas ones that could be performed whether or not anyone else exists.Individuals often act by virtue of membership in certain groups;often such membership bears a causal role in our behavior, andsometimes people act deliberately in order to promote the prospectsof members of a given group. Nevertheless, it is rational to awardproportionally to individual contributions to those actions andindividual shares in the production of the consequences of thoseactions.     

“道德”探幽

道德既是人之为人的内在规定性,亦是人的自由存在方式,既是人对存在的反思性把握,亦是人的反思性存在方式。     

Autonomy,Sanity and Moral Theory

The concept of autonomy plays atleast two roles in moral theory. First, itprovides a source of constraints upon action:because I am autonomous you may not interferewith me, even for my own good. Second, itprovides a foundation for moral theory: humanautonomy has been thought by some to producemoral principles of a more general kind.This paper seeks to understand what autonomyis, and whether the autonomy of which we arecapable is able to serve these roles. We wouldnaturally hope for a concept of autonomy thatis value-neutral rather than value-laden. Thatis to say, we would want the judgement that Iam autonomous to depend wholly on, say,structural features of my psychology, and in noway to require us to make ethical judgements, orother value judgements. Being value-neutral isperhaps desirable in a concept of autonomyserving the first role, and plausiblyindispensible in one playing the second. Ishall argue, however, that value-neutral conceptionsof autonomy are impoverished and out of linewith our intuitions; set out and defendan explicitly value-laden conception ofautonomy; and explore the implications of such a view for theability of autonomy to play the rolesmentioned above.     

Freedom and Rationality as Predictors of Cross-National Happiness Patterns: The Role of Income as a Mediating Variable

Freedom and rationality have traditionally been viewed as essential ingredients to the 'pursuit of happiness'. Previous research has found that the way in which happiness is linked to freedom and other attributes of individualistic society is affected by the income level. This paper formulates a structural model of the linkage between political freedom, rationality, and happiness which takes explicit account of income as a mediating variable. Since income is hypothesized to be linked to the degree of freedom and rationality prevailing in a society, this approach permits to distinguish between direct and indirect linkages of happiness to freedom and rationality. Estimating the model with cross-national data yields the following key findings: (1) Happiness is positively related to freedom as well as to rationality at high freedom/rationality levels and negatively at low levels. (2) Whereas freedom affects happiness only indirectly (through its impact on income), rationality has both direct and indirect effects on happiness.