Effects of handedness consistency and saccade execution on eyewitness memory in cued- and free-recall procedures*

Identifying characteristics that distinguish between people with relatively good versus poor episodic memory is an important goal of eyewitness-memory research, as is identifying activities that can improve people’s ability to retrieve episodic memories. Consistency of hand preference is a trait associated with the quality of people’s episodic memory and repetitive saccade execution is an activity known to improve people’s ability to retrieve episodic memories. These factors were examined in relation to cued and free recall of a staged criminal event. Individuals with inconsistent hand preference (versus consistent) remembered more on a cued-recall test and also freely recalled a larger amount of victim information. Repetitive saccade execution did not increase cued recall but did increase free recall of victim information. Theoretical implications are discussed, as is potential practical significance, with an emphasis on the size of the observed effects.     

Testing a modified cognitive interview with category clustering recall in Iran

The cognitive interview (CI) has been an effective method for interviewing eyewitnesses often leading to changes in legislation and practice in many countries. This study was the first to employ the CI in Iran and test whether category clustering recall (CCR) was superior to a free recall when incorporated within an investigative interview. A between‐subjects design assigned 66 participants to one of three interview conditions after they watched a mock robbery. The participants were interviewed 48 hr later using either a structured interview (SI), the CI, or a modified cognitive interview (MCI) that replaced free recall with CCR at the first retrieval attempt. Analysis of variance suggests CCR was more effective than free recall and the CI group recalled more information than the SI group, replicating the CI superiority effect. This has implications for law enforcement in Iran and worldwide by suggesting these techniques can be used to enhance recall.     

The weirdness of belief in free will

It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically universal. In this paper we look at the folk concept of free will and its critical assessment in the context of recent psychological research. Is there a widespread consensus about the conceptual content of free will? We compared English “free will” with its lexical equivalents in Lithuanian, Hindi, Chinese and Mongolian languages and found that unlike Lithuanian, Chinese, Hindi and Mongolian lexical expressions of “free will” do not refer to the same concept free will. What kind people have been studied so far? A review of papers indicate that, overall, 91% of participants in studies on belief in free will were WEIRD. Thus, given that free will has no cross-culturally universal conceptual content and that most of the reviewed studies were based on WEIRD samples, belief in free will is not a psychological universal.     

Spinoza on Lying and Suicide

Spinoza is often taken to claim that suicide is never a rational act, that a ‘free’ person acting by the guidance of reason will never terminate his/her own existence. Spinoza also defends the prima facie counterintuitive claim that the rational person will never act dishonestly. This second claim can, in fact, be justified when Spinoza's moral psychology and account of motivation are properly understood. Moreover, making sense of the free man's exception-less honesty in this way also helps to clarify how Spinoza should, and indeed does, recognize the possibility of rational suicide.     

Implicit attitudes and the social capacity for free will

In this paper I ask what implicit attitudes tell us about our freedom. I analyze the relation between the literature on implicit attitudes and an important subcategory of theories of free will—self-disclosure accounts. If one is committed to such a theory, I suggest one may have to move to a more social conceptualization of the capacity for freedom. I will work out this argument in five sections. In the first section, I discuss the specific theories of free will that are central to this paper. In the second section, I will show that implicit-bias research raises questions about people’s capacities to exercise (these specific understandings of) free will. In the third section, I will consider how an individual may overcome these failures and argue that the individual ability for self-regulation is significantly limited. One could stop here and conclude that free will is a limited capacity. But I argue that this conclusion would be too hastily drawn. I will instead continue to ask what would be required for free will. By discussing how failures of free will are due to social structures and may be therefore repaired by changing social structures in section 4, I will arrive at an alternative conclusion about the capacity for free will in section 5.     

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARENT‐CHILD PLAY SCALE FOR USE IN CHILDREN WITH FEEDING DISORDERS

The Parent‐Child Play Scale was developed as a scale that complements the Parent‐Child Feeding Scale, created by I. Chatoor et al. (1997), to evaluate mother–infant/toddler interactions in two different caregiving contexts of a young child's everyday life, specifically play and feeding. This Play Scale can be used with infants and toddlers ranging in age from 1 month to 3 years and provides reliable global ratings of mother–child interactions during 10 min of videotaped free‐play in a laboratory setting. The scale consists of 32 mother and infant/toddler interactive behaviors which are rated by trained observers from videotaped observations. Four subscales are derived: Dyadic Reciprocity, Maternal Unresponsiveness to Infant's/Toddler's Cues, Dyadic Conflict, and Maternal Intrusiveness. Construct validity and interrater and test‐retest reliability of the Play Scale have been demonstrated. This Play Scale discriminates between children with and without feeding disorders as well as between children with different subtypes of feeding disorders as defined by the Diagnostic Classification of Mental Health and Developmental Disorders of Infancy and Early Childhood, Revised (DC:0–3R) (Feeding Disorder of State Regulation, Feeding Disorder of Caregiver‐Infant Reciprocity, and Infantile Anorexia). It can be used for research or clinical practice in the diagnosis and treatment of early feeding problems, to assess the pervasiveness of mother–infant/toddler difficulties and to monitor changes following therapy.     

道德:自由意志的内在定在——黑格尔《法哲学原理》读书札记

道德是不同于外在法的内在法 ,自由意志在个人意志中的具体存在即为道德。道德不仅是主观精神 ,更是能行动的意志。     

信息时代的组织范式：内部市场

1990年以来 ,一种被誉为信息时代的组织范式 ,即所谓的自由企业范式 ,受到了学术界和企业界的很大重视。自由企业范式强调非集中化管理体制 ,灵活的组织内部关系 ,以及内部市场式的经营模式。本文描述了这种组织范式的理论基础及其应用原则 ,并对其在西方国家的应用及对我国的意义作了探讨。     

Logic Without Contraction as Based on Inclusion and Unrestricted Abstraction

On the one hand, the absence of contraction is a safeguard against the logical (property theoretic) paradoxes; but on the other hand, it also disables inductive and recursive definitions, in its most basic form the definition of the series of natural numbers, for instance. The reason for this is simply that the effectiveness of a recursion clause depends on its being available after application, something that is usually assured by contraction. This paper presents a way of overcoming this problem within the framework of a logic based on inclusion and unrestricted abstraction, without any form of extensionality. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Priestley Duality for Quasi-Stone Algebras

In this paper we describe the Priestley space of a quasi-Stone algebra and use it to show that the class of finite quasi-Stone algebras has the amalgamation property. We also describe the Priestley space of the free quasi-Stone algebra over a finite set. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.