康德宗教哲学对我们的启示

在这个演讲里,笔者试图从康德的哲学与宗教观里发现西方文化的心理镜像结构,并以此来参照对比中国文化的心灵结构,结合个人的经验对二者都有所论衡。     

Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions

I will argue that a desert-based justification for treating a person in a certain way is a justification that holds this treatment to be justified simply by what the person is like and what he or she has done, independent of (1) the fact that treating the person in this way will have good effects (or that treating people like him or her in this way will have such effects); (2) the fact that this treatment is called for by some (justified) institution or practice; or (3) the fact that the person could have avoided being subject to this treatment by choosing appropriately, and therefore cannot complain of it. I will explore the implications of this understanding of desert for the role of desert-based justifications of blame, punishment, and economic reward.     

Relationships between attachment behavior in the laboratory and the caretaking environment

How useful are observations of patterns of attachment behavior in a structured laboratory setting for making inferences about the quality of caretaking received by an infant in the home environment? To address this question a sample of 107 12-month-old infants who had participated in a longitudinal intervention project beginning before birth through 14 months of age were observed in a structured laboratory setting. Patterns of attachment behavior were compared to maternal caretaking variables observed in the home environment as well as to ratings of the quality of the infants' play. The results indicated that attachment behavior in the laboratory can be used to make inferences about the quality of caretaking in the home environment with confidence when a consistent and unambiguous pattern of either optimal or problematical attachment behavior is present, but not when the attachment behavior pattern is inconsistent or ambiguous.     

DARWINISM AND DETERMINISM

Abstract. Does Darwinism generally, and human sociobiology in particular, lead to an unwarranted (and possibly socially offensive) determinism? I argue that one must separate out different senses of determinism, and that once one has done this, a Darwinian approach to human nature can be seen to shed important light on our intuitions about free will, constraint, and control.     

FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM: A CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSION

Abstract. The problem of freedom of the will and determinism is one of the most intriguing and difficult in the whole area of philosophy. It constüutes a paradox. If we look at ourselves, at our ability to deliberate and make moral choices, it seems obvious that we are free. On the other hand, if we look at what we believe about causality (i.e., that every event and thing must have a cause), then it appears that we do not have free wills but are determined. Thus we seem to have inconsistent beliefs. In this paper I set forth and analyze the major contemporary arguments for free will and determinism as well as for compatibilism, the position that tries to combine insights from both theories. I end with a brief conclusion regarding my assessment of the status of the arguments.     

Developing positive social-emotional behaviors: a study of training and generalization effects

Four handicapped children were taught four positive social-emotional behaviors: smiling, sharing, positive physical contacting, and verbal complimenting, using instructions, modelling, and praise. Rates of these behaviors were shown to increase in four trained subjects using a within-subject multiple-baseline experimental design. The generality of the behavior change was investigated by integrating three untrained subjects with the trained subjects in a setting free of adult-imposed contingencies and through a series of follow-up observations. Three trained subjects evidenced collateral increases in the generalization setting on at least one other behavior when training in smiling was conducted. One trained subject showed generalization session increases for each behavior when training was conducted to increase that behavior. All three untrained subjects demonstrated increased rates of smiling and sharing when interventions were conducted to increase those behaviors with the trained subjects. There was no appreciable generalization of verbal complimenting by either the trained or the untrained subjects. Both trained and untrained subjects generally maintained their increased rates of smiling, sharing, and positive physical contacting across four weeks of follow-up observations.     

Precurrent contingencies: Behavior reinforced by altering reinforcement probability for other behavior

The present study explored the effects of a precurrent contingency in which one (precurrent) activity increased the reinforcement probability for another (current) activity. Four human subjects responded on a two-key computer mouse. Each right-key press was reinforced (points exchangeable for money) with .02 probability. In one condition (no precurrent contingency), pressing the left key had no scheduled consequence; in another condition (precurrent contingency), pressing the left key increased the reinforcement probability for right-key responding to .08 for 15 s. Initial exposure to the precurrent contingency resulted in acquisition of precurrent left-key responding for 3 subjects, but for the 4th subject a special contingency was required. Right-key responding occurred at a high stable rate across the conditions. Changeovers to left-key responding dropped to near zero when the precurrent contingency was absent and were maintained at enhanced levels when the precurrent contingency was present. Contacts with the left key consisted of short response runs. Right-key responses were more frequently emitted within 15 s of a left-key response when the precurrent contingency was present, an efficient adaptation to the contingency. Continued research on precurrent behavior may produce insights into complex phenomena such as autoclitics and self-control.     

Procurement time as a determinant of meal frequency and meal duration.

Foraging involves the expenditure of both time and effort in the acquisition of food; animals typically modify their meal patterns so as to reduce these expenditures or costs. The contribution of time, as compared with effort, to the overall cost perceived by an animal is not known. We investigated the effect of foraging time as a cost independent of effort by measuring the meal patterns of rats living in a laboratory foraging simulation in which they earned all their daily intake. They pressed a bar once to initiate an interval (procurement interval) leading to the presentation of a large cup of food from which they could eat a meal of any size. As the length of the interval increased from 1 s to 46 hr, meal frequency decreased regularly. Meal size increased in a compensatory fashion, and total daily intake was conserved through an interval of 23 hr. The changes in meal frequency occurred because of changes in the rat's latency to bar press after each meal. The functions relating meal frequency and size to the procurement interval were of the same shape as those seen when cost is the completion of a bar-press requirement, which entails the expenditure of both effort and time. When the bar-press requirement was increased to 10, meal frequency was reduced, but time and effort did not appear to simply add together in the rat's perception of cost. These data reveal that time is preceived to be a cost by rats foraging in this laboratory environment. These results suggest that the time parameters of foraging are different from those of consumption.     

Responsibility and Self-Expression

I present two different models of moral responsibility -- two different accounts of what we value in behavior for which the agent can legitimately be held morally responsible. On the first model, what we value is making a certain sort of difference to the world. On the second model, which I favor, we value a certain kind of self-expression. I argue that if one adopts the self-expression view, then one will be inclined to accept that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities.