心理应激对大白鼠自由基损伤的影响

本研究将动物分为实验模型５天、１０天、２０天组及对照组,并检测各组动物上述组中的ＬＰＯ、ＳＯＤ、ＣＡＤ水平进行了分析;研究因噪音诱发的心理应激反应时大白鼠脑、肝、肺、心、肾组织自由基损伤情况及防御酶的活性变化;结果发现：在心理应激反应条件下,动物各组织的因自由基反应而使ＬＰＯ含量升高、防御酶ＳＯＤ、ＣＡＤ活性下降,表明：１．心理应激可以诱发动物体内产生大量的自由基,并对脑、肝、肺、心、肾组织产生影     

The mirror and the hammer: the politics of resacralization

The paper consists of the opening chapter of Andrew Samuels’ book The Political Psyche, published in 1993, together with a retrospective introduction. In the chapter, the author discussed the possibilities and limitations of applying depth psychological thinking to social and political problematics. He situates the attempt to make such applications within a wider movement to refresh and reform Western political endeavours. He terms this wider project ‘resacralization’. The author cautions against psychological reductionism and a simplistic approach to market‐based capitalism, calling for a transformation of the latter to the degree possible. He links sociopolitical criticism and psychological writings on numinous experience, thereby connecting the worlds of politics and depth psychology without losing their separate and unique qualities.     

The hand of God or the hand of Maradona? Believing in free will increases perceived intentionality of others’ behavior

The question of whether free will actually exists has been debated in philosophy for centuries. However, how belief in free will shapes the perception of our social environment still remains open. Here we investigate whether belief in free will affects how much intentionality we attribute to other people. Study 1a and 1b demonstrate a weak positive relation between the strength of belief in free will and the perceived intentionality of soccer players committing handball. This pattern even holds for behavior that is objectively not intentional (i.e., when the player touches the ball accidentally). Going one step further, in Study 2 we find a weak correlation between belief in free will and perceiving intentions in very abstract geometrical shapes. These findings suggest that whether individuals believe in free will or not changes the way they interpret others’ behavior, which may have important societal consequences.     

A replication of the response‐restriction preference assessment

We replicated the response‐restriction (RR) preference assessment and compared results in terms of preference hierarchies to those from free‐operant and multiple stimulus without replacement (MSWO) formats with six children with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). We also assessed social validity of each format with teachers and clinicians who work with children with ASDs. Complete hierarchies were produced in four of 18 assessments and with MSWO and RR formats only. Results of the social validity assessment varied across raters, with each preference assessment format receiving the highest rating from at least one rater. Results are discussed in terms of practical recommendations and relative to the preference assessment literature as a whole.     

Making sense of agency: Belief in free will as a unique and important construct

Belief in free will is the general belief that human behavior is free from internal and external constraints across situations for both self and others. In the last decade, scholars in social‐cognitive psychology and experimental philosophy have made progress in defining free will terms, exploring how laypersons think of free will, discovering related cognitive processes and biases, and examining the behavioral outcomes of believing in free will. The growing interest in this construct raises the need for a discussion of what is new about free will beliefs, and how this construct differs from and relates to other well‐known agency constructs in the literature. In this review, we integrate conceptual discussions and empirical findings in the existing literature to highlight the belief in free will as a separate and important construct, different from existing constructs in the literature, and capturing unique aspects of agency. We conclude by calling researchers to recognize these differences and to leverage the potential in the construct of the belief in free will as a predictor of cognition and behavior.     

“Local determination”, even if we could find it,does not challenge free will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn

Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will” (free will that requires indeterminism), he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, determinism is unlikely to be established by neuroscience in any form that should trouble compatibilists or libertarians—that is, anyone who thinks we might have free will. We conclude that, in principle, neuroscience will not be able undermine libertarian free will and explain why these conclusions support a coherent compatibilist notion of causal sourcehood.     

Pre-existence and universal salvation – the Origenian renaissance in early modern Cambridge

ABSTRACT

The Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen and the Chief of His Opinions, published anonymously in London in 1661, is the chief testimony of the renaissance of Origen in early modern Cambridge. Probably authored by George Rust, the later Bishop of Dromore in Ireland, it is the first defence of Origenism, and delineates a rational theology based upon the unshakable foundation of God’s first attribute, his goodness. Trespassing and falling away from God’s goodness, the souls forfeit their original ethereal bodies or ‘vehicles’ and come to inhabit lesser ones made of air and earth. Making responsible use of their freedom, however, they may climb up the ontological ladder again. Rust’s rational theodicy with its stress on God’s universal goodness and the pre-existent soul’s free will is a key document of the Cambridge Platonists’ deeply Origenian philosophy of religion.     

Living on a Slippery Slope

Our actions, individually and collectively, inevitably affect others, ourselves, and our institutions. They shape the people we become and the kind of world we inhabit. Sometimes those consequences are positive, a giant leap for moral humankind. Other times they are morally regressive. This propensity of current actions to shape the future is morally important. But slippery slope arguments are a poor way to capture it. That is not to say we can never develop cogent slippery slope arguments. Nonetheless, given their most common usage, it would be prudent to avoid them in moral and political debate. They are often fallacious and have often been used for ill. They are normally used to defend the moral status quo. Even when they are cogent, we can always find an alternate way to capture their insights. Finally, by accepting that the moral roads on which we travel are slippery, we become better able to successfully navigate them.     

REDUCTIONISM AND HOLISM,CHANCE AND SELECTION,MECHANISM AND MIND

Abstract. Despite its rich and deepening panoply of empirical support, evolutionary theory continues to generate widespread concern. Some of this concern can be attributed to misunderstandings of the original concept, some to unfamiliarity with its current trajectories, and some to strongly held fears that it strips the human of cherished attributes. In this essay I seek to deconstruct such misunderstandings, lift up current concepts of what evolution entails, and address some of the existential issues it generates.